Dangers of local defence in Afghanistan

The Afghan Analysts Network has produced an extensive and critical report, written by Mathieu Lefevre, on Local Defence in Afghanistan. The report examines the use of "informal armed groups" - the local militias financed by the Afghan government and US military, particularly in areas where the Taliban is gaining ground.
Lefevre examined the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police, which was launched in 2006 by the Ministry of Interior and closed down in 2008. He also looks at the Afghan Public Protection Programme (known as AP3) which was set up in Wardak with the support of US Special Forces.
The third force examined is the Local Defence Initiatives, which started last summer. As Lefevre comments: "According to policy documents, the overall aim of LDI is to ‘secure local communities’ by giving ‘responsibility and employment to village members’ so that they ‘no longer provide support for insurgents’ and ‘will not allow insurgents to live within their village’.
"In a part of Arghandab district in, Kandahar province, the program is at a more advanced stage: a group of ‘defenders’ selected from the community provides security and work closely with US Special Forces, while a large group of villagers receives incentives in the form of agricultural and cash-for-work projects. The program is funded by the US military."
Lefevre says that the relationship between government-backed armed groups and the Afghan National Security Forces is often problematic and that such programs may deter prospective candidates for the police and army. He also points out that it is difficult to avoid picking sides when working with local groups, which may have long-term consequences.
Where success is evident, this is usually due to a relationship with highly trained international forces working with these government militias and is unlikely to survive for long without them. However, Lefevre recognises that the LDIs are not going to go away and that they now represent a model for reintegrating former Taliban insurgents. And bound up within this debate is a wider discussion about whether or not the Taliban can be militarily defeated and whether Coalition forces are "fighting to win" or simply gearing themselves towards an exit from the conflict.
If you want to know what these local militias look like close up then I suggest you read One Tribe at a Time by Major Jim Gant, about whom I have written before. You can read about him here.
One final point: apologies for my absence for the last few weeks, caused by a combination of a home move and a very inefficient ISP.

Afghanistan - the view from Moscow

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has produced an interesting report setting out how Afghanistan is perceived in Moscow. Afghanistan: A view from Moscow, written by Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko (both of whom work for Carnegie's Moscow Center), notes that "Russia is entwined in a complex web of relationships with the Afghan parties, neighbouring states and the West."
The Soviet Union lost 14,300 soldiers in Afghanistan and the war remains deeply traumatic within Russian society. It invaded Afghanistan when it was at the height of its power and left as a broken and mangled empire, on the brink of collapse.
While initially there appears to have been an element of schadenfreude in the Kremlin as they witnessed America and its allies being drawn into a more and more complex war, that feeling has since given way to one of concern about the implications of Western forces being defeated.
Russia knows very well that the situation in Central Asia is potentially dangerous. Already there are or have been insurrections in Chechnya, Daghestan, Tajikistan and parts of Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is also unstable.
The authors are critical of US plans to disengage from Afghanistan by the end of Barack Obama's term of office, saying that 'cutting and running' is not a good option. They argue that "Military operations need to mellow the Taliban just enough to separate and isolate the hard-line jihadists - to be further pursued and destroyed - from those whose interests are focused on power distribution within Afghanistan". They add:
"The main effort in Afghanistan should be trying to bring the Afghan government and the opposition together to discuss the terms of a new national settlement."
They add that the US should increase its relations with non-NATO partners, such as Pakistan, China and even Iran.

Relentless increase in "enemy-initiated attacks"

Some interesting figures in the latest GAO report on the security situation in Afghanistan, which shows that the level of "enemy-initiated attacks" has risen every year since 2005. The increase in the last year has been exceptionally high: between September 2009 and March 2010, the number of attacks increased by about 83 per cent compared to the same period last year. Attacks against civilians rose by 72 per cent.
Overall, more than 21,000 enemy-initiated attacks were recorded in 2009 - an increase of 75 per cent over 2008. The US military expects attacks to continue to rise in number throughout the coming summer.
The level of violence in Afghanistan is having a serious effect on reconstruction and development. The GAO report quotes a UN document that reports "limits on accessibility of development programme activities" in 94 districts considered very high risk and 81 districts considered high risk.
For example, by destroying generators at the Kandahar Industrial Park in August 2009, the Taliban halted economic development for the project. Almost a year later the generators have still not been replaced. And USAID reports that a $40m literacy programme has been severely disrupted because the villages taking part are no longer safe enough to visit.
With 84,000 US military personnel (due to rise to 98,000 very shortly) in Afghanistan, plus 40,000 Coalition troops and 113,000 soldiers from the Afghan National Army, the forces lined up against the Taliban are now greater than ever before.
US civilian numbers have also increased - up by 200 since December - with many of these extra staff earmarked to work in around 50 postings outside Kabul. Can't see that happening for a while.

Pakistan Taliban's claim for Times Square carbomb

(The blank space you are looking at above is due to the fact that YouTube has stupidly decided to censor Qari Hussein's video. I have kept the rest of the article as it was, including his spoken words, which I copied from the video. If anyone finds a copy of the video posted somewhere else, please let me know and I will endeavour to post it here. Presumably the two videos below may be taken offline soon, so make copies if you need them for reference - Editor, Wed 5 May.)

This is the video in which Qari Hussain Mahsud, the Pakistan Taliban leader and trainer of their suicide bombers, takes responsibility for the crude car bomb left in Times Square, New York. Still not clear if this is a genuine or opportunistic claim. Below is a translation of the words spoken by Qari Hussein:

"We, Tehreek-e-Taliban with all the pride and bravery, accept the responsibility for the recent attack on Times Square, New York, USA. We also congratulate the Muslim Ummah with all the pleasure and happiness. This attack is revenge for the great and valuable martyred leaders of Mujahideen, ie Baitullah Mahsud Shaheed (and) the Arab Mujahideen's leaders, especially Abu Umer al-Baghdadi Shaheed's companions in Iraq.
This is also a revenge for the global American interference and terrorism in Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan for Lal Masjid operation, the recent rain of drone attacks in the tribal areas and the abduction, torture and humiliation of our most respected and innocent sister, Dr Aafia Siddiqui. We furiously warn the member countries of NATO, their governments and common public to oppose the evil US policies and sincerely apologize for the massacres in Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal areas. Otherwise we prepared for the worst ever destruction and devastation in their regions, Inshallah."

Also of interest is this video, posted on 2 May, of Hakimullah Mahsud, proving conclusively that he is very much alive and well, even if he is no longer emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban. He says in the video that it was recorded on 2 April. In the video he says that attacks are being planned on America.


And this one, which is Hakimullah's voice, along with graphics and stills, is dated 19th April. In it Hakimullah says that American towns and cities are now on the Pakistan Taliban's target list.
It's hardly surprising that Pakistan's ISI intelligence service last week admitted that Hakimullah was still alive. They must have already seen copies of these videos.

Divergent strategy of al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies

Anne Stenersen, a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, has published an excellent study of the relationship between al-Qaeda and the various Taliban factions. Al-Qaeda's Allies, published by the New America Foundation, points out that al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura of the Taliban have diverged strategically since 2001, largely due to the former's relocation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
While the Quetta Shura has continued to fight US and Allied troops in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has become involved in internal Pakistani politics and has supported the campaign by militants there aimed at overthrowing the Pakistani state.
Stennersen notes: "Formally, al-Qaeda's leaders have sworn an oath of allegiance (bay'a) to Mullah Omar." But, she says: "In practice the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura is not necessarily one of command and control. Rather, it is a political relationship, where al-Qaeda has agreed not to establish a competing organisation to that of Mullah Omar's."
al-Qaeda fighters still take part in actions in Afghanistan, but these tend to be very localised and largely confined to the southeastern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Stennersen has analysed the 90 or so films released by the As-Sahab media house - al-Qaeda's official propaganda arm - in the series Pyre for the Americans in the Land of Khurasan.
This series first appeared in 2005. In 2006 38 films appeared, with production dropping off over the next few years until only three were produced in 2009. An analysis of where the films were shot showed that 44 were filmed in Khost and neighbouring Paktika, 12 were filmed in Kunar and 8 in Zabul. The significance is that Khost and Paktika are just over the border from the main al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Waziristan and Bajaur.
As Stennersen says, "It suggests that al-Qaeda has established few bases deep inside Afghan territory itself and that cross-border raids seem to be the preferred type of activity. Moreover, there is a disproportionate number of films from southeastern Afghanistan, given the high level of insurgency-related violence in this area."
The report examines the relationship of al-Qaeda with the Baitullah Mahsud group and other militants in FATA, as well as shedding light on the other foreign fighters who use FATA as a sanctuary, including the Uzbeks and Chechens.
Stennersen concludes: "In future al-Qaeda's alliances with local militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan may develop in one of two ways. The al-Qaeda militants could dissolve into the local militant environment and adapt to the agenda of local groups...If such a development takes place, al-Qaeda would gradually become irrelevant as an international terrorist organisation.
"Alternatively, and of more concern, al-Qaeda could succeed in inserting its ideology into the local militant environment. al-Qaeda's alliance with the late Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP may be seen as a development in this direction...If this development continues, it will make the Afghanistan-Pakistan region a hub for anti-American Islamist militancy for years to come."

Former ISI officer murdered by captors

Former ISI officer Khalid Khwaja, kidnapped several weeks ago, along with Col. Imam - another former ISI officer - and British journalist Asad Qureshi, has been found dead, dumped alongside the Miramshah-Mirali road in North Waziristan. A note attached to his bullet-riddled body claimed responsibility for the killing in the name of the Asian Tigers - a previously unknown group thought to be members of the Punjabi Taliban.
The group had initially asked for the freedom of a number of Afghan Taliban leaders imprisoned in Pakistan plus a $10m ransom for Qureshi. After the Afghan Taliban repudiated them and mocked them for hiding behind a made-up name, they changed their demands, instead seeking the release of various Punjabi militants from prison.
In the end, religion or politics played little part in this tacky story. This was never much more than a criminal kidnapping aimed at making money. When no-one responded to the cowardly kidnappers' demands, they cynically murdered one of their hostages.
Update: More on the background to Khwaja's killing, suggesting that the Asian Tigers are a group of militants expelled from the Pakistan Taliban and TTP, can be found in this useful article in The News, written by Mushtaq Yusufzai.

Pentagon's downbeat security report to Congress

Every 180 days the Pentagon has to submit a report to the US Congress covering progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan. The latest report, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, covering the period 1 Oct 2009 to 31 Mar 2010, can be found here.
The report states: "The continuing decline in stability in Afghanistan, described in the last report, has leveled off in many areas over the last three months of this reporting period. While the overall trend of violence throughout the country increased over the same period a year ago, much of this can be ascribed to increased International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) activity. Polls consistently illustrate that Afghans see security as improved from a year ago. At the same time violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year – an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010."
So it's a mixed message. Afghans apparently say security is better than it was, but violence is definitely up.
ISAF divides Afghanistan into districts, of which it identifies 80 as being 'Key Terrain' districts - defined as areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them. They are areas where most of the population lives and which contain centres of economic productivity, infrastructure and commerce routes. These districts largely follow the national 'ring road' that links Kabul, Kandahar and Herat.
In addition, ISAF identifies 41 'Area of Interest' districts, defined as areas that exert influence on the Key Terrain districts.
It is these 121 districts that are the focus of most of the ISAF and Afghan military activity, although these forces can only operate in 48 districts in total.
The report notes that the population sympathises with or supports the Afghan government in only 29 out of 121 Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts - just 24 per cent, which is perhaps the most significant figure in this report.
The report also shows that the Taliban are no slouches when it comes to reassessing their military strategy. Taliban commanders responded to the US troop surge by ordering their fighters to avoid head-on clashes with US-led forces and instead stepping up their use of roadside bombs or IEDs:
"This reporting period has seen insurgent combatants adhere closely to their leaders' intent with a 236 percent increase in IEDs noted across the country and a marked increase in stand-off tactics compared to the same period last year".
The report also raises questions about the effectiveness of the Marjah offensive, saying the Afghan government has been slow to bring in the local administrators and development projects critical to winning over local people.
"The insurgents' tactic of re-infiltrating the cleared areas to perform executions has played a role in dissuading locals from siding with the Afghan government, which has complicated efforts to introduce effective governance," says the report.
It notes that the Taliban's "operational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding", adding that the "strength and ability of (insurgent-run) shadow governance to discredit the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan government is increasing."

Hakimullah lives - Pakistani intel officials

Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rahman

The Guardian and the BBC are both reporting this morning that Hakimullah Mahsud, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader thought to have been killed by a US missile on 14 January this year, is still alive.
According to Declan Walsh of The Guardian, a senior Pakistani intelligence official confirmed the news and said: "He had some wounds but he is basically OK." The BBC confirms the story but says that his standing within the TTP has been diminished and that other leaders, including Waliur Rahman, are now playing a more prominent role.
The news, if true, will be a blow to the US, who blame him for his role in a suicide bomb attack on a CIA base in Eastern Afghanistan in December last year that killed seven CIA officers. Hakimullah's reported death only two weeks later in a drone missile strike in the Shaktoi area of South Waziristan was seen as an eloquent response. However, even though Hakimullah's death was confirmed by Pakistan's interior minister, Rehman Malik, it was never confirmed by the Americans. Nor did an obituary appear in the jihadi media, as is usual on such occasions.
Update: Today, at the Pentagon in Washington, the following exchange took place between a reporter and Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell:
"Q In light of the reports today that Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader, is actually, in fact, alive, after U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials had declared him dead after the drone strike, are there any concerns in this building about the quality of intelligence that we're receiving in that part of the world?

MR. MORRELL: I mean, frankly, I've seen those reports. I don't know how much stock people put in them. I think we've always been very careful from -- from this podium in particular about talking about individuals and their fate.

The only thing I would add to that -- I don't know -- I can't tell you definitively one way or another. Part of that is I don't think we ever officially commented on any of these.

But I can also tell you that I certainly have seen no evidence that the person you speak of is -- is operational today or is executing or exerting authority over the Pakistan Taliban as he once did. So I don't know if that reflects him being alive or dead, but he clearly is not running the Pakistani Taliban anymore."

Doubts raised about Taliban reintegration plans

A new report by Matt Waldman of the Afghan Analysts Network offers a gloomy assessment of plans to reintegrate Taliban fighters back into society.
Golden Surrender explores the possibilities of implementing plans outlined at the London Conference in February to pay Taliban fighters to give up their struggle, an idea based on the idea that most fighters do so because they have little economic choice.
As Waldman notes, the risks are high: "A well-executed reintegration scheme could have positive social, economic, and stabilisation benefits – and thus reduce the force of the insurgency – but if mishandled, it could do the reverse. Without intelligent design, effective delivery, and political resolve it has the potential to exacerbate local security conditions, undermine high‐level talks, and even increase insurgent recruitment. It could also distract policy‐makers from action to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Reintegration addresses the symptoms of the disease, and not the disease itself."
He notes the very limited success of previous programmes such as the Strengthening Peace Programme, the 2003-6 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process implemented through the Afghan New Beginnings Program and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program, none of which have had much impact on reducing Taliban recruitment - now standing at around 36,000 active fighters.
The views contained in Waldman's paper have been well researched. It is based on "more than 50 in-depth interviews, mainly in or near Kabul and Kandahar, with officials, diplomats, politicians, analysts, civil society representatives, community, tribal, and religious leaders, 10 former senior Taliban officials (six former ministers and two ambassadors), seven insurgent field commanders (operating in Kandahar, Wardak, Ghazni, and Khost provinces), and one senior Taliban intermediary."
Many of the Taliban commanders interviewed, while open to the idea of peace negotiations, say that their fighters are not simply fighting for money and will not be tempted to give up for money.
As Waldman say, the reasons they fight are myriad: "In the briefest terms, some of these are tribal, community, and group exclusion or disempowerment; leverage in local rivalries, feuds, and conflicts; government predation, impunity, or corruption; criminality, disorder, and the perversion of justice; civilian casualties and abusive raids or detentions; resistance to perceived western occupation or suppression of Islam; the hedging of bets; and as a reaction to threats, intimidation, or coercion."
He quotes one Taliban commander in Kandahar: "if we were fighting for money we would try to find work. At the moment our country is invaded, there is no true sharia, there is crime and corruption. Can we accept these for money? How then could I call myself a Muslim and an Afghan?"
The report is not entirely negative and indeed, Waldman points out that the details of the latest reintegration programme have not yet been announced. But he is right to be cautious: "Perhaps the greatest risk is that the programme distracts policy‐makers from addressing the root causes of the conflict, especially predatory, exclusionary politics, and the abuse of power. This would be treating the symptoms while ignoring the cancer."

The chequered past of Khalid Khwaja

The family of Khalid Khwaja, the former Pakistan Air Force and ISI officer recently kidnapped in Waziristan, along with pro-Taliban Col. Imam and British documentary maker Asad Qureshi, now says that he has been captured by the Punjabi Taliban.
Despite earlier claims that the men were in Waziristan at the invitation of the leadership of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in order to make a film highlighting the 'atrocities' being committed by the Pakistan Army and US drones on the people of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khwaja's family now says that the man who called and made demands from the captors identified himself as Usman Punjabi.
Usman Punjabi was known to both Khwaja and Imam. Both men made a trip to FATA about a month ago and when their guide refused to accompany them on this second trip, citing security concerns, Usman Punjabi sent a guide for them.
Despite his devotion to the cause of jihad, Khwaja could now be in difficulties. On a previous trip to Waziristan Khwaja is said to have conveyed a list of Punjabi Taliban leaders who were hiding in Waziristan to former TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud on behalf of the ISI. The ISI wanted Mahsud to hand them over.
And then, on his trip a month ago, some militants believed that Khwaja had supplied information to the Pakistani authorities that led to a missile strike that nearly killed TTP leader Waliur Rahman.
While Col. Imam has a long record of mentoring Afghan Taliban leaders and training guerrillas who fought against the Soviets, Khwaja has a much more chequered past. A former pilot, he spent only two years in the ISI before he was dismissed from his post on the Afghan desk in 1987 after writing a letter to General Zia ul-Haq saying he was a hypocrite for not imposing Islamic law in Pakistan.
"I went to Afghanistan and fought side-by-side with the Afghan mujahideen against Soviet troops. There I developed a friendship with Dr Abdullah Azzam [a mentor of bin Laden], Osama bin Laden and Sheikh Abdul Majeed Zindani [another mentor of bin Laden's]. At the same time, I was still in touch with my former organization, the ISI, and its then director general, retired Lieutenant General Hamid Gul", he told Asia Times Online in 2005.
Khwaja says that after Zia's death in 1988 he tried, along with Gul, to prevent Benazir Bhutto from coming to power. He claims that he provided millions of dollars from Osama bin Laden to Nawaz Sharif and that Sharif met bin Laden five times:
"The most historic was the meeting in the Green Palace Hotel in Medina between Nawaz Sharif, Osama and myself", Khwaja told Asia Times Online. "Osama asked Nawaz to devote himself to "jihad in Kashmir". Nawaz immediately said, "I love jihad." Osama smiled, and then stood up from his chair and went to a nearby pillar and said. "Yes, you may love jihad, but your love for jihad is this much." He then pointed to a small portion of the pillar. "Your love for children is this much," he said, pointing to a larger portion of the pillar. "And your love for your parents is this much," he continued, pointing towards the largest portion. "I agree that you love jihad, but this love is the smallest in proportion to your other affections in life."
These sorts of arguments were beyond Nawaz Sharif's comprehension and he kept asking me. "Manya key nai manya?" [Agreed or not?] He was looking for a Rs500 million [US$8.4 million at today's rate] grant from Osama. Though Osama gave a comparatively smaller amount, the landmark thing he secured for Nawaz Sharif was a meeting with the [Saudi] royal family, which gave Nawaz Sharif a lot of political support, and it remained till he was dislodged [as premier] by General Pervez Musharraf [in a coup in 1999]. Saudi Arabia arranged for his release and his safe exit to Saudi Arabia."
Khwaja says that in the late 1990s he acted as a go-between for the Americans and the Afghan Taliban as the former tried to arrange for bin Laden to be extradited from Afghanistan. However, some reports say that he also acted as a pilot for bin Laden, who he claims to have met "hundreds" of times.
After 9/11, Khwaja came to public notice again when he was arrested in connection with the disappearance of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Khwaja, who exchanged emails with Pearl, had close connections with Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, the religious leader Pearl was trying to interview when he disappeared in Karachi early in 2002. He was released without charge.
Little was heard of Khwaja again until 2007, when he was arrested outside the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad and charged with distributing 'hate' (ie anti-Shia) material. His arrest and subsequent detention for six months under the Maintenance of Public Order 1960 Law may have been connected with his campaigning for the release of dozens of militants who had 'disappeared' into ISI custody. Khwaja was close to the extremists who ran the mosque and it is also here that another event may have occurred that upset the Punjabi Taliban.
Two days ago a caller saying he was from the Punjabi Taliban told The News that Khwaja and his wife had played a negative role during the Lal Masjid crisis and instigated the mosque's leader, Maulana Abdur Rasheed Ghazi, to confront the government. And it gets worse:
“It was Khalid Khwaja and his wife who forced Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi to wear burqa to escape before the military operation was launched on Lal Masjid,” he claimed. “The group may release Col Imam and journalist Assad, but may not set free Khalid Khwaja for his dubious role,” he explained."
Khwaja's wife, in response, told The News that the claims were false: “You know wife and children of Maulana Ghazi stayed for over a month with us in our home. We had heard this allegation before and then one of Abdul Aziz Ghazi’s sisters asked her brother about this burqa issue. Ghazi said nobody had advised him but it was his own decision to wear a burqa and escape,” she said.
Oh dear. Now, now boys.
Having apparently qualified as a lawyer and started his Defence of Human Rights organisation - which only defends people allegedly under attack from the West - Khwaja has now become very active in the courts as a litigant.
In December 2009 he filed a petition seeking an end to the President's immunity under the Constitution. A week later he filed a petition seeking access to the six American nationals arrested in Sargodha and attempting to prevent their extradition. He told the court the six men had arrived in the counry to wage 'jihad' and that this was not a crime under any law.
In February he filed another petition against the arrest of five Afghan Taliban leaders, saying they should not be deported and that they should be produced before a court.
He also filed a petition challenging US drone attacks on Pakistani territory and urging the government to produce a report on the agreement with America and Blackwater on the use of drones in Pakistan. He sought directions from the government to get an FIR registered against US President Barack Obama for authorising the drone attacks.
The fact that the Afghan Taliban were not involved in Khwaja's kidnap was confirmed yesterday when their official spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid told The News they had nothing to do with the 'Asian Tigers': “If this is really a true jihadi organisation why didn’t it come with its original name,” he said, adding that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was completely ignorant about the group and its whereabouts.
Another senior Afghan Taliban commander also expressed his surprise over the kidnaps. “If we have publicly announced our fight against the major world powers in Afghanistan, then why we would keep our names secret while demanding release of our two leaders?” he commented.
While Col Imam is highly respected amongst the Afghan Taliban and other jihadi leaders, Khwaja seems to have made enemies. Whether they and Asad Qureshi are in the hands of the Punjabi Taliban or one of the criminal gangs that infest FATA and overlap in many cases with the jihadis, is still not entirely clear, although this now appears to be very likely. If so, prospects for Khwaja at least are not very good.

The Karzai family strengthens its grip on Kandahar

The fifth of the impressive Afghanistan Reports from the Institute for the Study of War, released today, argues that the influence of the President Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, over the city of Kandahar, "is the central obstacle to any of ISAF’s governance objectives, and a consistent policy for dealing with him must be a central element of any new strategy".
Like two previous reports in this series, Politics and Power in Kandahar is written by Carl Forsberg, who argues that a strong, personality-driven political order is emerging in Afghanistan that undermines ISAF's goals.
Strong factors in this new political order include the declining influence of the tribes and the rise of the Karzai family. Control over guns, money and foreign support have now become important sources of power.
Forsberg says that Ahmed Wali Karzai and several of his close relatives are at the centre of a number of commercial and military networks that give him considerable influence over business life in Kandahar. His control over firms like Watan Risk Management and Asia Security Group allow him to enforce his political will and to give himself shadow ownership of the government of Kandahar.
Former Kandahar governor Gul Agha Sherzai runs a rival commercial network to Karzai and this is the main reason, says Forsberg, that he was removed from power in the city and transferred to Nangahar province by President Karzai in 2005.
All of this has consequences for ISAF because the local population sees the provincial goverment as "an exclusive oligarchy devoted to its own enrichment and closely tied to the international coalition". The Taliban are able to exploit this sentiment, with many local powerbrokers who are excluded from Ahmed Wali Karzai's circle only too willing to back the insurgency.
The problems in Kandahar are well known and there have been several attempts to remove Karzai from city, but these have been blocked by the President - causing deep frustration in Washington and London. As Forsberg notes: "In 2007 US Ambassador Ronald Neumann suggested to no avail that the president give his brother an ambassadorial post abroad in response to renewed allegations of Ahmed Wali’s involvement in the drug trade. This was repeated in November 2009, when Ambassador Eikenberry reportedly demanded that President Karzai remove Ahmed Wali Karzai from Kandahar, and again in the spring of 2010, only for the president to continue to refuse his brother’s removal. In a press interview in December 2009, President Karzai noted that it would be an abuse of his powers and a violation of the constitution for him to remove Ahmed Wali Karzai from his position as elected head of the Kandahar provincial council."
Whether or not Karzai junior is removed from Kandahar, Forsberg says ISAF can mitigate some of the worst effects of his presence by such measures as disarming private militias, reforming the way it lets contracts and doing more to build a professional administration in the province. None of these, sadly, will be easy.

US contractor criticised for poor expenses records

Dyncorp International, the private US contractor that trains the Afghan police force, has failed to document millions of dollars in expenses and other costs, according to a US government audit report released last week by a US Senate subcommittee.
The November 2009 audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency uncovered serious deficiencies in how DynCorp International tracks payroll, bills from subcontractors, cost vouchers and millions of dollars in labour costs. Many of DynCorp's billing and financial controls, the report found, were inadequate. In fact, all six systems audited were found to be inadequate or inadequate in part.
The heavily redacted audit report identifies ten significant deficiences, including inadequate employee training compliant with company ethics program requirements, inadequate delineation of authority, inadequate written procedures for adjusting costs, etc, etc. Presumably Dyncorp is not out of pocket. The company's contract was due to end in January but has been extended to the end of the year, pending an open competition for a new contractor.

Curious case of kidnap in Waziristan

Curious developments in the case of British journalist Asad Qureshi and the two former ISI officers, all of whom disappeared recently in Waziristan (see below) while on their way to film Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Waliur Rahman.
Yesterday Geo TV received a video that claims all three men have been kidnapped by a group that calls itself the 'Asian Tigers'. Besides the video, Geo TV also received an email demanding the release of several senior Afghan Taliban leaders, at least two of whom were recently arrested by Pakistani security forces. They included Mullah Barodar, Mullah Mansoor Dadullah and Maulavi Abdul Kabir.
The Asian Tigers' email (written in English) says: “Khalid Khwaja and Col Imam in Taliban custody. Both ISI persons are enemy of Islam and Muslims. We demand released all Taliban leaders, Mullah Brother (Baradar), Mullah Mansoor Dadullah and Mullah Kabir. We will send list of other mujahideen within a few days. Ten days time, if government not released mujahideen, then we will kill ISI officers or other decision.”
They have also asked for a $10 million ransom for Qureshi, although this is not mentioned in the email.
The video shows Colonel Imam (real name Sultan Amir Tarar) and Squadron Leader (retd) Khalid Khwaja making statements. Col Imam can be heard saying that his real name is Sultan Amir Tarar and that he served in the Pakistan Army for 18 years, 11 of them in the ISI.
“I had consulted with Gen Aslam Beg (former army chief) about coming here,” Col Imam says.
Khalid Khwaja says he served in the Pakistan Air Force for 18 years and in the ISI for two years. “I came here on the prodding of Gen Hameed Gul, Gen Aslam Beg and ISI’s Col Sajjad,” Khwaja says.
Clearly something is not right here. First, the name Asian Tigers is a joke. No jihadi organisation would give themselves a name that sounds more like a Los Angeles street gang.
Second, there is a lot of tension between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban so it is unlikely that the former would approve of a kidnap operation in Pakistan aimed at freeing its leaders, particularly if it was to be carried out by the TTP on its behalf.
Third, Col Imam practically gave birth to the Taliban and he knows all of its leaders personally. The Afghan Taliban would not kill him and it is unlikely that TTP leader Waliur Rahman would be foolish enough to do so. Khwaja was responsible for initiating the court action that prevented Mullah Barodar from being extradited to Afghanistan several weeks ago.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that this is something else. In fact it stinks of the ISI, particularly the die-hard faction that continues to support the TTP. The fact that the names of former Generals Hameed Gul and Aslam Beg have been mentioned only strengthen this conviction. Both men are long-term supporters of violent jihad and both have shown support for al-Qaeda in the past. Perhaps they fear that Pakistan will hand over its Afghan Taliban prisoners to Afghanistan? Either way, it is likely that Col Imam and Khwaja are willing accomplices and that Asad Qureshi is possibly the only victim in this mess.

Violent incidents spike in Pakistan - PIPS

Casualties due to conflict in Pakistan (see tables above and below) showed a sharp spike last month, according to figures published by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, confirming that it remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world. The number of deaths due to violent conflict rose from 692 in February to 1002 in March, with similar rises for the number of people injured and the overall number of attacks.
The regional breakdown shows that Punjab suffered particularly badly, mainly due to casualties resulting from several devastating suicide bombings.

According to PIPS, the relative increase in the overall number of attacks is due to a higher number of terrorist/insurgents attacks reported in this month. They say: "The steep rise in the death casualties is due to large number of militants killed in the operational (304 killed) and their clashes with the security forces (177 killed); while the increase in the number of injuries is due to nine suicide attacks reported in this month in which a large number of civilians were injured."

Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani

Words from Sirajuddin Haqqani, commander of Afghan Taliban forces in Paktia, Khost and Paktika, are rare, so it is worth taking a look at an interview he has given to the pro-jihadi al-Balagh Media Centre. The interview, released on 13 April and now translated into English, reveals little of interest, although it is significant to see the extent to which Haqqani emphasises the importance of propaganda:
"The Internet Jihadists need to raise their level and organize themselves more, and come together, and increase their research, and publish their materials. They also need to be up to date, and they need to be fast with spreading the news from Islamic Jihadist world quickly, and release the messages from the commanders of Jihad. The goal is for their work to be something with a strong exclusive presence, they need to make the other (non-Jihadist) media agencies be asking for them, and not us asking for them. The Mujahideen need to help them, and the Jihadist movements need to increase their distributing of Jihadist material (statements, interviews etc...), and most importantly the official video releases. In addition, the general Muslim people need to help them financially, technically and by all other means. Internet Jihad networks are something we need to be proud of, and respect, the fact is that they are doing a great job."
The intereview was conducted by Fadil Abu Dujanah San'aani, who is probably a Yemeni. Haqqani emphasises in his interview that Arab fighters are welcome to fight with his forces against NATO. "They lighten our paths and resist the cross-worshipers in cooperation with us and we are with them in the same trench," he says.