The Haqqani network - the fountainhead of jihad

A new report from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point on the Haqqani Network - The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida - argues that this family-based jihadi network both protected and shaped al-Qaeda from its earliest days and allowed bin Laden's organisation to aspire towards global jihad.
While carefully avoiding any direct association with international terror organisations, the Haqqani Network has been unwilling to disengage from al-Qaeda and has aided its growth onto the world arena. "By shedding new light on the history of al-Qa’ida, this report also tells us that al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network, and not the Quetta Shura Taliban, became the United States’ primary enemies on 11 September 2001," say authors Don Rassler and Vahid Brown.
To date, the history of al-Qaeda has been understood in terms of the its outgrowth from the Maktab al-Kidamat organisation in Peshawar under the auspices of Abdullah Azzam. This approach, say the authors, fails to take into account the important connections between al-Qaeda's leaders and the Haqqani clan. "The scholarly and policy community have misapprehended the precise local context for the development of global jihadism - a context to be found in the Haqqanis' Paktia and not Azzam's Peshawar - and have underestimated the Haqqani network's critical role in sustaining cycles of violence far beyond its region of overt influence."
They argue that the ties between the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda have remained just as close since 9/11 under Sirajuddin Haqqani's command as they were prior to that when under the control of his father, Jalauddin. Sirajuddin continues to play an important role as a mediator - between the Pakistani ISI and the various factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, between the TTP and local Shias in Kurram and even between the Iranian state and al-Qaeda. In this latter case it is suggested that in 2010 he helped to secure the release of a top Iranian diplomat in exchange for several al-Qaeda commanders, including Saif al-Adel.
The authors point out the paradox of the fact that while the Haqqani network has functioned as Islamabad's proxy in Afghanistan, it has also served as al-Qaeda's local enabler for more than 20 years.
They say that even though the Pakistanis have in the past offered up the Haqqani network as a way of ending the conflict in Afghanistan, the organisation is unlikely to disengage from its relationship with al-Qaeda and other jihadist organisations: "Positioned between two unstable states, and operating beyond their effective sovereignty, the Haqqani network has long been mistaken for a local actor with largely local concerns. It is vital that the policy community correct the course that has taken this erroneous assessment for granted and recognize the Haqqani network’s region of refuge for what it has always been – the fountainhead of jihad."

Talibs travel to Kabul for talks with Karzai

Maulvi Abdul Kabir during his arrest in Peshawar in February

Pakistani newspapers are reporting today that a delegation of mid-level Taliban leaders travelled to Kabul two weeks ago to meet Afghan president Hamid Karzai.
They say the Taliban leaders who met Karzai were Maulvi Abdul Kabir, the governor of eastern Nangarhar province during Taliban rule and head of the Taliban's Peshawar council until his arrest in February this year in Peshawar; his deputy governor in the Taliban regime, Sedre Azam; and Anwar-ul-Haq Mujahed, a militant leader from eastern Afghanistan credited with helping Osama bin Laden escape the US assault on Tora Bora in 2001.
Kabir is a senior member of the Zadran tribe, as are Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani and many of their supporters. Some reports suggest the meeting was an attempt to persuade Kabir to break with the Haqqanis and thus weaken their tribal support.
He is thought to have been a close aide and possible successor of Mullah Abdul Ghani Barodar, the Taliban No2 who was also captured earlier this year. As leader of the Peshawar shura of the Taliban, Kabir was responsible for liaison between the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction of Hezb-i-Islami and the Pakistan Taliban.
The men were said to have been brought by helicopter from Peshawar in neighbouring Pakistan and driven into Kabul. Mujahed has been in Pakistani custody since June last year when he was picked up in a raid in Peshawar. Kabir is on the US most wanted list.
They spent two nights at a heavily fortified hotel in the Afghan capital before returning to Peshawar by helicopter, where Mujahed was placed again in custody.

Where is Mullah Omar?

Where is Mullah Omar? Even senior members of the Taliban don't seem to know his whereabouts, according to sources. They say he disappeared two months ago. Can there be any connection between this event and Pakistan's determination to play a key role in any negotiations over the ending of hostilities in Afghanistan? The same sources say that many senior Taliban figures are now in favour of a negotiated end to the fighting, adding that Sirajuddin Haqqani met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai during the summer in the south of the country.

Understanding the Haqqani Network

In case you're interested, the reward is now $5 million

The latest report from the Institute for the Study of War on the Haqqani network in Eastern Afghanistan is a tour de force by author Jeffrey Dressler. The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan explains how this formidable fighting organisation, based on two generations of fighters, has become the most dangerous element of the Afghan Taliban.
While Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura, based in the city of the same name in Baluchistan, remains as titular head of the Taliban, it is Sirajuddin Haqqani and his network of tribal, Pakistani and international fighters that are the backbone of the insurgency, particularly in the east of the country.
Dressler provides a comprehensive history of the network, showing how the Haqqani family, members of the Zadran tribe, have been able to dominate the region through their ruthless attitude towards competitors and their proxy status in relation to Pakistan's ISI intelligence service.
While paying lip service to Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis retain considerable freedom to do exactly as they please, particularly in their relations with al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters, most of whom are based in the Haqqani-dominated area around Miran Shah in North Waziristan. As Dressler points out, the Pakistan Army has consistently refused to mount an operation to take on the Haqqanis, regarding them as an important element in their political strategy in Afghanistan.
Dressler notes that until recently Coalition forces in Afghanistan lacked the resources to take on the Haqqanis. However, the massive increase in special forces, combined with drone attacks in North Waziristan, has now begun to have an impact.
He recommends exploiting the tribal disputes in the southeast of Afghanistan to exacerbate rifts over such issues as civilian casualties, expanding special forces operations, expanding the drone campaign and even conducting limited unilateral raids into North Waziristan to capture or kill key figures in the network.
It goes without saying that these are all military solutions to a situation that may, in the end, defy this kind of endgame. Nonetheless, Dressler's report is full of facts and details and essential reading for anyone who wants to follow the military campaign.

Four events leading in one direction

President Karzai's sacking of his interior minister and the head of Afghanistan's intelligence service, the possible extradition of Mullah Barodar from Pakistan to Kabul, the rumoured talks between the Karzai government and the Haqqani network and the resignation of General McChrystal. Four events that may be connected.
President Karzai is taking seriously the mandate he was given two weeks ago at the Peace jirga in Kabul to negotiate with the Taliban with a view to striking a deal for the reintegration and reconciliation of its fighters. His emissaries have already made it clear to the Pakistan military that they will be allowed to play a role in the endgame he hopes will end the fighting and they can probably smell a deal.
It was for this reason that Karzai decided to sack the interior minister and intelligence chief immediately following the Peace jirga. Both men are regarded by the Taliban (and Pakistan) as obstacles to negotiations, preferring instead a strategy based on destroying the organisation.
Hence the suggestions now circulating in Kabul and Islamabad that Barodar - and other senior Taliban leaders now in prison in Pakistan - will be brought back to Afghanistan, where Karzai hopes they will play a role in reaching out to sections of the Taliban leadership.
Hence too the talks with the Haqqanis. They are under the patronage of Pakistan's ISI intelligence service and would do nothing without their backing. Whilst it may not be true that Sirajuddin Haqqani himself made it to Kabul last week, it is likely that a more junior member of the family was present. (More on the Haqqanis can be found in a briefing note issued by the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War on Monday).
Nor is this the only attempt to reach out to the fighters in the east of the country. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami fighters have already met with the president and negotiations continue.
And so was McChrystal's resignation simply a matter of the general making a stupid mistake? Hardly. He is bitterly opposed to a negotiated solution to the fighting and was intent on breaking the back of the insurrection before considering negotiations. He had already told President Obama that this strategy would require more time and that the US forces were unlikely to be able to begin withdrawal by June next year. These views are increasingly out of line with the White House, where Obama's political reputation will stand or fall on his ability to keep his promise to begin withdrawing US troops by then. If McChrystal couldn't deliver this promise, then he had to go. He simply decided that he was not going to go quietly. Holbrooke and Eikenberry, the US special envoy and ambassador to Afghanistan respectively, may also feel they cannot support Karzai's policy and they too may make an early exit.
What has prompted Obama to back away from his general and to allow Karzai to explore his way of doing things? Probably the offensive in Marjah. Despite all the hype, the much-trumpeted offensive - and the now-aborted early entry into Kandahar - have been disastrous. Resistance continues in this small town and if the full might of the US and Coalition military cannot solve that problem, what chance of an overall military victory?

Karzai in meeting with Haqqanis - al-Jazeera

While Washington remains obsessed with who is leading its military and political forces in Afghanistan, amid rumours that Ambassador Eikenberry and special envoy Richard Holbrooke may be next for the chop, Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai appears to be cosying up to the Pakistani military.
al-Jazeera reports this morning that the president met with Sirajuddin Haqqani in face-to-face talks recently. "Haqqani, whose network is believed to be based across the border, is reported to have been accompanied to the meeting earlier in the week by Pakistan's army chief and the head of its intelligence services", the news organisation reports.
Such a meeting would not be inconceivable - although it has been denied by some sources. Karzai recently sacked his interior minister and intelligence chief in a move widely interpreted as being a concession made to the Taliban and Pakistan to encourage negotiations.
The Haqqani network is widely seen as being the main instrument of Pakistani policy in Afghanistan. Pakistan finances the network and allows its fighters - who include many foreigners - to move easily between Pakistan's tribal lands along the border and the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. So far, despite US pressure, the Pakistanis have refused to rein in Haqqani's fighters. Indeed, such a move would be almost impossible in Pakistan.

Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani

Words from Sirajuddin Haqqani, commander of Afghan Taliban forces in Paktia, Khost and Paktika, are rare, so it is worth taking a look at an interview he has given to the pro-jihadi al-Balagh Media Centre. The interview, released on 13 April and now translated into English, reveals little of interest, although it is significant to see the extent to which Haqqani emphasises the importance of propaganda:
"The Internet Jihadists need to raise their level and organize themselves more, and come together, and increase their research, and publish their materials. They also need to be up to date, and they need to be fast with spreading the news from Islamic Jihadist world quickly, and release the messages from the commanders of Jihad. The goal is for their work to be something with a strong exclusive presence, they need to make the other (non-Jihadist) media agencies be asking for them, and not us asking for them. The Mujahideen need to help them, and the Jihadist movements need to increase their distributing of Jihadist material (statements, interviews etc...), and most importantly the official video releases. In addition, the general Muslim people need to help them financially, technically and by all other means. Internet Jihad networks are something we need to be proud of, and respect, the fact is that they are doing a great job."
The intereview was conducted by Fadil Abu Dujanah San'aani, who is probably a Yemeni. Haqqani emphasises in his interview that Arab fighters are welcome to fight with his forces against NATO. "They lighten our paths and resist the cross-worshipers in cooperation with us and we are with them in the same trench," he says.

Attacks on Haqqanis prompted CIA killings

Jordanian doctor al-Balawi, who carried out the bombing at FOB Chapman

The suicide bomb attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan on Wednesday that killed seven CIA officers (including the female station chief), a Jordanian intelligence officer, and wounded six others was an eloquent and bloody response by Islamist militants based in Pakistan to recent drone attacks in North Waziristan.
The attacker managed to get into the base's gym where a meeting was in progress. One report from AP says a senior CIA debriefer attended the meeting, specifically to meet an agent. The CIA officers based in the camp were part of a unit that collated information and tasked drones used to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters in Pakistan.
The AP report said that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Qari Hussein, known as a trainer of suicide bombers, claimed in interview on Friday to the agency that his organisation had been approached by a CIA-trained turncoat who said he was willing to attack his erstwhile colleagues:
"Thank God that we then trained him and sent him to the Khost air base. The one who was their own man, he succeeded in getting his target," Hussain told an AP reporter who travelled to see him in South Waziristan.
Yesterday US President Obama wrote to the CIA to offer his condolences: "In recent years", he said, "the CIA has been tested as never before. Since our country was attacked on September 11, 2001, you have served on the frontlines in directly confronting the dangers of the 21st century. Because of your service, plots have been disrupted, American lives have been saved, and our Allies and partners have been more secure. Your triumphs and even your names may be unknown to your fellow Americans, but your service is deeply appreciated. Indeed, I know firsthand the excellent quality of your work because I rely on it every day."
It was the worst loss of life for the CIA since eight of its officers were killed in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983. Four others have been killed in Afghanistan since 9/11.
The attack on FOB Chapman is most likely connected with three recent CIA drone attacks launched on targets associated with Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose forces control territory almost directly over the border in North Waziristan. The first strike took place on Thursday 17 December and killed two insurgents as they travelled in a vehicle in the village of Dosali.
A second attack on the same day saw five drones fire as many as ten missiles into a compound in the village of Degan, killing at least 15 people including a senior al-Qaeda figure and seven foreigners. The large number of drones and missiles suggest that the CIA, which operates the drones, believed there was a very senior figure present.
The third attack, on 18 Dec, killed at least three militants and injured others.
The significance of these attacks is that they were against the Haqqanis, who are regarded by the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, as an asset. The Haqqanis receive both arms and finance from the ISI. Pakistan has refused to extend its present military campaign against Islamist militants in South Waziristan into North Waziristan because the relationship with the Haqqani network is regarded as being of strategic importance.
However, this relationship is becoming increasingly problematic for the Americans and the attack on FOB Chapman will undoubtedly have major consequences.
If Qari Hussein's claim is true, it is possible it was carried out on behalf of the Haqqani network. The Haqqanis are acting as hosts to many TTP militants who have been driven out of South Waziristan by the Pakistan Army offensive and this may have been a way of repaying their hospitality.
Update: Various sources are now reporting that the bomber was a Jordanian doctor and double agent, recruited a year ago in Jordan to provide information on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda No2, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Named as Hummam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, it appears he turned on his handlers, who included a Jordanian intelligence officer, Ali bin Zaid, who was the eighth person killed in the explosion - and also a member of the Jordanian Royal family. Qari Hussein's claim may still be true, even though the Afghan Taliban have also claimed responsibility for the operation.