Two new reports from the CRS

The US Department of Defense has 19 per cent more contractor personnel (207, 600) in Iraq and Afghanistan than uniformed personnel (175,000), according to a recent report from the US Congressional Research Service.
The impact of such huge numbers of contractors on military doctrine, not to mention the difficulty of managing them, are problems that have still not been solved. "These efforts are still in progress and could take three years or more to effectively implement," says the report.
The figures for Afghanistan show that in March this year there were 112,092 contractors working for the DoD. Of these, 16,081 were US citizens and 17,512 were third-country nationals. The rest, 78,499, were Afghan nationals. The DoD uses significantly more local nationals in Afghanistan than US citizens and third-country citizens combined. More of this kind of stuff can be found here.
And you might want to look here where a CRS report published last week discusses US Special Operations Forces (SOF). In relation to Afghanistan, the report notes the change of command of SOF in March from the Special Operations Command-Central to the Commander of ISAF, then General Stanley McChrystal. The report notes this probably happened because of a lack of unity of command, combined with criticism of a large number of civilian casualties resulting from SOF night missions.
The report's author does not know whether General David Petraeus will stick with the same policy, which has been severely criticised within the US military hierarchy.
US military officials have said that SOF raids have killed or captured 186 insurgent leaders and detained an additional 925 lower-level insurgents in the past 110 days. The raids have been particularly effective around Kandahar, they say, where there are "indications that IED attacks have decreased and that Taliban control appears to be weakening". It really does say this.
The report goes on "Senior NATO officials note that intelligence suggests that SOF missions aimed at provincial insurgent leaders have compelled some Taliban leaders to begin internal discussions about accepting the Karzai government’s offer of reconciliation. It has also been reported that a number of insurgent leaders have left their bases in Afghanistan to seek sanctuary in Pakistan because of the raids."
Officials also say that in 80 per cent of these raids no shots are fired. SOF units have been carrying out five raids a day against a "constantly updated list of high-value targets."
The same report also provides some interesting information on the US Village Stabilisation Program, which is set to be rolled out in 23 rural areas where regular forces cannot operate.
This militia programme will see local Afghan police chiefs in charge of the armed groups, watched over - hopefully - by US Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alphas (ODAs). To ensure that the militias do not turn on the Karzai government and its US allies, the report suggests that US army instructors do not provide the militias with tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by US and NATO forces. Hmmm. The Taliban seems to be doing well enough without being taught the finer points of soldiering.

Four events leading in one direction

President Karzai's sacking of his interior minister and the head of Afghanistan's intelligence service, the possible extradition of Mullah Barodar from Pakistan to Kabul, the rumoured talks between the Karzai government and the Haqqani network and the resignation of General McChrystal. Four events that may be connected.
President Karzai is taking seriously the mandate he was given two weeks ago at the Peace jirga in Kabul to negotiate with the Taliban with a view to striking a deal for the reintegration and reconciliation of its fighters. His emissaries have already made it clear to the Pakistan military that they will be allowed to play a role in the endgame he hopes will end the fighting and they can probably smell a deal.
It was for this reason that Karzai decided to sack the interior minister and intelligence chief immediately following the Peace jirga. Both men are regarded by the Taliban (and Pakistan) as obstacles to negotiations, preferring instead a strategy based on destroying the organisation.
Hence the suggestions now circulating in Kabul and Islamabad that Barodar - and other senior Taliban leaders now in prison in Pakistan - will be brought back to Afghanistan, where Karzai hopes they will play a role in reaching out to sections of the Taliban leadership.
Hence too the talks with the Haqqanis. They are under the patronage of Pakistan's ISI intelligence service and would do nothing without their backing. Whilst it may not be true that Sirajuddin Haqqani himself made it to Kabul last week, it is likely that a more junior member of the family was present. (More on the Haqqanis can be found in a briefing note issued by the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War on Monday).
Nor is this the only attempt to reach out to the fighters in the east of the country. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami fighters have already met with the president and negotiations continue.
And so was McChrystal's resignation simply a matter of the general making a stupid mistake? Hardly. He is bitterly opposed to a negotiated solution to the fighting and was intent on breaking the back of the insurrection before considering negotiations. He had already told President Obama that this strategy would require more time and that the US forces were unlikely to be able to begin withdrawal by June next year. These views are increasingly out of line with the White House, where Obama's political reputation will stand or fall on his ability to keep his promise to begin withdrawing US troops by then. If McChrystal couldn't deliver this promise, then he had to go. He simply decided that he was not going to go quietly. Holbrooke and Eikenberry, the US special envoy and ambassador to Afghanistan respectively, may also feel they cannot support Karzai's policy and they too may make an early exit.
What has prompted Obama to back away from his general and to allow Karzai to explore his way of doing things? Probably the offensive in Marjah. Despite all the hype, the much-trumpeted offensive - and the now-aborted early entry into Kandahar - have been disastrous. Resistance continues in this small town and if the full might of the US and Coalition military cannot solve that problem, what chance of an overall military victory?

General Stanley McChrystal the anthropologist

What a fascinating document is General Stanley McChrystal's Initial Assessment on Afghanistan, delivered to President Obama on 30 August and made public today for the first time, with redactions.
McChrystal, who is America's top military man in Afghanistan, has written a document that must be one of the most unusual ever to come from a military commander.
He often sounds more like an anthropology professor than a general as he grapples with the tricky problem of what is going on in Afghanistan. "The conflict in Afghanistan can be seen as a set of related insurgencies, each of which is a complex system with multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting relationships among those actors", he states. This is true, of course, but it is a pity it has taken eight years for America's senior brass to work out this most fundamental of facts.
Until recently there was no recognition by the military of the importance of the Afghan tribes to understanding events in the country. It was not understood, for example, that for insurgents to move from one part of the country to another required agreement from any tribes inhabiting the land in between.
Or that some of the Pashtun tribes were only fighting in Afghanistan, while others were also fighting against the Pakistan government. Or that there are both Sunnis and Shias amongst the Pashtuns. Or, until recently, that there are at least three (according to McChrystal) different Taliban factions (others would say there are five, or even seven).
The precise relationship between opium production and the insurgency has not been investigated. Opium eradication has been seen as a public health issue, not a matter of military strategy. And no effort has been put into producing propaganda that highlights the hypocrisy of the Taliban for producing drugs that are killing thousands of Moslems.
And how is it that the Taliban faction in Quetta in neighbouring Baluchistan is left undisturbed in this war? Everyone knows where they are and yet they appear to be untouchable.
In a remarkable admission, McChrystal acknowledges that the Taliban is better at propaganda than the Coalition: "Major insurgent groups outperform GIRoA and ISAF at information operations...They have carefully analysed their audience and target products accordingly. They use their Pashtun identity, physical proximity to the population and violent intimidation to deliver immediate and enduring messages with which ISAF and GIRoA have been unable to compete."
This is deeply depressing stuff. There are companies and consultants being paid millions of dollars to come up with solutions for problems like these, and yet the results are risible.
Having thoroughly (and correctly) trashed the Karzai government and the international community, McChrystal advocates what he calls population-centred counter insurgency. ISAF, together with the Afghan security forces, must shelter Afghans from violence, corruption and coercion. Military officers must also gain a much greater understanding of the country and its people.
This means local language training, a remarkable turnaround, considering that the British Foreign Office, for example, does not presently have any Pashto speakers.
"All ISAF personnel must show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity about the people of Afghanistan," he says.
It will be necessary to build personal relationships with the local people: "To gain accurate information and intelligence about the local environment ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armoured vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases."
This is all a very tall order and the question that will be on everyone's mind is whether or not it has all come too late. It may simply make more sense for the military to think of ways they can force the Taliban - in all its complexity - to the negotiating table.