Posts
A new report from the US Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) looks in detail at the scandal of large US currency exports from Afghanistan - mostly to private bank accounts in the Gulf - and shows that efforts to safeguard US cash entering the Afghan economy have been hampered by ineffective coordination, inconsistent Afghan cooperation and insufficient cash controls.
This is not a new problem, but it has not been investigated very thoroughly in the past. The same problem dogged US operations in Iraq, where billions of dollars simply disappeared.
SIGAR says US agencies cannot easily follow what happens to cash dollars that enter Afghanistan, with the possibility (and likelihood) that much of it is being stolen or, in some cases, diverted to the Taliban.
“The United States has poured billions of aid dollars into a country plagued by corruption, insurgency and the narcotics trade. It is essential that we use all available tools to ensure that US dollars are protected from fraud and diversion to the insurgency. We must also ensure that the Afghan government is a full partner in efforts to set a fledgling financial sector on sound footing,” said Herbert Richardson, acting head of SIGAR, when launching the report today.
He pointed out that the Afghan government has not cooperated with US officials to build a strong and clean financial sector.
SIGAR says that since 2002 the US Congress has appropriated more than $70 billion to implement security and development assistance in Afghanistan. Although only a small proportion of this ends up as cash in the Afghan economy, tens or possibly hundreds of millions of dollars - SIGAR does not give a figure - very quickly leaves the country in suitcases destined for foreign bank accounts.
A recent report published by Spiegel Online found that many of the most expensive properties in Dubai have been bought by Afghans with close connections to the government.
Vulnerabilities identified by SIGAR's auditors include failing to record serial numbers of cash given out to contractors and other recipients of US funds and the failure of Afghan commercial banks to record the serial numbers of Electronic Funds Transfer payments by US agencies to contractors when they are converted to cash.
The report notes that the Afghan Attorney General's office has not cooperated fully in prosecuting individuals suspected of having committed financial crimes; out of 21 leads forwarded by FinTRACA to the Afghan government, only four were prosecuted. President Karzai has even prevented US government advisers from gaining access to the Central Bank, where the atmosphere is described as "hostile".
Wednesday, 20 July 2011
Tuesday, 19 July 2011
Oh, and thanks for all those killings...
 |
| Inspire's tribute to Hakimullah |
Hakimullah, however, is very unlikely to see this tribute. He has not been heard of for months and is presiding in name only over an organisation that is riven with splits and turning on itself. Fearing a drone attack similar to the one that killed his predecessor, Baitullah Mahsud, he is hidden and silent.
The "revenge" mentioned in the tribute presumably refers to the mass-casualty suicide bombs the TTP lets off in public places in Pakistan with monotonous (and bloody) regularity. Some people say that Inspire is slick. Sick would be more accurate.
Cowper-Coles book offers fascinating diplomatic insights
Describing running the British embassy, he says: "Mostly, however, it was more like being the headmaster of a run-down but generally happy and successful prep school, or the governor of an open prison whose inmates were repaying their debt to society handsomely and many times over. None of us doubted that, compared with our rivals - the overlarge and persistently unhappy American Embassy, the Canadians, the French, the Germans, the Danes and the Dutch, plus a UN mission almost always at war with itself - we were by far the most effective diplomatic operation in town. We knew more, did more, worked harder and had more fun than any of the other Embassies."
Rivals? I thought we were all in it together! More of this fascinating book anon.
Thursday, 14 July 2011
Taliban still mostly killing civilians with its IEDs
Conflict-related civilian deaths in Afghanistan increased by 15 per cent increase in the first six months of 2011, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which today released its 2011 Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
UNAMA said the dramatic growth was mainly due to the use of landmine-like pressure plate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by what it calls Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) - ie the Taliban.
UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the period, with 80 per cent attributed to AGEs, an increase of 28 percent in civilian deaths linked to AGEs from the same period in 2010. A further 14 per cent of civilian deaths were attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), down nine per cent from the same period in 2010. Six per cent of civilian deaths could not be attributed to any party to the conflict.
With 368 civilian deaths, May 2011 was the deadliest month for Afghan civilians since UNAMA began documenting civilian casualties in 2007. In June 2011, a further 360 civilian deaths were recorded.
June also saw an all-time high in the number of security incidents in a single month and the highest-ever number of IED attacks recorded in a one-month period.
“Afghan children, women and men continue to be killed and injured at an alarming rate,” said Staffan de Mistura, Special Representative for the Secretary General.
IEDs and suicide attacks accounted for 49 per cent of all civilian deaths and injuries in the first six months of 2011. Civilian deaths from IEDs increased 17 per cent over the same period in 2010, making IEDs, with 444 victims, the single largest killer of Afghan civilians in the first half of 2011 and causing 30 per cent of all civilian deaths.
Air strikes remained the leading cause of Afghan civilian deaths by Pro-Government Forces, with an increasing proportion resulting from attacks by helicopters. In the first six months of 2011, 79 Afghan civilians were killed by air strikes, a 14 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2010. Forty-four of the total 79 civilian deaths were from helicopter attacks.
Civilian deaths from ground combat and armed clashes in the first half of 2011 increased by 36 per cent compared to the same period in 2010 while two per cent of all civilian casualties occurred as a result of night raids, down slightly from the first half of 2010. UNAMA documented 30 civilian deaths during night raid operations in the first six months of 2011.
UNAMA said the dramatic growth was mainly due to the use of landmine-like pressure plate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by what it calls Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) - ie the Taliban.
UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the period, with 80 per cent attributed to AGEs, an increase of 28 percent in civilian deaths linked to AGEs from the same period in 2010. A further 14 per cent of civilian deaths were attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), down nine per cent from the same period in 2010. Six per cent of civilian deaths could not be attributed to any party to the conflict.
With 368 civilian deaths, May 2011 was the deadliest month for Afghan civilians since UNAMA began documenting civilian casualties in 2007. In June 2011, a further 360 civilian deaths were recorded.
June also saw an all-time high in the number of security incidents in a single month and the highest-ever number of IED attacks recorded in a one-month period.
“Afghan children, women and men continue to be killed and injured at an alarming rate,” said Staffan de Mistura, Special Representative for the Secretary General.
IEDs and suicide attacks accounted for 49 per cent of all civilian deaths and injuries in the first six months of 2011. Civilian deaths from IEDs increased 17 per cent over the same period in 2010, making IEDs, with 444 victims, the single largest killer of Afghan civilians in the first half of 2011 and causing 30 per cent of all civilian deaths.
Air strikes remained the leading cause of Afghan civilian deaths by Pro-Government Forces, with an increasing proportion resulting from attacks by helicopters. In the first six months of 2011, 79 Afghan civilians were killed by air strikes, a 14 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2010. Forty-four of the total 79 civilian deaths were from helicopter attacks.
Civilian deaths from ground combat and armed clashes in the first half of 2011 increased by 36 per cent compared to the same period in 2010 while two per cent of all civilian casualties occurred as a result of night raids, down slightly from the first half of 2010. UNAMA documented 30 civilian deaths during night raid operations in the first six months of 2011.
The Haqqani network - the fountainhead of jihad
A new report from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point on the Haqqani Network - The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida - argues that this family-based jihadi network both protected and shaped al-Qaeda from its earliest days and allowed bin Laden's organisation to aspire towards global jihad.
While carefully avoiding any direct association with international terror organisations, the Haqqani Network has been unwilling to disengage from al-Qaeda and has aided its growth onto the world arena. "By shedding new light on the history of al-Qa’ida, this report also tells us that al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network, and not the Quetta Shura Taliban, became the United States’ primary enemies on 11 September 2001," say authors Don Rassler and Vahid Brown.
To date, the history of al-Qaeda has been understood in terms of the its outgrowth from the Maktab al-Kidamat organisation in Peshawar under the auspices of Abdullah Azzam. This approach, say the authors, fails to take into account the important connections between al-Qaeda's leaders and the Haqqani clan. "The scholarly and policy community have misapprehended the precise local context for the development of global jihadism - a context to be found in the Haqqanis' Paktia and not Azzam's Peshawar - and have underestimated the Haqqani network's critical role in sustaining cycles of violence far beyond its region of overt influence."
They argue that the ties between the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda have remained just as close since 9/11 under Sirajuddin Haqqani's command as they were prior to that when under the control of his father, Jalauddin. Sirajuddin continues to play an important role as a mediator - between the Pakistani ISI and the various factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, between the TTP and local Shias in Kurram and even between the Iranian state and al-Qaeda. In this latter case it is suggested that in 2010 he helped to secure the release of a top Iranian diplomat in exchange for several al-Qaeda commanders, including Saif al-Adel.
The authors point out the paradox of the fact that while the Haqqani network has functioned as Islamabad's proxy in Afghanistan, it has also served as al-Qaeda's local enabler for more than 20 years.
They say that even though the Pakistanis have in the past offered up the Haqqani network as a way of ending the conflict in Afghanistan, the organisation is unlikely to disengage from its relationship with al-Qaeda and other jihadist organisations: "Positioned between two unstable states, and operating beyond their effective sovereignty, the Haqqani network has long been mistaken for a local actor with largely local concerns. It is vital that the policy community correct the course that has taken this erroneous assessment for granted and recognize the Haqqani network’s region of refuge for what it has always been – the fountainhead of jihad."
While carefully avoiding any direct association with international terror organisations, the Haqqani Network has been unwilling to disengage from al-Qaeda and has aided its growth onto the world arena. "By shedding new light on the history of al-Qa’ida, this report also tells us that al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network, and not the Quetta Shura Taliban, became the United States’ primary enemies on 11 September 2001," say authors Don Rassler and Vahid Brown.
To date, the history of al-Qaeda has been understood in terms of the its outgrowth from the Maktab al-Kidamat organisation in Peshawar under the auspices of Abdullah Azzam. This approach, say the authors, fails to take into account the important connections between al-Qaeda's leaders and the Haqqani clan. "The scholarly and policy community have misapprehended the precise local context for the development of global jihadism - a context to be found in the Haqqanis' Paktia and not Azzam's Peshawar - and have underestimated the Haqqani network's critical role in sustaining cycles of violence far beyond its region of overt influence."
They argue that the ties between the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda have remained just as close since 9/11 under Sirajuddin Haqqani's command as they were prior to that when under the control of his father, Jalauddin. Sirajuddin continues to play an important role as a mediator - between the Pakistani ISI and the various factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, between the TTP and local Shias in Kurram and even between the Iranian state and al-Qaeda. In this latter case it is suggested that in 2010 he helped to secure the release of a top Iranian diplomat in exchange for several al-Qaeda commanders, including Saif al-Adel.
The authors point out the paradox of the fact that while the Haqqani network has functioned as Islamabad's proxy in Afghanistan, it has also served as al-Qaeda's local enabler for more than 20 years.
They say that even though the Pakistanis have in the past offered up the Haqqani network as a way of ending the conflict in Afghanistan, the organisation is unlikely to disengage from its relationship with al-Qaeda and other jihadist organisations: "Positioned between two unstable states, and operating beyond their effective sovereignty, the Haqqani network has long been mistaken for a local actor with largely local concerns. It is vital that the policy community correct the course that has taken this erroneous assessment for granted and recognize the Haqqani network’s region of refuge for what it has always been – the fountainhead of jihad."
Friday, 8 July 2011
FATA still attracting Western Islamists
A new edition of Paul Cruickshank's paper The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West has been published by the New America Foundation. It looks at 32 'serious' jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011 and shows that 53 per cent of them had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan, compared to just six per cent having connections to the Yemen.
Between January 2009 and June 2011 there were seven serious plots against the West in which those involved were trained or directed from groups in Pakistan, and just two that linked to the Yemen.
This new report looks at five new cases studies not included in the original version, including the failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 Hamburg cell, the alleged Norway cell, Najibullah Zazi's New York group and the Manchester plotters. It also gives a detailed breakdown by country of known militants moving from Europe to Pakistan for training and makes the point that Germany has seen a particularly alarming rise in travel flows to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
An average of five people a month left Germany to try to receive training in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In contrast US counterterrorism officials believe fewer American extremists appear to have travelled to Pakistan in 2010 and early 2011 than in 2009.
However Cruickshank notes that the CIA drone campaign is having an impact on foreign fighters, many of whom have been killed in missile strikes, although it has not yet staunched the flow of Westerners travelling to the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Perhaps the most interesting part of the report is the case history of Rami Makanesi, a member of the Hamburg jihadist group, who provided a 180-page account of his time in FATA to German security police following his deportation from Pakistan to Germany in September 2010.
Makanesi describes the paranoia of the al-Qaeda operatives he met about both the drone campaign and about spies. He says he came across Lebanese, Algerians, Kuwaitis, Turks, Tajiks and French militants of North African descent. In Mir Ali, in North Waziristan he was able to procure lodgings for five Euros a month and was easily able to obtain money sent from Germany. He kept in touch with his family in Germany via internet cafes.
He said the largest contingent of foreign militants in Mir Ali were Turks, of whom there were 100-150. There were also around 100 'Tatars' in the town and less than a dozen Arabs. During the summer fighting season in Afghanistan, the town almost emptied of foreign fighters, who made their way across the border with little hindrance from local Pakistani Army patrols.
He concludes: "Despite growing concern over Yemen, the tribal areas of Pakistan remain al Qaeda’s number one safe haven and the most threatening to the West as a whole."
Between January 2009 and June 2011 there were seven serious plots against the West in which those involved were trained or directed from groups in Pakistan, and just two that linked to the Yemen.
This new report looks at five new cases studies not included in the original version, including the failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 Hamburg cell, the alleged Norway cell, Najibullah Zazi's New York group and the Manchester plotters. It also gives a detailed breakdown by country of known militants moving from Europe to Pakistan for training and makes the point that Germany has seen a particularly alarming rise in travel flows to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
An average of five people a month left Germany to try to receive training in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In contrast US counterterrorism officials believe fewer American extremists appear to have travelled to Pakistan in 2010 and early 2011 than in 2009.
However Cruickshank notes that the CIA drone campaign is having an impact on foreign fighters, many of whom have been killed in missile strikes, although it has not yet staunched the flow of Westerners travelling to the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Perhaps the most interesting part of the report is the case history of Rami Makanesi, a member of the Hamburg jihadist group, who provided a 180-page account of his time in FATA to German security police following his deportation from Pakistan to Germany in September 2010.
Makanesi describes the paranoia of the al-Qaeda operatives he met about both the drone campaign and about spies. He says he came across Lebanese, Algerians, Kuwaitis, Turks, Tajiks and French militants of North African descent. In Mir Ali, in North Waziristan he was able to procure lodgings for five Euros a month and was easily able to obtain money sent from Germany. He kept in touch with his family in Germany via internet cafes.
He said the largest contingent of foreign militants in Mir Ali were Turks, of whom there were 100-150. There were also around 100 'Tatars' in the town and less than a dozen Arabs. During the summer fighting season in Afghanistan, the town almost emptied of foreign fighters, who made their way across the border with little hindrance from local Pakistani Army patrols.
He concludes: "Despite growing concern over Yemen, the tribal areas of Pakistan remain al Qaeda’s number one safe haven and the most threatening to the West as a whole."
Tuesday, 5 July 2011
Using the Taliban's own rules to challenge its actions
The Layha: Calling the Taliban to Account notes that the first version of the code appeared in 2006 as an attempt to consolidate the movement, inspire fighters and to curb their excesses. In the background was the fact that the organisation's image was being tarnished by corruption and abuse.
Later versions of the code, published in 2009 and 2010 illustrate the leadership's fears of fragmentation, concerns about the uncontrolled killing of suspected spies and the exploitation of jihad for criminal or material gain.
Clark notes that some clauses, such as those that permit kidnapping, are contrary to international law, while others, if applied, could reduce civilian suffering in the conflict. Added to this is the fact that the code is not enforced in some areas and attacks on civilians, for example, continue unabated.
However, civilian unhappiness with some of the clauses has led to revisions. For example, the 2006 version called on mujahideen to beat and kill recalcitrant teachers and burn their schools and have nothing to do with NGOs. These clauses were dropped in later editions.
Clark argues that the Taliban is very sensitive to charges that it violates its own code and often kills civilians. Journalists, she says, could find the Layha useful in helping to frame questions to put to the Taliban, for example in asking for explanations of fines issued by the Taliban, of ransom demands for prisoners or of attacks that kill civilians. She says it is important to ask more from the Taliban in terms of conduct that conforms with international human rights law.
Pakistan Taliban begins to break up
The leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Hakimullah Mahsud, has been isolated for much of the last year and is rapidly losing control of his organisation, according to news reports from Pakistan.
A report in the Express Tribune, for example, notes that there was a large split from the organisation recently, when Fazal Saeed Haqqani - in charge of the TTP in the Kurram tribal region - announced that he was leaving the organisation, along with around 1,000 of his fighters. Haqqani said he was opposed to the killing of civilians. The TTP has killed hundreds of civilians in a series of indiscriminate bombings throughout Pakistan in the last two years.
Just days before, Shakirullah Shakir, the main spokesman for the TTP's Fidayeeen-e-Islam suicide squad, was gunned down in in the Qutab Khail area of Miranshah in North Waziristan while riding his motorcycle to Mir Ali. No-one claimed responsibility for the targetted killing, but it is likely that the two events are connected. Shakir was a close aide to Qari Hussein Mahsud, the TTP's main organiser of suicide bombings.
Haqqani said he had decided to form a new organisation called Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami that will concentrate on fighting in Afghanistan: "“I repeatedly told the leadership council of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan that they should stop suicide attacks against mosques, markets and other civilian targets,” Haqqani told the AFP news agency by telephone.
“Islam does not allow killings of innocent civilians in suicide attacks,” he said, likening what TTP does in Pakistan to “what US troops are doing in Afghanistan” and vowing to continue the fight alone against the Americans.
There have also been reports of fighting between TTP factions in Khyber and Orakzai districts in recent weeks.
A report in the Express Tribune, for example, notes that there was a large split from the organisation recently, when Fazal Saeed Haqqani - in charge of the TTP in the Kurram tribal region - announced that he was leaving the organisation, along with around 1,000 of his fighters. Haqqani said he was opposed to the killing of civilians. The TTP has killed hundreds of civilians in a series of indiscriminate bombings throughout Pakistan in the last two years.
Just days before, Shakirullah Shakir, the main spokesman for the TTP's Fidayeeen-e-Islam suicide squad, was gunned down in in the Qutab Khail area of Miranshah in North Waziristan while riding his motorcycle to Mir Ali. No-one claimed responsibility for the targetted killing, but it is likely that the two events are connected. Shakir was a close aide to Qari Hussein Mahsud, the TTP's main organiser of suicide bombings.
Haqqani said he had decided to form a new organisation called Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami that will concentrate on fighting in Afghanistan: "“I repeatedly told the leadership council of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan that they should stop suicide attacks against mosques, markets and other civilian targets,” Haqqani told the AFP news agency by telephone.
“Islam does not allow killings of innocent civilians in suicide attacks,” he said, likening what TTP does in Pakistan to “what US troops are doing in Afghanistan” and vowing to continue the fight alone against the Americans.
There have also been reports of fighting between TTP factions in Khyber and Orakzai districts in recent weeks.
Afghanistan Conflict Monitor ceases publication
Sad news: the Afghanistan Conflict Monitor and its sister publication the Pakistan Conflict Monitor have ceased publication. A note from the publishers - the Simon Fraser University-funded Human Security Report Project in Vancouver, Canada - says "As a result of staffing constraints, changes in media reporting on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a shift in our strategic priorities, we have decided to discontinue the Afghanistan and Pakistan Conflict Monitors. As a consequence, we will no longer be producing the Daily Briefing, or updating the websites.
"Instead of continuing to feature news stories, which are increasingly well covered by other online news media like Foreign Policy's “AfPak Channel,” we will be focussing on more in-depth research and policy material from governments, researchers, and major NGOs. These resources can be found on our research portal, the Human Security Gateway."
"Instead of continuing to feature news stories, which are increasingly well covered by other online news media like Foreign Policy's “AfPak Channel,” we will be focussing on more in-depth research and policy material from governments, researchers, and major NGOs. These resources can be found on our research portal, the Human Security Gateway."
Thursday, 30 June 2011
UN's first quarterly report on Afghanistan
The first of a series of quarterly reports on the situation in Afghanistan has been issued by the UN Security Council. It covers the period from 9 March this year up to the end of June - a period that saw a 51 per cent increase in security incidents compared to the same period last year. There were 17 suicide attacks in April - a higher number than in any month in 2010.
A quarter of all attacks and more than half of all assassinations took place in the city of Kandahar. The report also provides an account of the attack on a UN compound in Mazar-e-Sharif on 1 April during which three international UN staff and four international guards were killed.
It notes the attack in Kandahar on 7 May during which 488 political prisoners - most of them Taliban supporters - escaped. The report takes special note of large demonstrations protesting against ISAF activities: "This kind of civil unrest, which is indicative of wider public discontent, marks a departure from the previous sporadic demonstrations against the international civil and military presence and raises serious concern, given the possibility of orchestrated violent rioting against the international community."
The report's review of political developments attempts to make the most of the very meagre political advances, including the tiny number of former Taliban members signing up for reintegration programmes.
UNAMA documented 1,090 deaths and 1,860 injuries of Afghan civilians during these three months, an increase of 20 per cent on last year, with "anti-government elements" linked to 80 per cent of these casualties. Most people were hit by IED explosions. Pro-government forces also caused damage and deaths to civilians through the use of air strikes and night raids.
The UN's extensive interest in women's rights has not stopped Afghan women from being punished for running away from home to flee persecution or forced marriage. Most women who run away are charged with adultery and the Supreme Court has recently upheld convictions of women victims of rape for the crime of adultery. Women can be sentenced to 15 years in prison if convicted. There are 650 women in prison in Afghanistan, along with 280 minors.
Many journalists in Afghanistan feel threatened, both from the Taliban and from pro-government factions and religious figures. The 16-page report also includes useful information on the transition towards Afghan security responsibility, governance, humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. It closes with a statement from the Secretary-General.
Tuesday, 28 June 2011
Jamil Ahmad's triumphant debut
Jamil Ahmad's The Wandering Falcon (Hamish Hamilton, London, 2011) is a remarkable book on traditional Pashtun society that should be compulsory reading for anyone studying this area. Written as a series of interlinked stories about an orphaned boy - Tor Baz, the black falcon - it brings the reader as close to the forbidden lands of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as is possible. Its alternating tenderness and tragedy pulls at the heart strings to paint a picture of this brutal society. Nothing in literature comes near to his description, for example, of a meeting between a young political officer (possibly the author himself?) and members of the Bhittani tribe, who live on the borders of the much more powerful Mahsuds in South Waziristan.
The publishers, I hope, will forgive me if I quote a paragraph in full from this achingly beautiful book:
The publishers, I hope, will forgive me if I quote a paragraph in full from this achingly beautiful book:
"The Mahsuds, because they always hunt in groups, are known as the wolves of Waziristan. A Wazir hunts alone. He is known as the 'leopard' to other men. Despite their differences, the two tribes share more than merely their common heritage of poverty and misery. Nature has bred in both an unusual abundance of anger, enormous resilience and a total refusal to accept their fate. If nature provides them food for only ten days in a year, they believe in their right to demand the rest of their sustenance from their fellow men who live oily, fat and comfortable lives in the plains. To both tribes, survival is the ultimate virtue. In neither community is any stigma attached to a hired assassin, a thief, a kidnapper or an informer. And then, both are totally absorbed in themselves. They have no doubt in their minds that they occupy centre stage, while the rest of the world acts out minor roles or watches them as spectators - as befits inferior species."Jamil Ahmad, now 80, is very well qualified to write this book. He spent his life in the Pakistan Civil Service, serving in the old Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. He served in Quetta, Chaghi, Khyber and Malakand and was later commissioner in Dera Ismail Khan and in Swat, as well as becoming chairman of the Tribal Development Corporation. He was Pakistan's ambassador in Kabul before, during and after the Soviet invasion in 1979 and finished his career as Chief Secretary in Baluchistan.
Sunday, 26 June 2011
Syed Shahzad's informative but flawed final work
Abducted and murdered in Pakistan in May by persons as yet unknown, Syed Saleem Shahzad was a remarkable journalist. Over many years while reporting for Asian Times Online he had won the trust of elements of the Pakistan Taliban and even of al-Qaeda. Ilyas Kashmiri, the former Pakistan Army captain who had formed al-Qaeda's 313 Brigade and Shadow Army (Lashkar-e-Zil) and who was behind many of that organisation's most devastating attacks in Pakistan, gave Shahzad his one and only published interview, along with other important figures from the jihadist movement who refused to speak to anyone else.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the most significant Afghan guerrilla faction, and Qari Ziaur Rehman - another important guerrilla commander and al-Qaeda recruit - both spoke to Shahzad. His access was legendary and he broke many important stories.
His posthumously published book, Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11 (Pluto Press, London, 2011), contains much new material and is chiefly important for the insight it provides into the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. Shahzad explains this as a Pakistani intelligence operation that was hijacked by al-Qaeda, or at least a number of former Pakistani Army officers who had allied themselves with al-Qaeda.
Principal amongst these was Major Haroon Ashik, also a former Lashkar-e-Toiba commander, whose intention was to provoke war between India and Pakistan and hence force Pakistan to move troops from anti-guerrilla actions along the Afghan border. Major Haroon was recently named in the US trial of David Headley and Tahawwur Rana. He is now believed to be in prison in Adiala, Pakistan where he is facing abduction charges.
It was Haroon who also came up with the strategy of attacking NATO convoys in Pakistan in an attempt to strangle the Coalition forces in Afghanistan by cutting off their supplies.
Shahzad's book also outlines in detail the way al-Qaeda has burrowed into the Pashtun tribes along the Afgthan-Pakistan border and attempted to break down the old tribal structures and subvert them to its own goals. This is undoubtedly true and one day will be seen by the Pashtuns as their greatest mistake and greatest tragedy.
However, the book is marred in two major respects.
First, it has not been edited and is very repetitive and contains a mountain of irrelevant material. In addition, the book is incomplete - for example, it only contains footnotes for the first three chapters. Considering Shahzad's untimely death this can perhaps be forgiven.
The second weakness is more substantial. Shahzad seems to have fallen for much of al-Qaeda's propaganda. He offers few criticisms and sees the last five years as an unbroken chain of success after success. He refers to the devastating drone attacks that have wiped out most of the al-Qaeda leadership in FATA, but still believes they are on the verge of driving the Coalition forces out of Afghanistan. He suggests that al-Qaeda has subsumed both the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban beneath its black banner and dominates them politically, militarily and ideologically.
Shahzad thinks 2012 will be the year of victory for al-Qaeda, but couches it in the language of mystical Islam. In some ways we should thank him for exposing the wackiness that is at the heart of al-Qaeda's misbegotten form of Islam, even if he appears to have succumbed to it himself. You need look no further than the last couple of paragraphs of the book to see this:
"Al-Qaeda's next aim is to occupy the promised land of ancient Khurasan, with its boundaries stretching from all the way from Central Asia to Khyber Paktoonkhwa, through Afghanistan and then expand the theatre of war to India.
"The promised Messiah, the Mahdi, will then rise in the Middle East and al-Qaeda will mobilise its forces from Ancient Khurasan for the liberation of Palestine, where a final victory will guarantee the revival of a Global Muslim Caliphate."
That is literally Shahzad's conclusion. No word here of the Arab Spring and the rejection by the Arab Street of Islam as a vehicle for revolution. He sees al-Qaeda's predicted success as the fulfilment of an ancient religious prophesy. But while this messianism at the heart of al-Qaeda's religious philosophy is something that has not received the attention it deserves, it also firmly puts that organisation into the camp of failed revolutions and crackpot religious fantasies. It is only a pity that an astute and well informed writer like Shahzad should fail to see the essential idiocy of such thinking. Roll on 2012.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the most significant Afghan guerrilla faction, and Qari Ziaur Rehman - another important guerrilla commander and al-Qaeda recruit - both spoke to Shahzad. His access was legendary and he broke many important stories.
His posthumously published book, Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11 (Pluto Press, London, 2011), contains much new material and is chiefly important for the insight it provides into the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. Shahzad explains this as a Pakistani intelligence operation that was hijacked by al-Qaeda, or at least a number of former Pakistani Army officers who had allied themselves with al-Qaeda.
Principal amongst these was Major Haroon Ashik, also a former Lashkar-e-Toiba commander, whose intention was to provoke war between India and Pakistan and hence force Pakistan to move troops from anti-guerrilla actions along the Afghan border. Major Haroon was recently named in the US trial of David Headley and Tahawwur Rana. He is now believed to be in prison in Adiala, Pakistan where he is facing abduction charges.
It was Haroon who also came up with the strategy of attacking NATO convoys in Pakistan in an attempt to strangle the Coalition forces in Afghanistan by cutting off their supplies.
Shahzad's book also outlines in detail the way al-Qaeda has burrowed into the Pashtun tribes along the Afgthan-Pakistan border and attempted to break down the old tribal structures and subvert them to its own goals. This is undoubtedly true and one day will be seen by the Pashtuns as their greatest mistake and greatest tragedy.
However, the book is marred in two major respects.
First, it has not been edited and is very repetitive and contains a mountain of irrelevant material. In addition, the book is incomplete - for example, it only contains footnotes for the first three chapters. Considering Shahzad's untimely death this can perhaps be forgiven.
The second weakness is more substantial. Shahzad seems to have fallen for much of al-Qaeda's propaganda. He offers few criticisms and sees the last five years as an unbroken chain of success after success. He refers to the devastating drone attacks that have wiped out most of the al-Qaeda leadership in FATA, but still believes they are on the verge of driving the Coalition forces out of Afghanistan. He suggests that al-Qaeda has subsumed both the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban beneath its black banner and dominates them politically, militarily and ideologically.
Shahzad thinks 2012 will be the year of victory for al-Qaeda, but couches it in the language of mystical Islam. In some ways we should thank him for exposing the wackiness that is at the heart of al-Qaeda's misbegotten form of Islam, even if he appears to have succumbed to it himself. You need look no further than the last couple of paragraphs of the book to see this:
"Al-Qaeda's next aim is to occupy the promised land of ancient Khurasan, with its boundaries stretching from all the way from Central Asia to Khyber Paktoonkhwa, through Afghanistan and then expand the theatre of war to India.
"The promised Messiah, the Mahdi, will then rise in the Middle East and al-Qaeda will mobilise its forces from Ancient Khurasan for the liberation of Palestine, where a final victory will guarantee the revival of a Global Muslim Caliphate."
That is literally Shahzad's conclusion. No word here of the Arab Spring and the rejection by the Arab Street of Islam as a vehicle for revolution. He sees al-Qaeda's predicted success as the fulfilment of an ancient religious prophesy. But while this messianism at the heart of al-Qaeda's religious philosophy is something that has not received the attention it deserves, it also firmly puts that organisation into the camp of failed revolutions and crackpot religious fantasies. It is only a pity that an astute and well informed writer like Shahzad should fail to see the essential idiocy of such thinking. Roll on 2012.
Wednesday, 15 June 2011
Critique of targeted killings in Afghanistan
 |
| Zabet Amanullah, killed in error by US forces |
Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network has written an excellent analysis of the alleged killing by Coalition forces of the Taliban deputy shadow governor of Takhar in September 2010. She claims, with plenty of evidence, that the person killed - along with nine other people - was in fact Zabet Amanullah, a former Taliban fighter who had laid down his weapons in 2001.
Clark's report, The Takhar Attack, which was published in May, says "The findings of this investigation raise systemic concerns over the intelligence that drives this and other targeted killings in Afghanistan." She adds that her investigation demonstrates the danger of relying on signals intelligence and social network analysis, "particularly when it is used as a basis for targeted killings, without cross‐checking and in the virtual absence of human intelligence and, indeed in this case, without even the ordinary common knowledge to be had from watching election coverage on television."
Questions of faith in Pakistan
The Jinnah Institute, a Pakistan-based think tank that promotes peace and fundamental rights, has published a report on the status of religious minorities in the country. A Question of Faith asks whether Pakistan will continue to discriminate against its citizens on the basis of religion and whether or not the majority of Pakistanis will continue to condone and collude in the discrimination and persecution of minorities. You can find a full copy of the report here.
Tuesday, 14 June 2011
Prospects for Bonn Conference 2
Abbas Daiyar, who writes the excellent Kabul Perspective blog, has written an excellent piece on the prospects for Bonn Conference 2, due to be held in December. His posting, The Dark Clouds, notes that Germany, as host, is trying to ensure a Taliban presence at the conference and that the US and the Taliban are now reportedly in direct contact. He says Pakistan is also saying it can guarantee the presence of the Haqqani network and that things look like they are shaping up for an announcement of a political settlement to hostilities in Afghanistan.
Daiyar says talk of a Karzai-mediated settlement is anathema to many of the warlords, such as General Dostum, Ismail Khan, Ata Mohammad Noor, Ahmad Zia Masoud and others, who appear to be in the process of creating a grand alliance to ensure they have a voice at the conference and negotiations. None of them trust Karzai or believe that he represents them. As Daiyar says: "Before the Taliban come to an agreement with the international community, it's important that they should come to an understanding with Afghans who resisted them for years; otherwise it's no solution to the conflict. The international troops have already announced withdrawal by 2014. They are not the problem for Taliban; rather the bigger challenges are internal in Afghanistan. The ineffective Peace Council should also bear in mind that it's not only the international community having problems with Taliban, but more serious problems with Taliban are from inside Afghanistan."
Daiyar wants conference organisers to make sure all factions of Afghan society, including women, are represented and that Afghans should be able to discuss the "fault lines" of the current system.
Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analysts Network has also been writing on similar themes. As he notes:
"They do not need a Karzai-Taleban deal that opens the exit door for foreign troops, they need an end of the bloodshed that will also physically reopen spaces for economic and political(!) activities, a debate about where their country is going. A deal which does not address main causes of the conflict (namely the monopoly over power of resources concentrated in the hands of a small elite, then possibly with some additional Taleban players) will not bring peace. Therefore, the ‘political process’ (the euphemism for talking to the Taleban in the programme of the Bonn conference) needs to involve a representative cross-section of Afghan society, including former anti-Taleban mujahedin, the ethnic minorities that have suffered most under the Taleban yoke and what usually is called civil society, including the women constituency, another main victim of past Taleban rule." Wise words.
Daiyar says talk of a Karzai-mediated settlement is anathema to many of the warlords, such as General Dostum, Ismail Khan, Ata Mohammad Noor, Ahmad Zia Masoud and others, who appear to be in the process of creating a grand alliance to ensure they have a voice at the conference and negotiations. None of them trust Karzai or believe that he represents them. As Daiyar says: "Before the Taliban come to an agreement with the international community, it's important that they should come to an understanding with Afghans who resisted them for years; otherwise it's no solution to the conflict. The international troops have already announced withdrawal by 2014. They are not the problem for Taliban; rather the bigger challenges are internal in Afghanistan. The ineffective Peace Council should also bear in mind that it's not only the international community having problems with Taliban, but more serious problems with Taliban are from inside Afghanistan."
Daiyar wants conference organisers to make sure all factions of Afghan society, including women, are represented and that Afghans should be able to discuss the "fault lines" of the current system.
Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analysts Network has also been writing on similar themes. As he notes:
"They do not need a Karzai-Taleban deal that opens the exit door for foreign troops, they need an end of the bloodshed that will also physically reopen spaces for economic and political(!) activities, a debate about where their country is going. A deal which does not address main causes of the conflict (namely the monopoly over power of resources concentrated in the hands of a small elite, then possibly with some additional Taleban players) will not bring peace. Therefore, the ‘political process’ (the euphemism for talking to the Taleban in the programme of the Bonn conference) needs to involve a representative cross-section of Afghan society, including former anti-Taleban mujahedin, the ethnic minorities that have suffered most under the Taleban yoke and what usually is called civil society, including the women constituency, another main victim of past Taleban rule." Wise words.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
