Posts
Monday, 30 November 2009
US govt defends its policy on Afghanistan
On Wednesday afternoon at 1.30pm Washington time Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, will all be giving evidence to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the subject of US Strategy in Afghanistan. Should be interesting. You can watch it live on TV here.
Rumsfeld the architect of bin Laden's escape
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Kerry, has just published Tora Bora Revisited: How we failed to get bin Laden and why it matters today (funny how committees are now apeing the publishing world's fad for overlong and complicated titles!).
It re-examines the farcical and half-hearted attempt to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001. They failed and the reasons are neatly summed up in the report:
"Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area."
It was the former US defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his military commander, General Tommy Franks, who made the incomprehensible decision not to reinforce the commandos, believing that large US forces would face a backlash and that, anyway, the war could be won by small groups of special forces acting in concert with local warlords. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that Rumsfeld is a dangerous idiot.
The Senate committee report makes it clear that, despite earlier denials, there was plenty of evidence that bin Laden and his senior commanders were at Tora Bora. The official history of the US Special Operations Command says: "All source reporting corroborated his presence on several days from 9-14 December".
As this report was produced by a Democratic-majority committee, its political overtones should not be dismissed. But before they become too complacent, the committee members may well want to consider how history will judge US policy in Afghanistan since January 2009.
It re-examines the farcical and half-hearted attempt to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001. They failed and the reasons are neatly summed up in the report:
"Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area."
It was the former US defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his military commander, General Tommy Franks, who made the incomprehensible decision not to reinforce the commandos, believing that large US forces would face a backlash and that, anyway, the war could be won by small groups of special forces acting in concert with local warlords. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that Rumsfeld is a dangerous idiot.
The Senate committee report makes it clear that, despite earlier denials, there was plenty of evidence that bin Laden and his senior commanders were at Tora Bora. The official history of the US Special Operations Command says: "All source reporting corroborated his presence on several days from 9-14 December".
As this report was produced by a Democratic-majority committee, its political overtones should not be dismissed. But before they become too complacent, the committee members may well want to consider how history will judge US policy in Afghanistan since January 2009.
How to bring peace through reconciliation
When Michael Semple, the Irish-born and Dari-speaking UN deputy head of mission in Afghanistan was expelled from that country in December 2007 for allegedly talking to the Taliban, it was widely recognised that this was a major blow to Western efforts at reconciliation.
Semple was expelled together with Mervyn Patterson, a British-born UN official after they travelled to Helmand and made contact with tribal leaders close to the Taliban. The Afghan security services believed they were involved in unauthorised contacts and were offering to pay commanders who defected.
Although it was not said openly, the suspicion was that both men were working for MI6. It later transpired that both men were the victim of petty jealousies, with one local leader reporting them to the Afghan intelligence service because he feared being marginalised.
Semple and Patterson insisted that their talks were legitimate. In part they were based on theories that Semple has now outlined in much greater detail in a new publication called Reconcialiation in Afghanistan, published by the United States Institute for Peace.
In this short, but very readable book, Semple outlines his argument that peace is achievable in Afghanistan. He says two-thirds of the Taliban are fighting not for idealogical reasons, but due to local conflicts and that these networks can be persuaded to reach an accommodation with the government.
Semple says his book is based on interviews between 2004 and 2007 with around 200 Afghans who had been involved directly or indirectly in the country's insurgency, ranging from senior Taliban leaders to the lowest level of insurgent. At least one was a provincial commander. "Many of the men expressed their aspirations for the future," writes Semple, "and none of them came across as crazy or fanatic."
The book gives excellent descriptions of all the attempts to date to open negotiations with insurgents in Afghanistan and offers many strategies for continuing that process. He says:
"To date, the focus of the Afghan government and international partners has been primarily on achieving subjugation or co-option of the armed opposition. But these efforts have achieved little strategic effects, partly because the fear of appeasement or capitulation has been used to deter potially effective measures of accommodation."
This book should be required reading for all military personnel in Afghanistan.
Semple was expelled together with Mervyn Patterson, a British-born UN official after they travelled to Helmand and made contact with tribal leaders close to the Taliban. The Afghan security services believed they were involved in unauthorised contacts and were offering to pay commanders who defected.
Although it was not said openly, the suspicion was that both men were working for MI6. It later transpired that both men were the victim of petty jealousies, with one local leader reporting them to the Afghan intelligence service because he feared being marginalised.
Semple and Patterson insisted that their talks were legitimate. In part they were based on theories that Semple has now outlined in much greater detail in a new publication called Reconcialiation in Afghanistan, published by the United States Institute for Peace.
In this short, but very readable book, Semple outlines his argument that peace is achievable in Afghanistan. He says two-thirds of the Taliban are fighting not for idealogical reasons, but due to local conflicts and that these networks can be persuaded to reach an accommodation with the government.
Semple says his book is based on interviews between 2004 and 2007 with around 200 Afghans who had been involved directly or indirectly in the country's insurgency, ranging from senior Taliban leaders to the lowest level of insurgent. At least one was a provincial commander. "Many of the men expressed their aspirations for the future," writes Semple, "and none of them came across as crazy or fanatic."
The book gives excellent descriptions of all the attempts to date to open negotiations with insurgents in Afghanistan and offers many strategies for continuing that process. He says:
"To date, the focus of the Afghan government and international partners has been primarily on achieving subjugation or co-option of the armed opposition. But these efforts have achieved little strategic effects, partly because the fear of appeasement or capitulation has been used to deter potially effective measures of accommodation."
This book should be required reading for all military personnel in Afghanistan.
Wednesday, 25 November 2009
Claims that Blackwater is active in Pakistan
In a remarkable article published in The Nation, US journalist Jeremy Scahill alleges that the controversial private security company Blackwater (now known as Xe) is involved in a "secret war " in Pakistan, involving the planned assassination of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives.
He says his main unnamed source "has worked on covert US military programs for years, including Afghanistan and Pakistan," and has direct knowledge of Blackwater's activities. If he is correct, his allegations will have a massive impact in Pakistan, which is already awash with rumours involving Blackwater.
The potential for blowback is enormous. Already many people in Pakistan are convinced that several recent car bombings, particularly in Peshawar in the North West Frontier, are the work of foreign intelligence agencies.
Two weeks ago, al-Qaeda's commander of military operations in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, issued a statement on the subject:
"Today, everyone knows what Blackwater and the criminal security contractors are doing after they came to Pakistan with the support of the criminal, corrupt government and its intelligence and security apparatus. They are the ones who commit these heinous acts, then accuse the Mujahedeen of their crimes."
According to Scahill, who is the respected author of Blackwater: The rise of the World's most powerful Mercenary Army (Serpent's Tail, 2007), Blackwater is continuing to work in Pakistan, even though a covert CIA program was closed down in June 2009. Its operatives, almost all ex-special forces, are working with the US Joint Special Operations Command to plan actions that are then carried out by the US Army.
In addition, says Scahill, Blackwater has a contract with a Pakistani company called Kestral Logistics, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting and is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. He adds that his sources have told him that Blackwater staff often take part in Kestral actions, particularly along the border with Afghanistan where they are known to work with the Frontier Corps.
Blackwater staff also work on two drone programs in Pakistan - one for the CIA and another for the JSOC. A source in military intelligence told Scahill: "So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes."
None of Scahill's sources are named, nor does he appear to have any physical evidence or photos for the claims he makes. Blackwater, the US Army, the US Ambassador to Pakistan have all denied the story. So far the Pakistani press has been subdued on the subject. But all that could change very quickly and the consequences for the military campaign against the Islamist militias in Pakistan will be immense.
He says his main unnamed source "has worked on covert US military programs for years, including Afghanistan and Pakistan," and has direct knowledge of Blackwater's activities. If he is correct, his allegations will have a massive impact in Pakistan, which is already awash with rumours involving Blackwater.
The potential for blowback is enormous. Already many people in Pakistan are convinced that several recent car bombings, particularly in Peshawar in the North West Frontier, are the work of foreign intelligence agencies.
Two weeks ago, al-Qaeda's commander of military operations in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, issued a statement on the subject:
"Today, everyone knows what Blackwater and the criminal security contractors are doing after they came to Pakistan with the support of the criminal, corrupt government and its intelligence and security apparatus. They are the ones who commit these heinous acts, then accuse the Mujahedeen of their crimes."
According to Scahill, who is the respected author of Blackwater: The rise of the World's most powerful Mercenary Army (Serpent's Tail, 2007), Blackwater is continuing to work in Pakistan, even though a covert CIA program was closed down in June 2009. Its operatives, almost all ex-special forces, are working with the US Joint Special Operations Command to plan actions that are then carried out by the US Army.
In addition, says Scahill, Blackwater has a contract with a Pakistani company called Kestral Logistics, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting and is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. He adds that his sources have told him that Blackwater staff often take part in Kestral actions, particularly along the border with Afghanistan where they are known to work with the Frontier Corps.
Blackwater staff also work on two drone programs in Pakistan - one for the CIA and another for the JSOC. A source in military intelligence told Scahill: "So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes."
None of Scahill's sources are named, nor does he appear to have any physical evidence or photos for the claims he makes. Blackwater, the US Army, the US Ambassador to Pakistan have all denied the story. So far the Pakistani press has been subdued on the subject. But all that could change very quickly and the consequences for the military campaign against the Islamist militias in Pakistan will be immense.
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
Anthropology and the US Army
The death of an American anthropologist embedded with a US Army platoon in southern Afghanistan last February has not stopped the controversial $250 million Human Terrain System (HTS) programme, under which anthropologists are embedded with army units in order to produce in-depth analysis of the tribal and social structure of communities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
I spotted this ad from the British company BAe Systems which is recruiting staff to work as analysts for the HTS Research Reachback Cell, based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce "culturally specific details in support of operational planning and related activities".
In February, anthropologist Paula Loyd died after a man in a village in southern Afghanistan poured inflammable liquid over her and set her on fire. Soldiers with her shot and killed her attacker. She was the third person on the HTS programme to die in the field. More on the background here.
Academia has always had reservations about such work. In November 2007, a year after the HTS was established, the American Anthropological Institute issued a statement advising its members to take extreme care before working with the military:
"We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing."
That has clearly not stopped people working for the HTS. The BAe Systems advert does not insist on a degree, but says candidates must have a minimum of seven years experience in intelligence analysis and production, civil affairs or psychological operations. Those recruited will work as members of a "cultural research team consisting of multi-discipline analysts and area subject matter experts providing regional cultural and analytical expertise to military decision makers in support of current operations". This would appear to go against the AAI guidelines.
It is interesting to note that some of the HTS output is in the public domain. My cousin's enemy is my friend: A study of Pashtun "tribes" in Afghanistan is a fascinating document. Published in September, it eloquently argues that the tribal system in Afghanistan is much misunderstood. Pashtuns do not operate along tribal lines, but along qawm lines. A qawm is a group with a specific interest which may cut across tribal and ethnic lines. In addition, the report points out that there is a traditional hostility between cousins on the father's side. Numerous feuds are based on this rivalry. The report states:
"In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain. In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish."
What is remarkable about this report is the fact that just as it was being published, the US army revealed that it was attempting to build a system of tribal militias in Afghanistan. The militias have little chance of success if any of the research from the HTS is to believed. A case of one hand not knowing what the other is doing?
I spotted this ad from the British company BAe Systems which is recruiting staff to work as analysts for the HTS Research Reachback Cell, based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce "culturally specific details in support of operational planning and related activities".
In February, anthropologist Paula Loyd died after a man in a village in southern Afghanistan poured inflammable liquid over her and set her on fire. Soldiers with her shot and killed her attacker. She was the third person on the HTS programme to die in the field. More on the background here.
Academia has always had reservations about such work. In November 2007, a year after the HTS was established, the American Anthropological Institute issued a statement advising its members to take extreme care before working with the military:
"We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing."
That has clearly not stopped people working for the HTS. The BAe Systems advert does not insist on a degree, but says candidates must have a minimum of seven years experience in intelligence analysis and production, civil affairs or psychological operations. Those recruited will work as members of a "cultural research team consisting of multi-discipline analysts and area subject matter experts providing regional cultural and analytical expertise to military decision makers in support of current operations". This would appear to go against the AAI guidelines.
It is interesting to note that some of the HTS output is in the public domain. My cousin's enemy is my friend: A study of Pashtun "tribes" in Afghanistan is a fascinating document. Published in September, it eloquently argues that the tribal system in Afghanistan is much misunderstood. Pashtuns do not operate along tribal lines, but along qawm lines. A qawm is a group with a specific interest which may cut across tribal and ethnic lines. In addition, the report points out that there is a traditional hostility between cousins on the father's side. Numerous feuds are based on this rivalry. The report states:
"In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain. In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish."
What is remarkable about this report is the fact that just as it was being published, the US army revealed that it was attempting to build a system of tribal militias in Afghanistan. The militias have little chance of success if any of the research from the HTS is to believed. A case of one hand not knowing what the other is doing?
Saturday, 21 November 2009
Three books worth reading
I've come across several fascinating books recently that should be required reading for anyone seeking to understand events in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
First, The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen (Hurst and Co, London 2009), a former Australian army officer and now a leading expert on guerrilla warfare and chief counterterrorism strategist for the US State Department. Although it is not solely about Afghanistan, Kilcullen's clear thinking shines out of this book.
There are too many gems of insight in this book to list them all, but here are a few of the more salient points. He argues that the insurgency in Afghanistan is not primarily focussed on overthrowing the Afghan state, but on consolidating the Pashtun areas under their control - on both sides of the border.
He says the strategy is not a classical Maoist protracted warfare insurgency: "A Maoist approach seeks victory through a displacement strategy of building what classical counterinsurgency theorists call 'parallel hierarchies' - a competitive system of control tantamount to a guerrilla counter-state in permanently liberated areas - which then spread across the country and seek to defeat the government in, eventually, a relatively conventional war of manoeuvre. Rather the Taliban appears to be applying an exhaustion strategy of sapping the energy, resources and support of the Afghan government and its international partners, making the country ungovernable and hoping that the international community will eventually withdraw in exhaustion and leave the government to collapse under the weight of its own lack of effectiveness and legitimacy."
How true! He contrasts the Taliban's concentration on providing governance (including courts) in the areas it controls, to the actions of the Karzai government which ignores these issues.
Kilcullen also point to the importance the Taliban attaches to propaganda, again in contrast to both the Afghan government and the Coalition forces: "The insurgents treat propaganda as their main effort, coordinating physical attacks in support of a sophisticated propaganda campaign."
All is not lost, according to Kilcullen, who point to the insurgents' in ability to break out of their Pashtun/international jihadi circle and spread into other ethnicities or language groups.
A second book that also makes fascinating reading is Decoding the New Taliban, edited by Antonio Giustozzi (also published by Hurst & Co). The essays it contains include 'The Taliban and the Opium Trade' by Gretchen Peters, 'The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History' by Thomas Coghlan, 'The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan' by Claudio Franco. There are ten further essays and many insights in all of them.
Finally, I thoroughly recommend Talibanisation of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11 by Pakistani journalist Amir Mir (Pentagon Security International, New Delhi, 2009). Mir's relentless investigation into the nexus between the TTP and the Pakistan military and intelligence communities is superb, showing as it does how the very forces nurtured by the ISI as an instrument of foreign policy turned on their masters and now threaten the stability of the state itself.
First, The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen (Hurst and Co, London 2009), a former Australian army officer and now a leading expert on guerrilla warfare and chief counterterrorism strategist for the US State Department. Although it is not solely about Afghanistan, Kilcullen's clear thinking shines out of this book.
There are too many gems of insight in this book to list them all, but here are a few of the more salient points. He argues that the insurgency in Afghanistan is not primarily focussed on overthrowing the Afghan state, but on consolidating the Pashtun areas under their control - on both sides of the border.
He says the strategy is not a classical Maoist protracted warfare insurgency: "A Maoist approach seeks victory through a displacement strategy of building what classical counterinsurgency theorists call 'parallel hierarchies' - a competitive system of control tantamount to a guerrilla counter-state in permanently liberated areas - which then spread across the country and seek to defeat the government in, eventually, a relatively conventional war of manoeuvre. Rather the Taliban appears to be applying an exhaustion strategy of sapping the energy, resources and support of the Afghan government and its international partners, making the country ungovernable and hoping that the international community will eventually withdraw in exhaustion and leave the government to collapse under the weight of its own lack of effectiveness and legitimacy."
How true! He contrasts the Taliban's concentration on providing governance (including courts) in the areas it controls, to the actions of the Karzai government which ignores these issues.
Kilcullen also point to the importance the Taliban attaches to propaganda, again in contrast to both the Afghan government and the Coalition forces: "The insurgents treat propaganda as their main effort, coordinating physical attacks in support of a sophisticated propaganda campaign."
All is not lost, according to Kilcullen, who point to the insurgents' in ability to break out of their Pashtun/international jihadi circle and spread into other ethnicities or language groups.
A second book that also makes fascinating reading is Decoding the New Taliban, edited by Antonio Giustozzi (also published by Hurst & Co). The essays it contains include 'The Taliban and the Opium Trade' by Gretchen Peters, 'The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History' by Thomas Coghlan, 'The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan' by Claudio Franco. There are ten further essays and many insights in all of them.
Finally, I thoroughly recommend Talibanisation of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11 by Pakistani journalist Amir Mir (Pentagon Security International, New Delhi, 2009). Mir's relentless investigation into the nexus between the TTP and the Pakistan military and intelligence communities is superb, showing as it does how the very forces nurtured by the ISI as an instrument of foreign policy turned on their masters and now threaten the stability of the state itself.
Devastating impact of waterboarding
In case you haven't seen it before, this short film demonstrates the devastating power of the waterboarding technique, as used on al-Qaeda's main planner for 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (more than 180 times), and others held at Guantanamo and elsewhere.
I should add that KSM told his interrogators little that he had not already told to al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda in an interview in Karachi months before his arrest. The result of Fouda's interviews, which took place over several days in an al-Qaeda safe house, were published in the book we wrote together, Masterminds of Terror. Despite being the only person ever to interview KSM - and his co-conspirator Ramzi Binalshibh - Fouda was not asked to testify to the 9/11 Commission.
I should add that KSM told his interrogators little that he had not already told to al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda in an interview in Karachi months before his arrest. The result of Fouda's interviews, which took place over several days in an al-Qaeda safe house, were published in the book we wrote together, Masterminds of Terror. Despite being the only person ever to interview KSM - and his co-conspirator Ramzi Binalshibh - Fouda was not asked to testify to the 9/11 Commission.
Wednesday, 18 November 2009
Counting the cost of thirty years of war
Thirty years of war in Afghanistan have had a devastating impact on the country, including the deaths of around two million Afghanis, the displacement of millions more and the destruction of much of its infrastructure, according to The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict 1978-2009, a report published today by nine NGOs working in the country.
However, what this has actually meant for millions of Afghans is brought home by the report, whose authors conducted detailed interviews with more than 700 men and women in 14 provinces. They found, for example, that two people out of five reported having property destroyed, while a third were robbed at some point. More than three-quarters of interviewees reported being forced to leave their homes, of whom 41 per cent were internally displaced and 42 per cent were externally displaced. The rest were displaced at home and abroad. Asked about the current conflict, 17 per cent said they were thinking of leaving the country.
Thirteen per cent reported being imprisoned, an experience that was described as arbitrary and linked with harassment, extortion and threats from local power holders. Release only came when relatives paid bribes or elders negotiated their release. One in five respondents reported being tortured, but only one per cent of these reported receiving any compensation or apology.
Seventy per cent of those interviewed believed unemployment and poverty as a major cause of the conflict, while almost half pointed to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government.
The interviewees' recommendations to the Afghan goverment are obvious and direct - stop corruption, uphold the law, investigate wrongdoing, reform the police and judiciary. They urge the international community to hold the Afghan government accountable and provide support for local and regional peacebuilding.
All this is fine as far as it goes, but perhaps the NGOs behind this project should have asked a few more questions of themselves. More than 40 per cent of all the billions of dollars spent on aid in Afghanistan never reaches the Afghan people. In fact it often never even leaves the donor country. Instead it is received as fees by NGOs and others who take the lion's share. Who's willing to put their hand up and take responsibility for that?
However, what this has actually meant for millions of Afghans is brought home by the report, whose authors conducted detailed interviews with more than 700 men and women in 14 provinces. They found, for example, that two people out of five reported having property destroyed, while a third were robbed at some point. More than three-quarters of interviewees reported being forced to leave their homes, of whom 41 per cent were internally displaced and 42 per cent were externally displaced. The rest were displaced at home and abroad. Asked about the current conflict, 17 per cent said they were thinking of leaving the country.
Thirteen per cent reported being imprisoned, an experience that was described as arbitrary and linked with harassment, extortion and threats from local power holders. Release only came when relatives paid bribes or elders negotiated their release. One in five respondents reported being tortured, but only one per cent of these reported receiving any compensation or apology.
Seventy per cent of those interviewed believed unemployment and poverty as a major cause of the conflict, while almost half pointed to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government.
The interviewees' recommendations to the Afghan goverment are obvious and direct - stop corruption, uphold the law, investigate wrongdoing, reform the police and judiciary. They urge the international community to hold the Afghan government accountable and provide support for local and regional peacebuilding.
All this is fine as far as it goes, but perhaps the NGOs behind this project should have asked a few more questions of themselves. More than 40 per cent of all the billions of dollars spent on aid in Afghanistan never reaches the Afghan people. In fact it often never even leaves the donor country. Instead it is received as fees by NGOs and others who take the lion's share. Who's willing to put their hand up and take responsibility for that?
Tuesday, 17 November 2009
NATO Parliamentarians debate Afghanistan
Afghanistan was the focus of much debate at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, meeting in Edinburgh this week. The Assembly, which brings together 350 parliamentarians from 28 NATO countries twice a year, heard General Sir Peter Wall, British Commander in Chief of Land Forces, admit that progress in Afghanistan had been slow and that this was affecting public support for the conflict.
The General also endorsed the idea of engaging select elements of the Taliban in political dialogue. “We want to see the reconcilable Taliban elements integrated, and we want to see the irreconcilable dealt with” said Sir Peter, noting that no counter-insurgency has ever been successful without such an engagement, and that similar initiatives were in fact already taking place at tribal level.
Retired German general Klaus Naumann criticised the Alliance’s reactive attitude towards US policy on Afghanistan. General Naumann went on to underline that NATO should aim to find “an Afghan solution” to establish a functioning state in the country.
“Simply sending in more NATO troops cannot be the solution” he said. “A viable strategy should build on past successes and, coupled together with a counterinsurgency strategy, should be oriented fundamentally around reconstruction”. This would include “working jointly with moderate elements” of the Taliban, of whom he estimated “no more than ten percent” were irreconcilable radicals. The general’s characteristically outspoken presentation was warmly received by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s political committee, and frequently interrupted by applause.
Professor Paul Wilkinson, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, said that it would be a “disaster” to withdraw troops from the country as this would allow the network to use it as a base for its international terrorist activities. Success in Afghanistan depended not simply on sending more troops, but required a holistic strategy, he pointed out.
Such a strategy must include political and economic measures, reinforced dialogue with moderate Muslim groups, intelligence gathering and broad and robust counter-proliferation measures to prevent acquisition of biological and nuclear weapons. “I believe that a holistic strategy has not been achieved yet but unless we do, we are not likely to win this struggle in the long run” he concluded.
The General also endorsed the idea of engaging select elements of the Taliban in political dialogue. “We want to see the reconcilable Taliban elements integrated, and we want to see the irreconcilable dealt with” said Sir Peter, noting that no counter-insurgency has ever been successful without such an engagement, and that similar initiatives were in fact already taking place at tribal level.
Retired German general Klaus Naumann criticised the Alliance’s reactive attitude towards US policy on Afghanistan. General Naumann went on to underline that NATO should aim to find “an Afghan solution” to establish a functioning state in the country.
“Simply sending in more NATO troops cannot be the solution” he said. “A viable strategy should build on past successes and, coupled together with a counterinsurgency strategy, should be oriented fundamentally around reconstruction”. This would include “working jointly with moderate elements” of the Taliban, of whom he estimated “no more than ten percent” were irreconcilable radicals. The general’s characteristically outspoken presentation was warmly received by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s political committee, and frequently interrupted by applause.
Professor Paul Wilkinson, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, said that it would be a “disaster” to withdraw troops from the country as this would allow the network to use it as a base for its international terrorist activities. Success in Afghanistan depended not simply on sending more troops, but required a holistic strategy, he pointed out.
Such a strategy must include political and economic measures, reinforced dialogue with moderate Muslim groups, intelligence gathering and broad and robust counter-proliferation measures to prevent acquisition of biological and nuclear weapons. “I believe that a holistic strategy has not been achieved yet but unless we do, we are not likely to win this struggle in the long run” he concluded.
Sunday, 15 November 2009
US opens new $60 million wing at Bagram prison
Bagram from the airThe US military unveiled a new $60 million prison at Bagram airbase, north of the capital Kabul today, saying it would provide detainees with better living conditions and also promote transparency. Reporters were allowed to visit the facility although it presently contains no inmates. They will start being moved into their new cells during the next two weeks. It is expected that all 700 prisoners presently held in the old prison at Bagram will be transferred by the end of the year. The new prison can hold up to 1,240 prisoners.
Asked how he would describe conditions at the old prison, US commanding officer Brigadier Mark Martins said it had always met international and domestic standards. In fact, prisoners at Bagram have minimal rights. They wear the same orange jump suits as prisoners held at Guantanamo, but have even fewer basic legal rights, such as the right to appear at military hearings that could assess whether or not they pose a security threat.
In June the BBC reported allegations of abuse and neglect at the facility, having interviewed 27 former detainees. The former detainees alleged they were beaten, deprived of sleep and threatened with dogs at the base.
In April 2009 the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act request for documents and information held by the CIA and Department of Defence on the prisoners in Bagram. It was seeking information on "the number of people currently detained at Bagram, their names, citizenship, place of capture and length of detention, as well as records pertaining to the process afforded those prisoners to challenge their detention and designation as ‘enemy combatants.’"
In a letter responding to the ACLU’s FOIA request, the CIA said it could "neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence" of records containing the information requested by the ACLU.
The DOD’s response said that the department has a list containing basic detainee information, including names, capture dates and circumstances, and length of detainment. However, the DOD said that this list is classified, and cannot be released for national security and personal privacy reasons.
"There are serious concerns that Bagram is another Guantánamo – except with many more prisoners, less due process, no access to lawyers or courts and reportedly worse conditions," said Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project. "As long as the Bagram prison is shrouded in secrecy, there is no way to know the truth or begin to address the problems that exist there." In September ACLU and the New York Civil Liberties Union issued a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Departments of Defense, Justice and State and the CIA, to enforce a FOIA request for the Bagram records. That case has still to be heard.
In recent years Bagram Airbase has expanded enormously and is now a small town spread over around 5,000 acres. The airfield is already handling 400 tonnes of cargo and 1,000 passengers daily, while plans are underway to build a new $22 million passenger terminal and a cargo yard costing $9 million. To increase cargo capacity, a parking ramp supporting the world's largest aircraft is to be completed in early 2010.
Thursday, 12 November 2009
Rash of propaganda stories widely believed
Stories from either side of the Durand Line illustrate the point that truth is always a matter for negotiation. Writing in the Jamestown Foundation's Global Terrorism Analysis, Andrew McGregor discusses the weird story of the "foreign helicopters" that are allegedly ferrying Taliban fighters to Baghlan, Kunduz and Samangan provinces in the north of Afghanistan. Even President Karzai has said the helicopters belong to "foreign powers" such as the United States and its allies.
Tolo TV reported Karzai saying: “We have received reliable reports from our intelligence service. We have received reliable reports from our people, and today I received a report that these efforts [to transfer Taliban fighters] are also being made mysteriously in the northwest. The issue of helicopters has also been proved. We do not make any more comments now and investigations are under way to see to whom and to which foreign country these helicopters belong.”
The story appeared in its most developed form in a statement issued in mid October by Iran's Press TV. Their story, quoting unnamed diplomats, alleged that Sultan Munadi, the Afghan journalist killed when UK special forces freed New York Times reporter Stephen Farrell from Taliban custody, was killed because he had documents and photographs verifying the British role in the chopper flights.
McGreggor also noted: "It was not long before the “mystery helicopters” were seen in Pakistan, where the “foreign allies” of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were alleged to be rescuing Taliban militants from the government offensive in South Waziristan. An Islamabad daily reported the belief of “some experts” that the airlift was part of a deal between the Western nations and the so-called “good Taliban”."
What is remarkable is that these stories are widely believed throughout Afghanistan and that the stories have travelled so fast.
Then last week, Washington Post reporter Pamela Constable reported an equally remarkable story in Peshawar, where only a few days previously the Mina Bazaar had been hit by a massive car bomb, killing more than 100 people.
No-one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, but there is little doubt it was organised by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in retaliation for the army offensive in South Waziristan. Car bombs went off three days in a row in and around Peshawar last week, killing dozens more people.
Constable reported that most of the outrage expressed by survivors, witnesses, religious leaders and other residents was not directed at Islamist extremist groups, but at the countries many Pakistanis see as their true enemies: India, Israel and the United States.
She said: "In part, this reaction stems from a deep popular conviction that no Muslim could perpetrate such atrocities against other Muslims. The more egregious the attack, the stronger seems the tendency to deny a domestic cause and blame other, more remote culprits. Some religious and political groups are encouraging such responses, eager to whip up xenophobic sentiment for their own ends."
She noted that the Jamaat-e-Islami religious party organized a “peace march” in central Peshawar from the Khyber Bazaar, scene of another car bomb that killed more than 30 people on 9 October, to the Mina Bazaar. "The marchers held up banners and shouted slogans denouncing the CIA, the Pentagon, the security company formerly known as Blackwater, U.S. drone attacks and American aid. There was no mention of the Taliban or al-Qaeda.
“Muslims! Muslims! We are here to protest against those wrongdoers who work for India, Israel and the United States,” a well-dressed, middle-aged rally organizer shouted through a bullhorn. “We protest against American interference and against our government, which is handing over Pakistan to the foreigners and the unbelievers.”"
A similar story could be told about the "Blackwater" fever that is also gripping Pakistan. Stories appear regularly suggesting that Xe, the company formerly known as Blackwater, is operating in secret in Pakistan. A week ago it was reported that 202 Blackwater personnel arrived in Islamabad on a flight from Heathrow. Many of them were speaking fluent Urdu, the reports said (as if!!!).
What all these stories illustrate is that the truth alone is no antidote to malicious propaganda. And the propaganda, whatever we may think of it, is very good. It achieves its fundamental goal; it is believed by many tens of thousands of people. Who is responsible for it?
Update: On Thursday, al-Qaeda's No.3 in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, issued a recording saying that Blackwater was behind the suicide attacks in Peshawar: "Today, everyone knows what Blackwater and the criminal security contractors are doing after they came to Pakistan with the support of the criminal, corrupt government and its intelligence and security apparatus," Yazid said.
On the same day, the BBC's Orla Guerin interviewed a 14-year-old boy from Bajaur who told her how he had been beaten and forced to train as a suicide bomber by the TTP.
Tolo TV reported Karzai saying: “We have received reliable reports from our intelligence service. We have received reliable reports from our people, and today I received a report that these efforts [to transfer Taliban fighters] are also being made mysteriously in the northwest. The issue of helicopters has also been proved. We do not make any more comments now and investigations are under way to see to whom and to which foreign country these helicopters belong.”
The story appeared in its most developed form in a statement issued in mid October by Iran's Press TV. Their story, quoting unnamed diplomats, alleged that Sultan Munadi, the Afghan journalist killed when UK special forces freed New York Times reporter Stephen Farrell from Taliban custody, was killed because he had documents and photographs verifying the British role in the chopper flights.
McGreggor also noted: "It was not long before the “mystery helicopters” were seen in Pakistan, where the “foreign allies” of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were alleged to be rescuing Taliban militants from the government offensive in South Waziristan. An Islamabad daily reported the belief of “some experts” that the airlift was part of a deal between the Western nations and the so-called “good Taliban”."
What is remarkable is that these stories are widely believed throughout Afghanistan and that the stories have travelled so fast.
Then last week, Washington Post reporter Pamela Constable reported an equally remarkable story in Peshawar, where only a few days previously the Mina Bazaar had been hit by a massive car bomb, killing more than 100 people.
No-one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, but there is little doubt it was organised by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in retaliation for the army offensive in South Waziristan. Car bombs went off three days in a row in and around Peshawar last week, killing dozens more people.
Constable reported that most of the outrage expressed by survivors, witnesses, religious leaders and other residents was not directed at Islamist extremist groups, but at the countries many Pakistanis see as their true enemies: India, Israel and the United States.
She said: "In part, this reaction stems from a deep popular conviction that no Muslim could perpetrate such atrocities against other Muslims. The more egregious the attack, the stronger seems the tendency to deny a domestic cause and blame other, more remote culprits. Some religious and political groups are encouraging such responses, eager to whip up xenophobic sentiment for their own ends."
She noted that the Jamaat-e-Islami religious party organized a “peace march” in central Peshawar from the Khyber Bazaar, scene of another car bomb that killed more than 30 people on 9 October, to the Mina Bazaar. "The marchers held up banners and shouted slogans denouncing the CIA, the Pentagon, the security company formerly known as Blackwater, U.S. drone attacks and American aid. There was no mention of the Taliban or al-Qaeda.
“Muslims! Muslims! We are here to protest against those wrongdoers who work for India, Israel and the United States,” a well-dressed, middle-aged rally organizer shouted through a bullhorn. “We protest against American interference and against our government, which is handing over Pakistan to the foreigners and the unbelievers.”"
A similar story could be told about the "Blackwater" fever that is also gripping Pakistan. Stories appear regularly suggesting that Xe, the company formerly known as Blackwater, is operating in secret in Pakistan. A week ago it was reported that 202 Blackwater personnel arrived in Islamabad on a flight from Heathrow. Many of them were speaking fluent Urdu, the reports said (as if!!!).
What all these stories illustrate is that the truth alone is no antidote to malicious propaganda. And the propaganda, whatever we may think of it, is very good. It achieves its fundamental goal; it is believed by many tens of thousands of people. Who is responsible for it?
Update: On Thursday, al-Qaeda's No.3 in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu Yazid, issued a recording saying that Blackwater was behind the suicide attacks in Peshawar: "Today, everyone knows what Blackwater and the criminal security contractors are doing after they came to Pakistan with the support of the criminal, corrupt government and its intelligence and security apparatus," Yazid said.
On the same day, the BBC's Orla Guerin interviewed a 14-year-old boy from Bajaur who told her how he had been beaten and forced to train as a suicide bomber by the TTP.
Tuesday, 10 November 2009
Circling the Lion's Den one year on
It is now exactly a year since I started this blog. In that time I have written 108 articles and around 7500 of you have logged on; daily visitors now average between 40 and 60. Numbers are rising and several hundred people have bookmarked the blog. In the next year I anticipate at least 40,000 hits and hopefully more. On average about half of the readers come from the United States, followed by the UK, Russia, Australia and a whole host of other countries. Most of you look at more than one page and stay on the site for about two minutes.
Having looked around, there are few blogs on Afghanistan that offer anything like the breadth of coverage you will find on Circling the Lion's Den. Despite minimal publicity on my behalf, the blog has received widespread coverage and has managed to break a number of significant stories including, for example, the Taliban's cartoon channel on YouTube, which was covered around the world. A big thankyou to you all for making it worth my while.
Having looked around, there are few blogs on Afghanistan that offer anything like the breadth of coverage you will find on Circling the Lion's Den. Despite minimal publicity on my behalf, the blog has received widespread coverage and has managed to break a number of significant stories including, for example, the Taliban's cartoon channel on YouTube, which was covered around the world. A big thankyou to you all for making it worth my while.
More signs of division across the Durand Line
In yet another example of the way in which Mullah Omar's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is trying to put distance between itself and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan of Hakimullah Mahsud, an Afghan IEA commander called Abdul Mannan - alias Mullah Toor - has said targeting innocent people in suicide attacks and blasts is wrong. He added in an interveiw with Pakistan's Geo TV that his organisation targets only Americans and Nato forces. Staff from the United Nations in Afghanistan - not to mention Afghan voters, journalists and many others - may wish to disagree.
Saturday, 7 November 2009
Afghan security deteriorates - GAO report
As President Obama ponders his next move in Afghanistan, he will not have been cheered up much by the most recent Government Accountability Office report on the security environment in the country. It shows that Afghanistan's security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting all aspects of US and allied reconstruction operations:
"As we reported in April 2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on US, Afghan and coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan."
The report says the most recent data available (August 2009) showed the highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan's security situation began to deteriorate.
"Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and August 2009 - more than two and a half times the number experienced during the same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks reported in all of 2005."
It notes that violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making increasing use of IEDs, suicide attacks and attacks targeting infrastructure and development projects.
The report notes that US officials cite poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such efforts. It mentions the case of the Kajaki dam, where vital supplies can no longer be transported by road and have to be brought in by air.
A letter to the GAO from Drew Luten, acting assistant administrator from USAID's bureau of management, (and included as an annexe to the report) spells out the extent of the problems:
"Under the section of the draft report regarding oversight of programs due to security concerns, the ongoing security situation in Afghanistan has made comprehensive and direct oversight of ongoing programs difficult. I would further note that due to the deteriorating security situation in the South and East of the country, monitoring of the delivery of heath services has been significantly hindered or stopped in some areas. Additionally, the USAID Agriculture Rapid Response program had three top engineers resign in one month due to threats against them and their families."
"As we reported in April 2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on US, Afghan and coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan."
The report says the most recent data available (August 2009) showed the highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan's security situation began to deteriorate.
"Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and August 2009 - more than two and a half times the number experienced during the same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks reported in all of 2005."
It notes that violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making increasing use of IEDs, suicide attacks and attacks targeting infrastructure and development projects.
The report notes that US officials cite poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such efforts. It mentions the case of the Kajaki dam, where vital supplies can no longer be transported by road and have to be brought in by air.
A letter to the GAO from Drew Luten, acting assistant administrator from USAID's bureau of management, (and included as an annexe to the report) spells out the extent of the problems:
"Under the section of the draft report regarding oversight of programs due to security concerns, the ongoing security situation in Afghanistan has made comprehensive and direct oversight of ongoing programs difficult. I would further note that due to the deteriorating security situation in the South and East of the country, monitoring of the delivery of heath services has been significantly hindered or stopped in some areas. Additionally, the USAID Agriculture Rapid Response program had three top engineers resign in one month due to threats against them and their families."
Friday, 6 November 2009
Pak Taliban flees in front of army offensive
The Pakistan Army announced today that four weeks after the start of Operation Rah-e-Nijat, its forces had entered into the town of Makeen in South Waziristan, having already routed the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from a whole swathe of the region. This is no small feat. The militants had been left largely to their own devices in this region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for many years and had built up huge stockpiles of weapons and hidden arms dumps.
The last time the army attempted to enforce its writ in this area, in 2008, it was forced into a humiliating retreat. Then, in order to ensure the safe extraction of 300 of its soldiers holed up in a fort at Ladha, a few miles to the south of Makin, the army agreed to withdraw from the area and cede the fort to Baitullah Mahsud and his militants to be used as a "dispensary".
This time it is different. The speed of the Rah-e-Nijat offensive against the much-feared Mahsuds and their TTP and al-Qaeda allies has been truly astounding. The three-pronged Army offensive has captured just about every major town and village in the region, including Sherwangi, Kotkai, Kaniguram and Sararogha.
What is different this time? According to the Army itself, it has been done by adopting the very tactics used successfully in the past by the tribesmen. Instead of moving slowly and cautiously along the few roads in the area, where they would always be sitting targets for ambushes and IEDs, the troops have stuck to the hills, taking over ridges and commanding features before moving down to enter a built-up area.
"We have beaten them at their own tactic. This has been the classic Mehsud tactic, encircling and ambushing the enemy from the ridges and commanding features and we did the same to them. They were not prepared for this,’ one official told The Dawn newspaper .
In addition, the army has sent in 30,000 troops, many more than in previous incursions into the area. But probably the most important factor was air power from the Pakistan Air Force and the Army's aviation wing. Recently supplied with American high resolution cameras and night vision goggles - and using its own unmanned aerial vehicles (see my posting below) - the jets and helicopters were able to pick off their targets. The Taliban suddenly found that they no longer "owned the night", as they had done in the past.
In each engagement, the militants found themselves outgunned and outsmarted. Before long, even the allegedly tough Uzbek fighters had had enough and many have now decamped to other FATA agencies, including North Waziristan and Orakzai. The Pakistan Army claims to have killed around 500 militants for a loss of only 40 soldiers.
The TTP claim that they are making a tactical retreat only to draw in the army so that it can be better destroyed. However, this is merely talk. As several army officers have already asked, what kind of force that is intent on fighting leaves its weapons and arms dumps behind?
"When somebody retreats, he takes his weapon to fight another day. He does not flee and abandon his weapons. What has happened is that they have left behind huge cache of arms and ammunition", said one officer.
The real question is what happens next. If the Mahsuds and the TTP really are comprehensively defeated and sue for peace, it will have a dramatic impact on the fighting across the border in Afghanistan. We can expect a massive fall-off in attacks in eastern Afghanistan and perhaps a haemorrhage of the more ideologically driven fighters (including many of the foreigners) into Baluchistan.
The Paksitan government is likely to support the formation of tribal lashkars in South Waziristan to restore power to the traditional tribal leaders at the expensive of Hakimullah Mahsud and his clan.
However, the following points should be borne in mind. First, the successes so far are due in no small part to the decision by the Ahmadzai Wazir militant commander Maulvi Nazir in Wana and Hafiz Gul Bahadar to stay neutral and not join the fight.
Second, lashkars will only be formed once the non-TTP tribesmen are certain that the TTP will not be returning to impose their will (and take revenge) on the region.
Third, and most important, Pakistan's military has still not given up on the Afghan Taliban. It only acted against the TTP because it had begun to challenge the writ of the state. Until the Army accepts that the whole Taliban project on both sides of the border is doomed, the conflict is likely to continue. We are still a long way from that.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
