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More on anthropologists and the US Army's Human Terrain System (see my entry for 24 Nov). At its annual meeting in held in Philadelphia this week, the American Anthropological Association published another report on the Human Terrain System. Its Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) published its Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program which has been gestating since December last year.
The report notes that HTS and similar programs are becoming a greater fixture within the US military, a fact that should be a "source of concern" for the AAA and for any social science organisation or federal agency "that expects its members or employees to adhere to established disciplinary and federal standards for the treatment of human subjects".
In fact there are a total of 27 Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) teams, 21 of which are in Iraq and six in Afghanistan. Those working for the HTS go through a four-and-a-half month training programme before being placed into a Human Terrain Team.
At present HTS has 417 employees (including deployed team members, personnel in training, RRC members, and program staff, including both military and non-military personnel). Of those, 135 have an MA degree, 11 are ABD, 49 have a PhD, and 33 have other technical or military degrees.
The report says that any anthropologist working for HTS will have difficulty reconciling potentially irrreconcilable goals and in determining whether or not s/he will be able to follow the AAA's disciplinary Code of Ethics.
The key statement is as follows: "When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic factors of the HTS concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology."
The AAA does not rule out entirely the possibility of constructive engagement between anthropology and the military, although its panel suggests that the organisation should emphasise the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice for job seekers.
One obvious point, if the HTS is beyond the pale for the AAA, what about the university departments - for example at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, which offers Afghanistan Immersion training - that offer courses for HTS employees? How do they feel about their role?
Showing posts with label American Anthropological Institute. Show all posts
Showing posts with label American Anthropological Institute. Show all posts
Friday, 4 December 2009
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
Anthropology and the US Army
The death of an American anthropologist embedded with a US Army platoon in southern Afghanistan last February has not stopped the controversial $250 million Human Terrain System (HTS) programme, under which anthropologists are embedded with army units in order to produce in-depth analysis of the tribal and social structure of communities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
I spotted this ad from the British company BAe Systems which is recruiting staff to work as analysts for the HTS Research Reachback Cell, based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce "culturally specific details in support of operational planning and related activities".
In February, anthropologist Paula Loyd died after a man in a village in southern Afghanistan poured inflammable liquid over her and set her on fire. Soldiers with her shot and killed her attacker. She was the third person on the HTS programme to die in the field. More on the background here.
Academia has always had reservations about such work. In November 2007, a year after the HTS was established, the American Anthropological Institute issued a statement advising its members to take extreme care before working with the military:
"We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing."
That has clearly not stopped people working for the HTS. The BAe Systems advert does not insist on a degree, but says candidates must have a minimum of seven years experience in intelligence analysis and production, civil affairs or psychological operations. Those recruited will work as members of a "cultural research team consisting of multi-discipline analysts and area subject matter experts providing regional cultural and analytical expertise to military decision makers in support of current operations". This would appear to go against the AAI guidelines.
It is interesting to note that some of the HTS output is in the public domain. My cousin's enemy is my friend: A study of Pashtun "tribes" in Afghanistan is a fascinating document. Published in September, it eloquently argues that the tribal system in Afghanistan is much misunderstood. Pashtuns do not operate along tribal lines, but along qawm lines. A qawm is a group with a specific interest which may cut across tribal and ethnic lines. In addition, the report points out that there is a traditional hostility between cousins on the father's side. Numerous feuds are based on this rivalry. The report states:
"In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain. In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish."
What is remarkable about this report is the fact that just as it was being published, the US army revealed that it was attempting to build a system of tribal militias in Afghanistan. The militias have little chance of success if any of the research from the HTS is to believed. A case of one hand not knowing what the other is doing?
I spotted this ad from the British company BAe Systems which is recruiting staff to work as analysts for the HTS Research Reachback Cell, based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce "culturally specific details in support of operational planning and related activities".
In February, anthropologist Paula Loyd died after a man in a village in southern Afghanistan poured inflammable liquid over her and set her on fire. Soldiers with her shot and killed her attacker. She was the third person on the HTS programme to die in the field. More on the background here.
Academia has always had reservations about such work. In November 2007, a year after the HTS was established, the American Anthropological Institute issued a statement advising its members to take extreme care before working with the military:
"We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing."
That has clearly not stopped people working for the HTS. The BAe Systems advert does not insist on a degree, but says candidates must have a minimum of seven years experience in intelligence analysis and production, civil affairs or psychological operations. Those recruited will work as members of a "cultural research team consisting of multi-discipline analysts and area subject matter experts providing regional cultural and analytical expertise to military decision makers in support of current operations". This would appear to go against the AAI guidelines.
It is interesting to note that some of the HTS output is in the public domain. My cousin's enemy is my friend: A study of Pashtun "tribes" in Afghanistan is a fascinating document. Published in September, it eloquently argues that the tribal system in Afghanistan is much misunderstood. Pashtuns do not operate along tribal lines, but along qawm lines. A qawm is a group with a specific interest which may cut across tribal and ethnic lines. In addition, the report points out that there is a traditional hostility between cousins on the father's side. Numerous feuds are based on this rivalry. The report states:
"In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain. In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish."
What is remarkable about this report is the fact that just as it was being published, the US army revealed that it was attempting to build a system of tribal militias in Afghanistan. The militias have little chance of success if any of the research from the HTS is to believed. A case of one hand not knowing what the other is doing?
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