ISI officially represented on Taliban shura - report

Pakistani military intelligence not only funds and trains Taliban fighters in Afghanistan but is officially represented on the movement's leadership council, giving it significant influence over operations, a report released on Sunday said.
The report, The Sun and the Sky: the relationship between Pakisan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents, written by Harvard scholar Matt Waldman and published by the London School of Economics, says research strongly suggested support for the Taliban was the "official policy" of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). Waldman says up to seven members of the Taliban's shura are ISI agents. You can view an al-Jazeera interview with Waldman above.
Links between the some members and former members of the ISI and Islamist militants have been known about for some time, but Waldman's report is new in suggesting that this is the organisation's official policy.
The LSE report states: “As the provider of sanctuary and substantial financial, military and logistical support to the insurgency, the ISI appears to have strong strategic and operational influence — reinforced by coercion. There is thus a strong case that the ISI orchestrates, sustains and shapes the overall insurgent campaign.”
It also alleges that Asif Ali Zardari, the president of Pakistan, recently met captured Taliban leaders to assure them that the Taliban had his government’s full support, although this has been vigorously denied by Zardari’s spokesman.

How to build peace and reconciliation

Plans for reintegrating Taliban fighters must address the concerns of Afghan women

The Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia has published the first in a new series of papers called Afghan Voices.
Will the Afghan Government's reintegration and reconciliation efforts bring peace to Afghanistan? is written by Wazhma Frogh, a postgraduate Chevening Scholar studying International Development Law and Human Rights at Warwick University.
Frogh's paper looks at the background to reintegration programmes in Afghanistan, noting that previous efforts, such as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Plan and the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, failed because they were not directed at the Taliban or they had insufficient authority.
At the Peace Jirga recently concluded in Kabul it seems that everyone was clear on the meaning of reintegration, but that reconciliation is a more difficult concept. Frogh says it has been defined as a dialogue with at least certain elements of the Taliban. However, this was not clarified at the Jirga - which instead asked the government to develop its own framework on both reintegration and reconciliation.
Two concrete proposals emerged: the removal of militants' names from blacklists and the prompt release of Taliban militants from Afghan and ISAF prisons.
Frogh says that to succeed the government's plans must address four key issues: first, the ongoing instability in the country, not all of which is due to the Taliban insurgency, but is also connected to the failure to reward loyal supporters of the regime and also the failure to offer anything to the huge numbers of young people in the country, where around 60 per cent are under 25 years old.
Second,the need to clarify the elements of any potential reconciliation programme. If it is based on financial incentives, what happens when the money stops? She also asks if reintegration can really happen before reconciliation.
Third, Frogh says the plans must address the concerns of Afghan women, many of whom fear that their minimal gains since the overthrow of the Taliban will be reversed. She points out that only one of the 28 committees formed at the Peace Jirga was chaired by a woman. In three days no plenary opportunity was offered to any woman to express their worries.
Finally, the plans should also provide incentives for Taliban leaders to join the process.
In summary, Frogh says: "What is required is a comprehensive approach that includes a genuinely national consultative and consensusbuilding process and efforts to address both broader governance failures and other threats to Afghan stability and security (not just the Taliban insurgency). A comprehensive approach needs to address past injustices inflicted on all Afghans if enduring peace and stability is to be achieved." She says justice was a casualty of the Peace Jirga: "There was no mention of the war crimes during the civil war, nor the injustices and violence inflicted on the Afghan nation in the past nine years."

The Hell of life in Pakistan's FATA

It should never be forgotten that the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan - probably the most dangerous area in the world - have never been consulted over whether or not their land should be used as a launchpad for jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan and as a battleground against the Pakistani Army by local insurgents.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has no mandate from the tribal people and exerts its authority primarily through murder and intimidation. Its foreign 'guests' - Islamist militiamen - are there because it has suited the Pakistan military to have them there as its pursues its long-term strategy in Afghanistan of limiting India's infuence and making the Kabul regime into as much of a client state as possible.
The seven tribal agencies that make up FATA have been ignored by Islamabad and starved of investment. The people there are subject to disgraceful Colonial-era laws and receive little or no protection from the state.
A new report from Amnesty International - 'As if Hell fell on me': the human rights crisis in Northwest Pakistan - sets out in detail the impact this situation has had on FATA. Based on 300 interviews, it argues that the residents of FATA live in a human rights-free zone and that over a million have been turned into refugees: "The people of FATA - overwhelmingly members of the Pashtun ethnic group - already suffer from some of the lowest standards of living in Asia, and are particularly vulnerable to the impact of the conflict and insecurity caused by the Pakistan Taliban insurgency and the government's harsh response."
It notes that the overall literacy rate in FATA is around 17 per cent, with only seven percent of women being able to read. Nearly two-thirds of the population live below the national poverty level. There are only 33 hospitals covering over three million people. Millions of people have left, either to work in the Gulf, or to live in poverty and fear in cities like Karachi and Lahore.
Amnesty note that the Pakistani Taliban has combined a harsh interpretation of Islamic doctrine, unprecedented violence (particularly against civilians) and intimidation to drive out what few legal institutions existed in FATA.
"Taliban forces in FATA have prohibited music, forced men to grow beards, destroyed hundreds of schools and effectively stopped the operation of all schools in the area. They have used force to enforce their dictates that both women and girls be veiled and accompanied by male relatives when going outside their homes and have severely limited the operations of health clinics and humanitarian agencies. The Taliban have systematically abused the right to life and to freedom from arbitrary detention, torture, gender, religious and ethnic discrimination and the right to free expression - among other internationally recognised human rights."
This is a very well researched document and should be read by anyone with an interest in understanding the complexities of politics in Pakistan and the dynamics of the insurgency along the border with Afghanistan.

Neo-con thoughts on Afghanistan-Pakistan

David Gartenstein-Ross and Clifford May have edited a collection of essays on Afghanistan and Pakistan for the neo-con Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam, Security and Stability includes essays on religious militancy in Pakistan's military, the US Army's Human Terrain System, an assesment of Pakistan's peace agreements with militants in Waziristan from 2004-2008 and several others, by writers including Hassan Abbas, Christine Fair and Sebastian Gorka.
Some of the essays are not bad, but all this from a pro-Iraq war organisation that is islamophobic and whose anti-Iran, anti-Hamas, anti-Hezbollah views, according to some commentators, differ little from those of Israel's right-wing Likud Party.

Resolution agreed at the Kabul Peace jirga

In case you have not seen it, here is the resolution adopted at the end of the National Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul last week.
The jirga's final resolution calls for the release of prisoners who have allegedly been detained by Afghan and foreign forces without sufficient evidence.
It also calls for the formation of a commission to lead efforts to open negotiations with the Taliban, who have vowed not to engage in peace talks until all foreign troops leave Afghanistan.
The resolution also says insurgents who want to take part in the peace process must cut their ties to al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. It says militants who join the peace process should be removed from the U.N. blacklist.
On Sunday, President Karzai, in compliance with the resolution, called for a review of the cases of all prisoners linked to the Taliban and other militants and announced the formation of a special office to review the cases.
He simultaneously sacked his Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and National Directorate of Security chief Amrullah Saleh. He appointed Munir Mangal as acting interior minister and Ibrahim Spinzada as acting intelligence chief. A statement on his website inferred that the officials had been sacked for not preventing the rocket and gun attack on the opening of the jirga last Wednesday. It said their explanations had not been satisfactory.
However, there is more to this. Both men were pro-American and agreed with the caution expressed by US policymakers over integrating former Taliban fighters into the police and armed forces.
Saleh, an ethnic Tajik who has a close relationship with the CIA, is thought to have been opposed to Karzai's stated policy of releasing Taliban fighters as a way of demonstrating goodwill towards the organisation. However, it is also likely that the Taliban itself has insisted on his removal as a precondition for talks. US opposition to the sacking is likely to be muted.
Otherwise the jirga resolution has few surprises -although it ends with a denunciation of Israel for its attack on the aid flotilla trying to get through the blocade to Gaza, during which nine people were killed by Israeli commandos.

Signs of religious conservatism in Pakistan

The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) has produced an interesting, if slightly confusing, survey of public attitudes towards Islamic radicalisation in Pakistan.
Interviews were conducted across Pakistan, mostly with people living in urban areas and small towns. About 30 per cent lived in rural areas. Many of those interviewed were in intermediate education (29.3 per cent) or studying at university (37.5 per cent). Only 8.3 per cent of those interviewed were illiterate and 2.2 per cent had been educated in madrassas. Therefore the survey sample was skewed towards educated, literate, professional people and it could be argued that the views of rural people were under-represented. Functional illiteracy is as high as 80 per cent in some parts of the country.
Despite this, respondents clearly had conservative views. Sixty-seven per cent thought it was a woman's religious duty to wear the veil in public places and 48.8 per cent believed women should not have the right to divorce. Nearly 23 per cent did not listen to music, with two-thirds of those not listening saying that this was for religious reasons. Just over half of all respondents endorsed Pakistani recording artist Junaid Jamshaid's decision to quit singing pop songs in 2004 and concentrate on singing religious nasheeds. Jamshaid has since joined the Tablighi Jamaat group of Islamic preachers.
Sixty-five per cent said that a person who did not pray five times a day could not become a better Moslem, while 59 per cent said that the struggle to implement sharia law in Pakistan was a form of jihad.
However, despite their conservatism, 81 per cent thought female education was "extremely necessary". Almost 60 per cent thought women should be allowed to work outside the home, compared to 40 per cent who did not.
On their religious beliefs, 77 per cent said they thought Muslims were lagging behind other nations and 31 per cent claimed this was because they had deviated from Islam. Under a fifth thought this was due to scientific and technical backwardness.
Almost two thirds (63.6 per cent) thought Pakistan's decision to joint the US-led 'War on Terror' was incorrect, although 46 per cent were wary of the Taliban, denying that it was fighting for Islam. Of those who were sympathetic to the Taliban, over a third condemned its acts of violence.
Overall, the survey results are confusing. According to PIPS: "All these findings indicate that the average Pakistani takes his religion seriously and wishes to see it in the public domain. But, unlike the Taliban, he does not want to make it claustrophobic for other people. The average Pakistani thus wants to look progressive in a conservative framework. He is caught between two competing narratives: the first one, which is primarily grounded in religion and is now championed by militant groups, makes him want to see his religion triumph; the other, usually trotted out by the government and the media, is mostly based on information and rational analysis, making him realize the significance of progressing in the world."

Corruption increasing in Pakistan

Seventy percent of people questioned as part of a 205-page survey by Transparency International in Pakistan say that the present government is more corrupt than its predecessors.
TI's National Corruption Perception Survey 2010 says that overall corruption has increased by 11.37 percent from Rs195 billion in 2009 to Rs233 billion in in the last year. Punjab is the only province where provincial government is rated to be cleaner than previous provincial governments and Khyber-Pakhtunkwa is rated the most corrupt.
Police and the power sector are ranked as the two most corrupt sectors, followed by land administration. In fact the police have been judged to be the most corrupt sector for the last four years in a row.
Corruption in the judiciary, education and local government sectors has also increased compared to 2009, whereas Customs and Taxation are ranked the least corrupt.
Syed Adil Gilani, chairman of TI Pakistan, said that corruption is the root cause of poverty, illiteracy, terrorism, shortage of electricity, food and the lack of governance in Pakistan. He said the most corrupt sector is tendering, which eats at least 40 percent of the Pakistan's development budget.

UN Rapporteur questions legality of targetted killings

The UN Special Rapporteur on on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, has produced a detailed study of the implications of the increasingly common policy of extrajudicial 'targetted' killings, particularly in relation to drone attacks in Pakistan.
Alston's last major report was on the US failure to protect human rights in Afghanistan and Iraq - or even, for that matter, in US gaols. You can read my summary of that June 2009 report here.
Defined as "the intentional, pre-meditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator", the US has used drones for targetted killings on an increasingly wide scale in recent years, while other countries have used less spectacular, but equally lethal methods.
The result, says Alston, has been "a highly problematic blurring and expansion of the boundaries of the applicable legal frameworks – human rights law, the laws of war, and the law applicable to the use of inter-state force. Even where the laws of war are clearly applicable, there has been a tendency to expand who may permissibly be targeted and under what conditions."
He adds that the states concerned have often failed to specify the legal justification for their policies, to disclose the safeguards in place to ensure that targeted killings are in fact legal and accurate, or to provide accountability mechanisms for violations.
In addition, says Alston, and most troublingly, they have refused to disclose who has been killed, for what reason, and with what collateral consequences. "The result has been the displacement of clear legal standards with a vaguely defined licence to kill, and the creation of a major accountability vacuum."
Alston is not solely concerned with US drone attacks. He gives other examples, including the killing of rebel Chechen warlord Omar ibn al Khattab in April 2002 by Russian armed forces, the November 2002 killed of Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi and five others in Yemen in a CIA Predator strike, killings in Sri Lanka between 2005-2008 by both the Tamil Tigers and government forces and the January 2010 operation to kill Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mahbouh in Dubai, allegedly by Mossad agents.
The report notes, for example, that Israel has developed specific legal arguments to justify its targetted killing of Palestinians. One human rights group has revealed that between 2002-2008 at least 387 Palestinians were killed as a result of targetted killings by Israeli forces. Of these, 234 were the targets, while the remainder were 'collateral' casualties. It is hardly surprising that Israeli leaders should consider it 'reasonable' to send armed commandos against the Gaza flotilla and to allow them to open fire, when its rules governing such actions are so lax.
Alston concludes that states should publicly identify the laws they use to justify targetted killings and also why killing is better than capture. They should make public the number of civilians killed in targetted killing operations and adhere to a range of measures aimed at ensuring mistakes are investigated and that all measures to prevent them are in place.

Who really killed Khalid Khwaja?

Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir and Osama bin Laden
Two weeks ago, the blog Let us Build Pakistan published the transcript of a recorded conversation between prominent Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir and an unnamed person thought to be a senior member of the Pakistan Taliban.
The transcript seems to show Mir providing information to the Taliban member about Khalid Khwaja, a former Pakistani airforce pilot who was murdered in Waziristan recently, having been captured by a previously unknown group called the Asian Tigers.
Khwaja was kidnapped along with a former ISI officer and British journalist Asad Qureshi and held for several weeks before he was executed. The suggestion is that information provided by Mir to the Taliban may have sealed Khwaja's fate. The conversation took place while Khwaja was still alive and in the custody of the Asian Tigers.
Mir informs his contact that he believes Khwaja to have been working for the CIA and lists a number of alleged 'crimes'. He urges that he be further interrogated by his Taliban-linked captors. Within days of the conversation Khwaja was dead and had been left by the side of the road close to Mir Ali in North Waziristan.
You can read a transcript of the tape, which first surfaced on the ISI fan page on facebook, here.
The following day Hamid Mir answered the points raised against him, saying that the "concocted tape" was fabricated and that it was part of a government plot to discredit him because he was a vociferous critic.
His statement was accompanied by an alleged press release from the Pakistan Taliban on behalf of the Asian Tigers, also acquitting Mir of any blame and saying that no conversation had taken place between them and the journalist. You can read both here. Neither has much merit.
It is well known that Mir has long had connections with the jihadis in Pakistan and al-Qaeda. After all, he interviewed bin Laden three times - more than any other journalist. In 2007 former President Musharraf declared him a Taliban sympathiser and banned him from Geo TV for more than four months. If the recent tape turns out to be true, he should be banished from the airwaves for ever and prosecuted for incitement to murder.

Death of al-Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan

The reported death of Sheikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed, along with members of his family in a US drone strike in North Waziristan last week, is a huge blow for al-Qaeda. An Egyptian who was a long-time companion of al-Qaeda No. 2 Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, he was a founder member of al-Qaeda, a member of its ruling shura and - since May 2007 - the head of the organisation in Afghanistan.
As a veteran he would have known many of the Afghan Taliban leaders personally and would have been instrumental in ensuring that al-Qaeda did not offend its Taliban hosts and at all times in Afghanistan acted under their auspices. In recent years those relationships have come under strain and it was hardly surprising that al-Qaeda moved much closer to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and particularly its former leader Baitullah Mahsud - who was killed in a US drone strike last August. al-Yazid issued a fulsome tribute to Mahsud on his death, calling him a "valiant and incomparable leader".
Since his appointment as al-Qaeda emir in Afghanistan, al-Yazid has issued regular statements through al-Qaeda's as-Sahab media house. Covering such subjects as the death of Sheikh Abu al-Laith al-Liby, the June 2008 attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad, the December 2009 suicide attack on a CIA station in Khost and regular appeals to the people of Pakistan and appeals for money, they can be read on the website of the NEFA Foundation. No successor has yet been announced.

Dangers of local defence in Afghanistan

The Afghan Analysts Network has produced an extensive and critical report, written by Mathieu Lefevre, on Local Defence in Afghanistan. The report examines the use of "informal armed groups" - the local militias financed by the Afghan government and US military, particularly in areas where the Taliban is gaining ground.
Lefevre examined the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police, which was launched in 2006 by the Ministry of Interior and closed down in 2008. He also looks at the Afghan Public Protection Programme (known as AP3) which was set up in Wardak with the support of US Special Forces.
The third force examined is the Local Defence Initiatives, which started last summer. As Lefevre comments: "According to policy documents, the overall aim of LDI is to ‘secure local communities’ by giving ‘responsibility and employment to village members’ so that they ‘no longer provide support for insurgents’ and ‘will not allow insurgents to live within their village’.
"In a part of Arghandab district in, Kandahar province, the program is at a more advanced stage: a group of ‘defenders’ selected from the community provides security and work closely with US Special Forces, while a large group of villagers receives incentives in the form of agricultural and cash-for-work projects. The program is funded by the US military."
Lefevre says that the relationship between government-backed armed groups and the Afghan National Security Forces is often problematic and that such programs may deter prospective candidates for the police and army. He also points out that it is difficult to avoid picking sides when working with local groups, which may have long-term consequences.
Where success is evident, this is usually due to a relationship with highly trained international forces working with these government militias and is unlikely to survive for long without them. However, Lefevre recognises that the LDIs are not going to go away and that they now represent a model for reintegrating former Taliban insurgents. And bound up within this debate is a wider discussion about whether or not the Taliban can be militarily defeated and whether Coalition forces are "fighting to win" or simply gearing themselves towards an exit from the conflict.
If you want to know what these local militias look like close up then I suggest you read One Tribe at a Time by Major Jim Gant, about whom I have written before. You can read about him here.
One final point: apologies for my absence for the last few weeks, caused by a combination of a home move and a very inefficient ISP.

Afghanistan - the view from Moscow

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has produced an interesting report setting out how Afghanistan is perceived in Moscow. Afghanistan: A view from Moscow, written by Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko (both of whom work for Carnegie's Moscow Center), notes that "Russia is entwined in a complex web of relationships with the Afghan parties, neighbouring states and the West."
The Soviet Union lost 14,300 soldiers in Afghanistan and the war remains deeply traumatic within Russian society. It invaded Afghanistan when it was at the height of its power and left as a broken and mangled empire, on the brink of collapse.
While initially there appears to have been an element of schadenfreude in the Kremlin as they witnessed America and its allies being drawn into a more and more complex war, that feeling has since given way to one of concern about the implications of Western forces being defeated.
Russia knows very well that the situation in Central Asia is potentially dangerous. Already there are or have been insurrections in Chechnya, Daghestan, Tajikistan and parts of Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is also unstable.
The authors are critical of US plans to disengage from Afghanistan by the end of Barack Obama's term of office, saying that 'cutting and running' is not a good option. They argue that "Military operations need to mellow the Taliban just enough to separate and isolate the hard-line jihadists - to be further pursued and destroyed - from those whose interests are focused on power distribution within Afghanistan". They add:
"The main effort in Afghanistan should be trying to bring the Afghan government and the opposition together to discuss the terms of a new national settlement."
They add that the US should increase its relations with non-NATO partners, such as Pakistan, China and even Iran.

Relentless increase in "enemy-initiated attacks"

Some interesting figures in the latest GAO report on the security situation in Afghanistan, which shows that the level of "enemy-initiated attacks" has risen every year since 2005. The increase in the last year has been exceptionally high: between September 2009 and March 2010, the number of attacks increased by about 83 per cent compared to the same period last year. Attacks against civilians rose by 72 per cent.
Overall, more than 21,000 enemy-initiated attacks were recorded in 2009 - an increase of 75 per cent over 2008. The US military expects attacks to continue to rise in number throughout the coming summer.
The level of violence in Afghanistan is having a serious effect on reconstruction and development. The GAO report quotes a UN document that reports "limits on accessibility of development programme activities" in 94 districts considered very high risk and 81 districts considered high risk.
For example, by destroying generators at the Kandahar Industrial Park in August 2009, the Taliban halted economic development for the project. Almost a year later the generators have still not been replaced. And USAID reports that a $40m literacy programme has been severely disrupted because the villages taking part are no longer safe enough to visit.
With 84,000 US military personnel (due to rise to 98,000 very shortly) in Afghanistan, plus 40,000 Coalition troops and 113,000 soldiers from the Afghan National Army, the forces lined up against the Taliban are now greater than ever before.
US civilian numbers have also increased - up by 200 since December - with many of these extra staff earmarked to work in around 50 postings outside Kabul. Can't see that happening for a while.

Pakistan Taliban's claim for Times Square carbomb

(The blank space you are looking at above is due to the fact that YouTube has stupidly decided to censor Qari Hussein's video. I have kept the rest of the article as it was, including his spoken words, which I copied from the video. If anyone finds a copy of the video posted somewhere else, please let me know and I will endeavour to post it here. Presumably the two videos below may be taken offline soon, so make copies if you need them for reference - Editor, Wed 5 May.)

This is the video in which Qari Hussain Mahsud, the Pakistan Taliban leader and trainer of their suicide bombers, takes responsibility for the crude car bomb left in Times Square, New York. Still not clear if this is a genuine or opportunistic claim. Below is a translation of the words spoken by Qari Hussein:

"We, Tehreek-e-Taliban with all the pride and bravery, accept the responsibility for the recent attack on Times Square, New York, USA. We also congratulate the Muslim Ummah with all the pleasure and happiness. This attack is revenge for the great and valuable martyred leaders of Mujahideen, ie Baitullah Mahsud Shaheed (and) the Arab Mujahideen's leaders, especially Abu Umer al-Baghdadi Shaheed's companions in Iraq.
This is also a revenge for the global American interference and terrorism in Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan for Lal Masjid operation, the recent rain of drone attacks in the tribal areas and the abduction, torture and humiliation of our most respected and innocent sister, Dr Aafia Siddiqui. We furiously warn the member countries of NATO, their governments and common public to oppose the evil US policies and sincerely apologize for the massacres in Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal areas. Otherwise we prepared for the worst ever destruction and devastation in their regions, Inshallah."

Also of interest is this video, posted on 2 May, of Hakimullah Mahsud, proving conclusively that he is very much alive and well, even if he is no longer emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban. He says in the video that it was recorded on 2 April. In the video he says that attacks are being planned on America.


And this one, which is Hakimullah's voice, along with graphics and stills, is dated 19th April. In it Hakimullah says that American towns and cities are now on the Pakistan Taliban's target list.
It's hardly surprising that Pakistan's ISI intelligence service last week admitted that Hakimullah was still alive. They must have already seen copies of these videos.

Divergent strategy of al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies

Anne Stenersen, a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, has published an excellent study of the relationship between al-Qaeda and the various Taliban factions. Al-Qaeda's Allies, published by the New America Foundation, points out that al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura of the Taliban have diverged strategically since 2001, largely due to the former's relocation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
While the Quetta Shura has continued to fight US and Allied troops in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has become involved in internal Pakistani politics and has supported the campaign by militants there aimed at overthrowing the Pakistani state.
Stennersen notes: "Formally, al-Qaeda's leaders have sworn an oath of allegiance (bay'a) to Mullah Omar." But, she says: "In practice the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura is not necessarily one of command and control. Rather, it is a political relationship, where al-Qaeda has agreed not to establish a competing organisation to that of Mullah Omar's."
al-Qaeda fighters still take part in actions in Afghanistan, but these tend to be very localised and largely confined to the southeastern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Stennersen has analysed the 90 or so films released by the As-Sahab media house - al-Qaeda's official propaganda arm - in the series Pyre for the Americans in the Land of Khurasan.
This series first appeared in 2005. In 2006 38 films appeared, with production dropping off over the next few years until only three were produced in 2009. An analysis of where the films were shot showed that 44 were filmed in Khost and neighbouring Paktika, 12 were filmed in Kunar and 8 in Zabul. The significance is that Khost and Paktika are just over the border from the main al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Waziristan and Bajaur.
As Stennersen says, "It suggests that al-Qaeda has established few bases deep inside Afghan territory itself and that cross-border raids seem to be the preferred type of activity. Moreover, there is a disproportionate number of films from southeastern Afghanistan, given the high level of insurgency-related violence in this area."
The report examines the relationship of al-Qaeda with the Baitullah Mahsud group and other militants in FATA, as well as shedding light on the other foreign fighters who use FATA as a sanctuary, including the Uzbeks and Chechens.
Stennersen concludes: "In future al-Qaeda's alliances with local militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan may develop in one of two ways. The al-Qaeda militants could dissolve into the local militant environment and adapt to the agenda of local groups...If such a development takes place, al-Qaeda would gradually become irrelevant as an international terrorist organisation.
"Alternatively, and of more concern, al-Qaeda could succeed in inserting its ideology into the local militant environment. al-Qaeda's alliance with the late Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP may be seen as a development in this direction...If this development continues, it will make the Afghanistan-Pakistan region a hub for anti-American Islamist militancy for years to come."