Taliban and al-Qaeda 'distinct groups with different goals'

"The Taliban and al-Qaeda remain distinct groups with different goals, ideologies and sources of recruits; there was considerable friction between them before September 11, 2001, and today that friction persists."
This is one of the main findings of a study of the relationship between the two organisations, published today by the Centre on International Cooperation and written by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn.
Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: the core of success in Afghanistan also argues that elements of current US policy in Afghanistan - especially night raids, house searches and attempts to fragment the Taliban - are "changing the insurgency and inadvertently creating opportunities for al-Qaeda to achieve its objectives and preventing the achievement of core goals of the United States and the international community".
The authors argue that there is room to engage the Taliban on renouncing their relationship with al-Qaeda and providing guarantees against the use of Afghanistan by international terrorism.
These findings are worthy of notice, not least because the authors, who have spent several years as almost the only Westerners living in Kandahar, are well equipped to know the views of the Afghan Taliban. They edited Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef's autobiography, My Life with the Taliban and have access to people who are close to the Taliban leadership.
They point out that the original Taliban leadership around Mullah Omar was never very close to Osama bin Laden and that he exploited his friendship with regional leaders, in particular with the Haqqani clan, and ultimately betrayed the trust shown to him by Mullah Omar. But as military attrition has hit the Taliban, a new younger generation of fighters, radicalised by the events following 9/11, is now in place and more sympathetic to the al-Qaeda programme of international jihad. This nexus is being intensified as a result of current US policy in Afghanistan.
This short paper is well worth reading, although it is limited in its scope. It does not, for example, go into much details of the links between the Haqqani clan and the Arab fighters around bin Laden or indeed the other foreign fighters based in Pakistan's tribal territories. Nor does it discuss the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. More information is certainly needed on these relationships.

Hezbe-e-Islami keep on talking to Afghan govt.

Talks between the Afghan government and representatives of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami group on Monday went well, according to a spokeman for the group. “So far, the talks have been very, very positive,” spokesman Haroon Zarghun told Dawn.
The delegation included Hekmatyar’s deputy Qutbuddin Hilal, Hekmatyar's son-in-law and Afghanistan’s former ambassador to Pakistan Dr Ghairat Baheer, as well as senior leader Ustad Qaribur Rehman Saeed.
Haroon Zarghun said the delegation would meet President Karzai again when he returned from his three-day official visit to China. They were also expected to meet American and Nato officials to discuss the 15-point peace plan, the spokesman said.
The delegation also met former arch rivals from the Northern Alliance, including Vice-President Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Speaker of the Afghan parliament Younis Qanouni and leader of Ittehad-i-Islami Professor Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf.
They also met with former Taliban leaders, now in Kabul, including their former foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, Arsala Rehmani and former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef.
A detailed backgrounder on the talks, by Thomas Ruttig of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, can be found here

Good Taliban or Bad Taliban?

Almost as memorable as the the iconic film of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers is my recollection of Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, giving a press conference in his back garden in Islamabad on the night in October 2001 when US forces began the invasion of Afghanistan.
Zaeef, invariably wearing his black Taliban turban, had become the public face of the Islamic Emirate, defending ad nauseam the grotesque decision to destroy the buddhas at Bamiyan or Mullah Omar's refusal to hand Osama bin Laden over to the Americans. For a short time he was on the world stage, our only access to the mysterious and terrifying government of the country he represented.
His autobiography, My Life with the Taliban, is a truly remarkable book and genuinely adds to the sum of knowledge on this most written-about subject. Its author - and editors Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn- should be congratulated.
After four ghastly years in Guantanamo Bay Zaeef, who now lives in Kabul and often acts as a conduit to his former comrades, shows few signs that he has in any way changed his allegiances, although it is clear that he bitterly regrets the consequences of 9/11 and argues that a deal to hand over bin Laden to a neutral court in a Muslim country prior to the attacks could have been reached. Yet his anger is palpable and it is clear we are not dealing with a Mandela figure, willing to forgive and forget.
He makes few concessions towards either the Americans who wrongly imprisoned him for so long, or to the Karzai regime in Kabul - or for that matter, towards Pakistan, whose politicians and intelligence officers he clearly hates:
"Now, as then, the ISI acts at will, abusing and overruling the elected government whenever they deem it necessary. It is a military intelligence adminstration that is led by Pakistan's military commanders. It is the combined clandestine services, civil and military. It shackles, detains and releases, and at times it assassinates. Its operations often take place far beyond its own borders, in Afghanistan, India or in Iran. It runs a network of spies in each country and often recruits from among the local population to carry out covert missions. Its personnel are skilled and receive training in various fields, from espionage techniques to explosives." There speaks one who knows.
This intelligent and pious man has produced a remarkable book, and a rare one at that. Almost nothing is known about the events he describes and he has produced an epic first draft (and first-hand account) of recent Afghan history. Here writes a man who, according to his own narrative, originated the idea of the organisation which later became the Taliban.
And he was present at the historic meeting when Mullah Omar was made its leader and only 20 metres away from the Emir al-Mumineen when he lost his eye fighting against the Russians.
No senior Taliban has ever written anything so intimate or so accurate.
Zaeef, like so many of the Taliban, is a Pashtun from a town close to Kandahar and his description of what happened to his family following the Soviet invasion is typical of hundreds of thousands of his fellow Afghans.
He was from a poor background but rose to become one of Mullah Omar's most trusted ministers. Continually in this book he tries to leave the limelight and retreat to study in a small mosque, but each time he is pressed back into service, particularly by Mullah Omar, who knew him from the earliest days.
Zaeef, for all his skill and knowledge, remains untouched by the horrors inflicted on Afghanistan by the Taliban. The woman shot to death in front of a crowd at the Kabul football stadium? She had killed her husband and it was right. And I have never read a book where so many of the protagonists are now dead.
He speaks at one point of the Taliban's finances in the mid-90s. Not only was corruption endemic, but the economy was broken:
"The Taliban's budget for the entire country each year amounted to roughly $80 million. Military expenditures took the lion's share of the budget. From what was left, our portion for development came to 70-75bn Afghanis - about $7 million at the time. The budget didn't even come close to what was needed in order to start any serious development; it was like a drop of water that falls on a hot stone, evaporating without leaving any trace."
At some point you can begin to see why it made more sense for Zaeef to seek the sanctuary of a mosque rather than face up to the fact that the Taliban/al-Qaeda view of government cannot cope with modern society - or even a traditional, agricultural society such as Afghanistan.
Despite his stubborness - combined with silence on his own views of bin Laden and al-Qaeda - Zaeef's book is absolutely essential reading. He, more than anyone else, speaks eloquently for those with whom Karzai will have to negotiate.

Frontline Club event on the Taliban

Tomorrow night (Tuesday) I will be chairing a discussion at the Frontline Club in London on 'Understanding the Taliban'. Amongst the panel will be Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn - the only two Westerners living in Kandahar. They are also responsible for editing My Life with the Taliban, the autobiography of Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan.
The event is already a sell-out, but I will report on it here. And I thoroughly recommend the book, which I will be reviewing shortly.
Update: The event was a great success. As well as the two previously mentioned speakers, Horia Mosadiq from Amnesty International and journalist Ken Guest also took part in the panel discussion. You can listen to a podcast here.

More information on 2008 Taliban talks in Mecca

With the possibility of talks between the Afghan government and its Taliban foes now taking a central role, it is worth taking a look at an article by Hamid Mir, published in The News, which gives the fullest account published so far of the talks that took place in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in September 2008.
According to Mir:
"The Afghan Taliban in the Makkah talks were represented by their former foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, former minister Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, and Afghanistan’s last ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef. It is said the trio had travelled to Makkah to perform Umra, but sources said they were hosted as official guests of the Saudi government. They were also among those who attended the Iftar-cum-dinner party of King Abdullah on September 29, 2008. The Afghanistan government delegation was led by former chief justice Maulvi Abdul Hadi Shinwari and included, among others, Abdul Salam Rocketi, a Taliban commander under Mullah Omar who eventually surrendered to the US."
Mir says the talks foundered over Taliban demands that all US and foreign forces leave the country before they would consider such questions as handing over Osama bin Laden or signing up to support the Afghan constitution.
He also says that Prince Turki al-Faisal played an important role in convening the talks. Prior to the talks, the Saudis also sent an emissary to North Waziristan to meet with the Afghan Taliban leadership. At one point it was hoped the emissary might be able to meet with al-Qaeda's deputy leader, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. The meeting never took place and only lower-level Taliban leaders made themselves available, possibly for security reasons.
The make-up of the Taliban delegation to Mecca explains how the Taliban can claim that no official representatives were present at the talks. All three men are former Taliban ministers who live under the Karzai regime and have renounced violence, but who retain links with their former comrades.