al-Libi last of Bagram escapees

The Bagram escapees in their orange jumpsuits

If it is confirmed that Abu Yahya al-Libi was killed in a CIA drone strike in North Waziristan earlier this week, it will be the final chapter in one of the most embarrassing events of the Afghan War.
al-Libi was the only one of the four prisoners who escaped from the Bagram Detention Center on 11 July 2005 who still remained at large. The escape has entered the annals of jihadi history as a major humiliation for the US forces in Afghanistan and helped to give al-Libi his exalted status within al-Qaeda. al-Libi was not thought to have been much of an organiser or thinker, but was important to al-Qaeda because he had had religious training and his prison escape engendered awe and admiration amongst the recruits he met and cultivated whilst living in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The Bagram escape was notorious because even to this day it remains unexplained. How did the men open the door of their shared prison cell? Where did they obtain the blue overalls they changed into? How did they find their way out of the compound, over the wall and into a waiting vehicle? Who were their accomplices? Initially a US guard was suspected of complicity, but no-one has ever been charged.

The four ex-prisoners in a video issued after their escape

All four of those who escaped were dangerous terrorists, awaiting transfer to Guantanamo Bay. They escaped under the noses of their American guards and disappeared into the night. Before long, videos extolling the exploits of the four men were circulating in jihadi chatrooms and internet forums.
The three others who escaped from Bagram were Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Qahtani, Omar al-Faruq and Abu Abdullah al-Shami.
al-Qahtani, a Saudi said by some to have been responsible for maintaining al-Qaeda's operational support structure in Afghanistan and also leader of the escapees, was allegedly recaptured by US forces in a safe house near Khost airport, eastern Afghanistan, in November 2006, although this has never been officially confirmed. His present whereabouts are unknown.
Omar al-Faruq, an Iraqi citizen brought up in Kuwait, was a long-term al-Qaeda operative, sent to south-east Asia in 1998 to organise support for the organisation and to liaise with the Jemaah Islamiyah organisation. Captured in Indonesia in the summer of 2002, he was later handed over to the US Army in Afghanistan. al-Faruq was eventually killed in a shoot-out with British troops in the Iraqi port city of Basrah in September 2006, having only been in the country for a few weeks.
Abu Abdallah al-Shami was a Syrian who was originally captured by US forces in Khost province in 2003. He was killed in an airstrike in July 2008 in Afghanistan's Paktika province, where he led Arab, Pakistani, Uzbek and Chechen forces.

Poor translations mar Abbottabad documents

A close examination of the documents seized in Abbottabad by US Special Forces last May and released by the Combatting Terrorism Center last week reveals an inconsistency.
The complete translated documents made available on the CTC website are very poorly translated and contain basic grammatical and spelling errors. However, the commentary provided by CTC quotes from the same documents, but gives much more accurate translations.
Thus the letter (SOCOM-2012-0000007) written by al-Qaeda leaders Atiyatullah and Abu Yahya al-Libi to Hakimullah Mahsud, emir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan TTP and dated 3 December 2010, refers to the "concept, approach and behaviour of the TTP" in the translation provided, but "the ideology, methods and behaviour" in the commentary.
Again, the translated letter refers to the "clear legal and religious mistakes", while the commentary refers to "clear legal errors and dangerous lapses".
Perhaps more annoying is the sentence that is the crux of the letter. The translation runs as follows: "Considering Hakimullah as the sole Emir for everyone to swear allegiance to, whoever oppose him and isn’t a member of the movement is an adulterer, the none differentiation between the Jihad Emirate and the Great Imam post, and neglecting the daily conditions of the Muslims; all of which according to the Shari’a (Muslim laws) are a misconception of the real situation, and may cause an inter-Mujahidin fighting."
This does not even make sense.
In the commentary it is translated (with useful comments) as follows: "News had reached `Atiyya and al-Libi that Mahsud had declared himself to be “the singular leader to whom everyone must pledge allegiance and declaring anyone who rebels against him (kharij `alyhi) or is not in his Tehrik to be a rebel (baghi).” In classical Islamic political parlance, dissenters (khawarij) and rebels (bughat) who renounce the authority of the legitimate imam are subject to jihad and liable to be killed."
The commentary further adds: "Thus, Mahsud’s announcement amounted to declaring himself to be the great imam with political authority over all Muslims, so `Atiyya and al-Libi found it necessary to point out to him that there is a difference “between the [minor] position of leader of jihad and that of great imam,” a distinction with which Mahsud should familiarize himself."
This makes things much clearer.
The translated document ends with a very weak statement: "We hope that you will take the necessary action to correct your actions and avoid these grave mistakes; otherwise we have to take decisive actions from our end."
In fact, as the commentary makes clear, the threat was much more explicit: "“unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming [your ways] and dissociating yourself from these vile mistakes [that violate Islamic Law], we shall be forced to take public and firm legal steps from our side."
How did the CTC manage to produce two different translations of the same document and then publish the poorest quality one as a resource? Unbelievable!