Taliban rule book emphasises lawful actions

Thanks to the NEFA Foundation for publishing a translation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's (Taliban's) new Book of Rules. (see my post of 31 July).
Translated from Pashto, the book comprises 11 chapters, starting with 'Granting Refuge' and running through dealing with prisoners and spies, the enemy's logistics and supplies, war booty, formation and dispatchment, intra-muhahideen affairs, martyrdom operations, education and training, official forbiddance, general advice and a short chapter called 'About the Book of Rules'.
The book tells us many things about the Taliban. First it shows yet again that the organisation knows how to create good publicity. In Pakistan, where the existence of the book has had extensive coverage in local languages, it sustains the belief that that Afghan Taliban - in contrast to its Pakistani counterpart - is fighting a just war against occupation and should be supported.
Besides being a code of behaviour, it is also an attempt to present the organisation as a government in waiting. With a substantial presence now in 80 per cent of the country, it may actually control more of Afghanistan than President Karzai. Its regional and provincial structure has grown dramatically and it seems certain the Taliban sharia courts are already active in many areas.
The simple, effective shape of the organisation, means that military decisions can be made quickly and independently and that basic justice can also be delivered quickly. (Of course, real government - the administration of health, education, transport, etc - is something else and it is doubtful that the Taliban has any skills in this area).
It also wants to come across as a reasonable organisation, acting in a lawful manner - definitely not the brutal thugs so redolent of its previous incarnation. This was the reasoning behind the organisation's recent statement that it no longer wanted to be known as the Taliban - not least because of the activities of the Pakistan Taliban, which is increasingly seen as a liability. It prefers to be known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
The fact that the organisation felt it necessary to issue such a document is in itself significant. This is clearly a growing organisation that needs to exert central control over new and expanding forces. Yet the rules are not a constitution for any potential future Taliban state. They are effectively the marching orders of a band of raiders.
The introduction states that "It is compulsory for all the Mujahideen, their provincial and districts’ heads to strictly follow this new set of rules and regulations. All the materials issued prior to this booklet will be considered invalid.”
The rules allow 'refuge' to be given to anyone who renounces the existing government of Afghanistan, although it allows them to stay in their job if it will serve the mujahideen cause.
They also give a procedure for dealing with prisoners. Whether or not they are local or foreign, they are to be handed over to the Taliban provincial commander, who will decide what to do. Some will be released in exchange for other prisoners held by the Afghan government, but the rules explicitly state: "Receiving money for prisoners' release is forbidden."
This is significant. It should make it easier to identify who the kidnappers are. If they ask for money, the likelihood is that they are not Taliban. And it also means that the death of any prisoners in Taliban custody can be directly attributed to their leader, as the rules also state that no-one has the authority to authorise the execution of prisoners except for Taliban leader (Emir al-Momeneen) Mullah Omar and his (unnamed) deputy. The rules allow Taliban guards to shoot their prisoners if they are themselves in danger.
Even spies caught working for the enemy can only be executed with the permission of Mullah Omar. Having in the past allowed zealous footsoldiers to execute 'spies' with little or no trial or evidence,the rules now say there must be witnesses and good evidence before someone can be convicted of spying. Executions of spies (by gunshot) can no longer be filmed for propaganda purposes.
The rules are mostly unsurprising. The form of organisation is hierarchical, but not cellular. There are guidelines for resolving disputes between militia commanders and rules on the distribution of booty, which plays an important role in radical Islamist literature. Mujahideen who loot a convoy after a firefight can seize the goods as booty, while paying a tenth as a toll to the Taliban organisation. If the same men happen to come across an abandoned convoy and seize the goods without firing a shot, the lot belongs to the Taliban's central funds.
The rules on suicide bombers say the bomber must be well trained and that he should only be used against important targets and that civilian casualties should be avoided. Sadly, these rules seldom seem to be in force. Many of the bombers are young boys who are bullied and manipulated to carry out operations, often with little regard for innocent lives. Nowhere is there a justification for this technique under Islamic law.
Mujahideen are warned against getting involved in local disputes and told to refer such issues up to the provincial command. They are also strictly warned against taking weapons without consent, smoking, homosexuality with young boys, the forceful collection of religious tax, house searches and kidnapping for ransom.
The rest of the book tells mujahideen to be 'firm but fair' and to look clean and respectable. "The Mujahideen should behave well with the general public and make efforts to bring their hearts closer to them. It must be the quality of a Mujahid to present himself as a role model for a common man." They must follow the rules or expect punishment if they don't.

Fighting still intense in Pakistan's Swat Valley

The Utror river in Kalam Bazaar in happier days

Fighting in the Swat Valley in north-western Pakistan between the Army and Tehreek-e-Taliban militants is still fierce, even though people are beginning to return to their houses in the southern parts of the region. Yesterday the Pakistan Army said 16 militants were killed in the Maidan area of Lower Dir, while another five were killed in different parts of the Valley.
One incident in particular, in the beautiful Kalam Valley, indicates just how fierce the fighting has become. When a group of Taliban fighters set up a checkpoint close to the the village of Urtror, the villagers called the security forces who arrived and shot dead one of the militants. Another jumped into the river Swat and was reported drowned, while six others escaped.
However, that was not the end of the affair. According to The News International, "the security forces reportedly hanged the body of the slain militant from a pole on Gammon bridge near Kalam town. This practice is apparently being followed to warn the militants of a similar fate."
This report accords with others I have seen that suggest the bodies of militants have been put on public display or left in public places by the Army as a warning to others.
The viciousness of the TTP fighters who have arrived in the area is not in doubt either. Ghazala Khan, writing for the blog All things Pakistan recounts a horrific story from a young woman called Palwasha from the Charbagh area of the Swat Valley. TTP militants tried to force her father to marry off Palwasha and her three sisters on the spot to four men they brought to the family house. Read her blog to find out what happened.
The situation in Swat - not to mention other parts of the North West Frontier Province and FATA - is nothing if not complex. It has always been my belief that a good knowledge of the tribal structure and history in this part of the world is essential. Without it, most military action can only exacerbate problems.
After years in which the US Army in particular has failed to distinguish between the different Taliban factions - or even between those that operate in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and those that confine themselves to the tribal territories - things now seem to be changing. In this context a new report by the Nine Eleven/Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation is to be welcomed.
Written by NEFA Foundation Senior Investigator Claudio Franco, The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case is to be welcomed. It is the first of three reports that aim to explain the background to the various Taliban factions in Pakistan. This first report looks into the Pakistan Army's offensive in Bajaur, which started a year ago and which was the first indication that there had been some kind of change of policy by the army in its attitude towards the militants who had effectively declared independence from Islamabad. It concentrates on the history and background of Faqir Mohammed.
Franco makes the point that up until 2007 Bajaur mainly functioned as a logistical base for the more active TTP campaigns further south in Waziristan. However, he says, "Terrorist plots targeting both London and Barcelona, respectively, in 2005 and 2007, were linked to al-Qaida operatives based in the Bajaur area. Moreover, the Agency border passes, in particular the Nawa Pass, have functioned for years as a revolving door to and from neighboring Kunar Province in Afghanistan."
The report is invaluable and personally I can't wait to see the next two.