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More evidence of General David H Petraeus' flawed judgment is evident today in an excellent article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran in the Washington Post.
The article catalogues Petraeus' inappropriate relationship with Kimberly and Frederick Kagan of the right-wing, defence-contractor supported, Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute respectively.
The husband-and-wife team appear to have been taken on as unpaid advisers to the General during his time in Afghanistan, promoting a series of hawkish policies that chimed nicely with their corporate sponsors' (DynCorp International, CACI International and General Dynamics) agendas. Shocking that America's most senior general in Afghanistan should have allowed himself to become associated with two such arms industry pimps.
Showing posts with label Kimberly Kagan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kimberly Kagan. Show all posts
Wednesday, 19 December 2012
Thursday, 13 January 2011
A few reports you may have missed...
Defining success in Afghanistan by Frederick W Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, A report by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War .
The Kagans define success as "the establishment of a political order, security situation, and indigenous security force that is stable, viable, enduring, and able—with greatly reduced international support—to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists." They argue that military forces are making progress and that policy does not need changing much. They say that the Taliban has lost almost all of its momentum and main safe havens in the south and that locals are now stepping forward to fight the Taliban with ISAF support. In the East insurgents do not have much momentum and they are extremely unlikely to gain strength in the north. "From a military standpoint, the counterinsurgency is going reasonably well, insofar as it is possible to judge over the winter." The main test, they say, will come in late summer 2011 when the insurgency is expected to peak.
A New Deal: a plan for sustainable Afghan Stability by Bijan R Kian and Wayne Porter of the New America Foundation argues that it is time to transition from "foreign-funded, Afghan-assisted development to a sustainable "Afghan-funded, foreign-assisted programme that reduces corruption. Drawing on parallels between the United States in 1933 and present-day Afghanistan, they suggest setting up an Afghan Development Corps of young Afghans to work on project such as water, sewage and sanitation, reforestation and land management.
Strategies to Counter Opiate Production in Afghanistan: Are we on the right track? is produced by URD, the French government's development agency. They conclude that "Though slow, practices are changing and there is growing recognition that there is no one replacement crop, nor any one “alternative” form of development, but that only holistic socio-economic and political development will make it possible to reduce dependence on opium poppy cultivation in a sustainable manner."
The Kagans define success as "the establishment of a political order, security situation, and indigenous security force that is stable, viable, enduring, and able—with greatly reduced international support—to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists." They argue that military forces are making progress and that policy does not need changing much. They say that the Taliban has lost almost all of its momentum and main safe havens in the south and that locals are now stepping forward to fight the Taliban with ISAF support. In the East insurgents do not have much momentum and they are extremely unlikely to gain strength in the north. "From a military standpoint, the counterinsurgency is going reasonably well, insofar as it is possible to judge over the winter." The main test, they say, will come in late summer 2011 when the insurgency is expected to peak.
A New Deal: a plan for sustainable Afghan Stability by Bijan R Kian and Wayne Porter of the New America Foundation argues that it is time to transition from "foreign-funded, Afghan-assisted development to a sustainable "Afghan-funded, foreign-assisted programme that reduces corruption. Drawing on parallels between the United States in 1933 and present-day Afghanistan, they suggest setting up an Afghan Development Corps of young Afghans to work on project such as water, sewage and sanitation, reforestation and land management.
Strategies to Counter Opiate Production in Afghanistan: Are we on the right track? is produced by URD, the French government's development agency. They conclude that "Though slow, practices are changing and there is growing recognition that there is no one replacement crop, nor any one “alternative” form of development, but that only holistic socio-economic and political development will make it possible to reduce dependence on opium poppy cultivation in a sustainable manner."
Wednesday, 23 September 2009
Another 40,000 US troops for Afghanistan?
If President Obama eventually agrees to support General Stanley McChrystal's recommendation of more US troops in Afghanistan, just how many troops is that likely to be? No-one outside the Pentagon knows for sure, as the figures are not contained in the General's report.
However, Frederick W. Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and Kimberly Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War, have produced a report that offers some estimates.
A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan: Afghanistan Force Requirements argues that an additional 40-45,000 troops will be necessary in 2010 to add to the 64,000 already there.
(It should be noted that, according to the authors, of the 64,000 troops presently in-country, only 23,000 are available for counter-insurgency operations.
Compare that to Iraq, where before the troop surge the 15 US brigades there could put around 72,000 counter-insurgency troops on the ground and at the height of the surge, the total was more like 105,000. Iraq and Afghanistan have similar populations, although the latter is a much bigger country.)
These troops are in addition to the 20 non-US ISAF battalions that provide another 16,000 counter-insurgency troops and around 50,000 Afghan National Army troops. It will also be necessary to speed up the training of an extra 30,000 Afghan troops by October next year.
The US and ISAF troops should concentrate their efforts in Helmand/Kandahar, Paktia/Paktika and Nangahar and the Konar River Valley, say the authors. Other areas should simply be held or, in some cases, abandoned.
Without the extra troops suggested by Kagan and Kagan, they say the fighting in Helmand will continue to be indecisive, and Kandahar will have to be ceded to the enemy. Alternatively it may become necessary to withdraw completely from Helmand, which would not only humiliate the British Army, but would also lead to a mass slaughter of those who cooperated with the ISAF forces. From a military standpoint at least, President Obama would appear to have very few choices.
However, Frederick W. Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and Kimberly Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War, have produced a report that offers some estimates.
A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan: Afghanistan Force Requirements argues that an additional 40-45,000 troops will be necessary in 2010 to add to the 64,000 already there.
(It should be noted that, according to the authors, of the 64,000 troops presently in-country, only 23,000 are available for counter-insurgency operations.
Compare that to Iraq, where before the troop surge the 15 US brigades there could put around 72,000 counter-insurgency troops on the ground and at the height of the surge, the total was more like 105,000. Iraq and Afghanistan have similar populations, although the latter is a much bigger country.)
These troops are in addition to the 20 non-US ISAF battalions that provide another 16,000 counter-insurgency troops and around 50,000 Afghan National Army troops. It will also be necessary to speed up the training of an extra 30,000 Afghan troops by October next year.
The US and ISAF troops should concentrate their efforts in Helmand/Kandahar, Paktia/Paktika and Nangahar and the Konar River Valley, say the authors. Other areas should simply be held or, in some cases, abandoned.
Without the extra troops suggested by Kagan and Kagan, they say the fighting in Helmand will continue to be indecisive, and Kandahar will have to be ceded to the enemy. Alternatively it may become necessary to withdraw completely from Helmand, which would not only humiliate the British Army, but would also lead to a mass slaughter of those who cooperated with the ISAF forces. From a military standpoint at least, President Obama would appear to have very few choices.
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