Slow progress on on Afghan power supply

Providing electricity to the scattered towns and villages of Afghanistan is probably one of the best ways of undermining the Taliban insurgency. Nothing can change the lives of most Afghans more than access to cheap, reliable power. So it is with a somewhat heavy heart that one reads the latest report from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGIR).
With the snappy title, Afghanistan Energy Supply Has Increased but An Updated Master Plan Is Needed and Delays and Sustainability Concerns Remain the report doesn't exactly build high hopes of progress.
True, Afghanistan’s installed electrical capacity has increased in the last eight years by an estimated 139 percent, up from 430 megawatts (MW) in 2001 compared to 1,028.5MW in September 2009.
But that modest increase hides many problems. Afghanistan’s operational capacity (621.4 MW) - the amount of electricity that is actually used - is only 60 percent of its installed capacity. This is much less even than the amount of power used in the Washington DC area alone.
The reasons for this shortfall are many and varied. For example, the Afghanistan government lacks the capability to collect the revenue needed to fund current and expected fuel costs and operating and maintenance expenses. According to the Afghan Energy Sector Strategy, the energy sector lost $128.5m in revenue in 2005 due to poor commercial operations. USAID estimates that the Kabul Electricity Directorate alone lost approximately 60 percent or $125m in revenues in 2008 and without changes this loss could rise to $275m annually by 2015.
Then there is corruption. Corruption examples include extra fees for connections, bribes to meter readers, bypassing of meters, and incomplete revenue returns to Central Ministry of Energy and Water. The Asian Development Bank, in its May 2009 report on Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan cited examples of patronage for ministry jobs, consumer expectations of bribes to pay for utility services, and investor expectations of demands and bribes. For example, as many as 25 signatures are required ito secure an electricity connection in Kabul through the official procedures. But no signatures are required if you pay a bribe.
Other problems include an aging labour force and a shortage of young people entering the skilled labour, technical, and professional ranks.
Contractors have not performed well either, particularly the major US contractors, the Louis Berger Group and Black and Veatch. In fiscal year 2009, USAID had six active energy infrastructure projects underway, valued at an estimated $422.6m. All but one of these did not meet scheduled completion dates. Reasons for delays include poor contractor performance, poor contract oversight, and security concerns.
Security costs in particular have risen dramatically, from around 10 per cent of contract costs to around 30 per cent. Casualties have also been high, with the Louis Berger Group reporting, for example, 195 killed, 286 wounded, and 28 kidnapped over the last nine years in Afghanistan.
There are some small signs of hope, with the possibility of importing more energy from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but the chances of lights going on all over Afghanistan are not great. As of September 2009, the Afghan Energy Information Center estimates that approximately 15 percent of households in urban centers had access to electric power, whereas only six percent of rural households had access to electricity. Afghans mostly rely on electricity produced by costly diesel generators as opposed to lower cost options such as imported power or natural gas, hydro, solar, and wind energy.

Careless Hakimullah targetted by drones

Interesting to note that the drone missile attack today aimed at Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Hakimullah Mahsud took place in a village in Shaktoi, close to the border between North and South Waziristan. This is exactly the spot where, on 21 December (as reported on this blog a couple of days later) Hakimullah's deputy, Waliur Rahman, gave an interview to AP in which he bragged about the group's success in evading the Pakistan Army's offensive in South Waziristan.
Although the AP reporter did not reveal the exact location of the interview, he said it was in a "large, mudbrick compound". Sounds very much like the former seminary targeted in today's drone strike in which at least a dozen militants were killed, including several foreigners. Both the TTP and local ISI officials admitted that Hakimullah had been in the compound before it was almost completely destroyed by two missiles. They say he escaped, but that has yet to be confirmed. If he continues to be so careless in his movements it won't be long before he goes the way of his predecessor (and cousin) Baitullah Mahsud, killed in a drone missile attack last August.
Here's Pakistan's Top Twenty list of TTP leaders, for whom they have offered substantial rewards. One at least, no17, Abdullah Shah Mahsud, has already been captured. The rest remain at large, despite the Pakistan Army's recent offensive into South Waziristan.

Rewards of $600,000:
Hakimullah Mahsud: Overall leader of TTP. Formerly he led TTP forces in Arakzai, Kurram, and in Khyber and Peshawar before assuming the top job after his cousin Baitullah Mahsud was killed in a US Predator strike on 5 August.
2. Waliur Rahman Mahsud: Overall commander of the TTP in South Waziristan. Waliur was competing with Hakimullah for the leadership of the TTP following Baitullah's death.
3. Qari Hussain Mahsud: The notorious trainer of child suicide bombers and an effective military commander. Credited with masterminding some of the most deadly suicide strikes in Pakistan as well as the attack on the CIA at FOB Chapman.

Rewards of $300,000:
4. Azam Tariq: Official TTP spokesman. His real name is Mohammad Raees Khan Mahsud.
5. Maulvi Azmatullah Mahsud: Military commander of TTP forces in the Barvand region. Formerly a close aide to Baitullah.
6. Mufti Noor Wali Mahsud: Commander of a TTP training camp in the Gargaray region.
7. Mufti Noor Saeed: Military commander in South Waziristan.
8. Maulvi Shameem Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
9. Amirullah Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
10. Nasiruddin Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
11. Shah Faisal Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
12. Sher Azeem Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
13. Jaleel Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.
14. Mohammad Ismael Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.

Rewards of $120,000:
15. Asmatullah Bhittani: Military commander in the towns of Jandola and Tank. Also known as Shaheen.
16. Arfeshaheen: Military commander in South Waziristan.
17. Abdullah Shah Mahsud: Military commander in Shaktoi region in South Waziristan. Captured.
18. Mohammad Anwar Kandapur: Military commander in the district of Dera Ismail Khan.
19. Maulvi Abdul Wali: Military commander in South Waziristan.
20: Khan Saeed Mahsud: Military commander in South Waziristan.

A deadly year of terrorism for Pakistan

Latest figures from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) confirm that 2009 was a dreadful year for Pakistan. Their usually reliable figures show that a total of 2,586 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian related incidents of terrorism were reported across the country, killing 3,021 people and injuring 7,334.
This makes Pakistan the most dangerous country in the world for terrorism, with more people being killed here than in Afghanistan, Iraq or any other place.
The highest number of attacks was reported from the North West Frontier Province (1,137), followed by Balochistan (792) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (559). As many as 46 attacks took place in Punjab, 30 in Sindh, 12 in Islamabad and five each in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir.
The 87 suicide attacks in 2009 were 32 percent higher than the previous year. These attacks claimed the lives of 1,299 persons and injured 3,633, says PIPS.
When you add in casualties in terrorist attacks, operational attacks by the security forces and their clashes with the militants, intertribal clashes and the cross-border attacks of the US and NATO forces in FATA are counted, overall casualties total 12,632 people dead and 12,815 injured. These figures are much higher than those published two weeks ago by Dawn newspaper (see my report of 31 Dec below).
PIPS says that government forces were able to inflict heavy damage on the terrorists’ networks and infrastructure in FATA and adjacent areas. However, some caution should be applied when dealing with official figures on terrorists killed during operations. Many journalists have reported that there is often no sign of dead bodies following some military actions.
That said, the military says 596 operational attacks were launched in 2009, compared to 313 operational attacks in the previous year. During the year, 12,866 militants were arrested, including 75 al-Qaeda and 9,739 TTP supporters and militants belonging to other banned groups and Baloch insurgents.
Compare these figures to Afghanistan. According to a report from the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan published yesterday, the number of Afghan civilians killed in violence in 2009 was 2,412, compared with 2,118 in 2008. This figure was higher than in any year since the Taliban were ousted in 2001 and was a rise of 14 per cent on the previous year, but still substantially below the casualty figures for neighbouring Pakistan.
Seventy per cent of last year's civilian deaths - representing about 1,681 people - had been caused by insurgent attacks, while pro-government forces including NATO and US troops, had been responsible for a quarter of civilian deaths (596 people).
According to the report: "Suicide and other attacks involving IEDs continued to claim the most civilian lives in 2009 with an overall toll of 1,054 killed. 225 civilians were killed as a result of targeted assassinations and executions. Together, these tactics accounted for over 78 per cent of the civilian deaths attributed to 'anti-goverment element' actions."
In an email statement the Taliban challenged the credibility of UNAMA’s report and accused the organization of disseminating incorrect and biased information. “Partial judgment, and blind support of one side and condemnation of the other, only irreparably harms your credibility,” said the statement addressed to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
UNAMA rejected the Taliban accusations and said it has a mandate to impartially report civilian casualties of war based on reliable facts and the testimonies of victims.
The UNAMA report noted that deaths attributed to allied forces dropped by nearly 30 per cent in 2009.
The UNAMA report also noted that there were 520 international Coalition troop deaths throughout the year, up from 295 for 2008.

Afghan Taliban: more information please

Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg of the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War have had another go at trying to explain the functioning of the Quetta Shura of the Taliban (QST) in a new report called The Quetta Shura in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operations and Shadow Governance.
Dressler's competent last effort, Securing Helmand, was not specifically about the Quetta Shura, but it covered many of the issues contained in this latest report.
But it has to be said that both reports are frustrating. There is plenty of detail about attacks carried out by the Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan, but little if any new information about how the organisation operates and how it is evolving. We still know almost nothing about the leadership. Who is in the Quetta Shura? Where do they come from? What is their background? None of these points are answered. Only four or five members of the QST are mentioned by name.
Then there is the question of the relationship between the QST and both al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Following the suicide attack on the CIA base at FOB Chapman in Khost on 30 December all three organisations claimed responsibility. Are they really that close? If so, why did the QST issue a statement in the summer distancing itself from the TTP and saying that it no longer wanted to be known as the Taliban? Why indeed did Mullah Omar issue a new rulebook for the organisation last year stressing the need for ethical behaviour by its fighters?
And on foreign fighters, what is the situation? Dressler makes a strong case to support the argument that there is a large presence of foreign fighters in southern Afghanistan under the command of the Taliban. Others suggest that there may be only a hundred or two. If anything, it would appear that most foreigners are travelling to Pakistan to fight with the TTP. Indeed, another Jordanian was killed there this week, this one allegedly a bodyguard of al-Qaeda's No 3, Mustapha Abul Yazid . There is little evidence - certainly in terms of jihadist obituaries - of large numbers of foreigners dying in Helmand.
More light will be shed on the Taliban with the publication of their former Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef's, autobiography, My life with the Taliban, next month. More on that soon. For those of you in London, Alex Strick Van Linschoten, who edited it, will be talking about the book at SOAS on 21 January and at several other venues subsequently. For some reason the Mullah himself cannot make it. The UK official launch will be held at the Frontline Club on 9 February.

UK Defence Ministry publishes journalist briefings

Good to see that the UK's Ministry of Defence is now posting online its briefings to journalists. On Thursday Fleet Street's finest heard via a video link-up from Major General Nick Carter, commander of NATO's Regional Command South. Speaking from Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan, Carter explained that he commanded around 45,000 NATO troops in an area the size of England and Wales put together.
He said that the McChrystal strategy had meant a change in mission statement. Until last July he had been talking about defeating the insurgency; now he is talking about protecting a population.
There are many fascinating elements to the briefing, which gives a clear insight into NATO strategy in the region. One example will suffice. Major-General Carter explained that British forces in Sangin have had a very tough time over the past 18 months, but not simply because of the Taliban. In fact they have been in the middle of a complicated tribal dispute.
Carter explained it as follows: "When Sher Mohammed Akindzada was removed from the governorate of Helmand at the end of 2005, the delicate balance of power that existed between his Alizai tribe and that of Dan Mohammed Khan up in Sangin, who are Allakozai, was disrupted. The upshot of that was that the Ishaqzai tribe, which had been reasonably downtrodden for several years, saw an opportunity to rise up and have a go at the Allakozai tribe. And Dan Mohammed Khan, the leader of the Allakozai tribe, found himself under significant pressure."
This meant that British forces in Sangin tasked with providing security and stability in that area in partnership with Afghans, have been labelled as supporters of the Allakozai tribe. The result is that Alizai and the Ishaqzai who want to make trouble for the Allakozai have made life difficult for the British battle groups.
Carter referred to Major-General Flynn's report on intelligence (published last week - see below), saying that he agreed with the critique it offered of traditional intelligence gathering and that it was necessary to appreciate what was happening in a particular area, rather than simply looking at insurgent groups, the economy, etc as separate entities.
As he said in answer to a question about Flynn's report: "What we're dealing with in Afghanistan is not just purely enemy matters. It's what's often called the white picture; it's understanding the politics, the governance dynamics, the tribal dynamics, the anthropological issues. It's those issues which don't strictly come under the definition of intelligence but are none the less the information environment, which if you don't understand it and you don't work out how to corral it you simply won't make the sort of progress we were describing."

Text of Jordanian suicide bomber's video

In yet another media coup for Islamist militants, the Jordanian doctor who blew himself up on 30 December at FOB Chapman in eastern Afghanistan has appeared in a video alongside the leader of the Pakistan Taliban, Hakimullah Mahsud.
The video, recorded in both English and Arabic, shows Dr Hummam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi reading a short statement explaining his decision to carry out the deadly attack which killed seven CIA officers and his Jordanian handler. The English statement, in which he uses his kunyah (lit. a 'hidden' name but often used by followers of al-Qaeda. Abu Dujannah was a Companion of the Prophet, famous for wearing a red headband) and which differs slightly from the Arabic version, reads as follows:
"I am Dr Abu Dujannah al-Khorasani, a Jordanian. I left my family, I left my clinic, I left my car to join the mujahidin in the land of Khorasan. The Jordanians and the American intelligence services offered me millions of dollars to work with them and to spy on mujahidin here, but alhamdillah, I came to the mujahidin and told them everything and we arranged together this attack to let the Americans understand that the belief of Allah, the iman we hold, the taqwa we stand for, cannot be exchanged for all the wealth in the world.
This attack will be the first of the revenge operations against the Americans and their drone teams outside the Pakistani borders.
After they killed the Amir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Baitullah Mahsud - may God have mercy on his soul - this is a message to all kaffirin that we as Moslems, and muhajiroun and ansar, we never forget our martyrs. We never forget our prisoners and we will never forget Afia Siddiqui and Sajida Rishawi and our jihad, inshallah, will continue, until we free our prisoners and until the word of Allah prevails."
The two people he refers to are Afia Siddiqui, a Pakistani woman arrested in Afghanistan and now on trial in New York and Sajida Rishawi, a Jordanian woman who tried to blow up a hotel in Amman in 2005 and was subsequently captured and sentenced to death.
The fact that Hakimullah Mahsud appears in the video shows that the TTP had a strong hand in the operation. It is likely, therefore, that Qari Hussein, who runs the training camps for TTP suicide bombers and who made the first claim of responsibility for the attack, was the person who prepared Dr al-Balawi for his mission.
The video also suggests that al-Balawi was very confident of the success of the mission, even though he had never been to FOB Chapman before. Why was he so confident that he would evade security checks? How did he know he was going to meet members of the CIA drone teams? Someone has a lot of explaining to do.

Taliban's Mullah Barodar speaks out

Interesting interview with Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan No2, Mullah Barodar Akhund (aka Abdul Ghani). The interview was published in Pashto by the Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press and translated by the US government's Open Source Center. It was published by Juan Cole's Informed Comment blog.
The interview was carried out by email and first published on 31 December. Mullah Barodar points out that 2009 was a very successful year for the mojahedin: "The casualties and financial and losses they inflicted on the invaders could be found in reports, speeches and announcements of the Pentagon and other Western sources, who said the casualties of the past
seven years has been equal to the losses and casualties of the current year. That means the current year has been the bloodiest year full of calamities and fears for them in the past eight years which is a great achievement of the mojahedin."
In answer to a question about Western attempts to differentiate between the Islamic Emirate and al-Qaeda, Barodar is cagey, emphasising that the current jihad is led by Mullah Omar and that "what the international community says about separating the Taliban an al-Qaeda is meaningless, it is just a pretext."
He denies that either the Taliban or al-Qaeda leadership are in Pakistan. And he also denies that any Taliban leaders have been talking to the Afghan government. When the interviewer
specifically asks him about the activities of Abdullah Anas - an Algerian former mojahedin who is known to have been involved in talks with elements of the Taliban - Barodar denies it explicitly. "We have neither permitted anyone to negotiate nor do we have any representative by the name of Abdullah Anas."
He sticks to the usual Taliban line, which is to say that negotiations can only take place once foreign forces have left the country. Asked how under a Taliban government he will guarantee that no-one will use Afghanistan to prepare attacks on another country, he gives the less-than-reassuring answer: "We had given the world such an assurance also during the Islamic Emirate's previous era. We have and will have the same stance in the future as well."

Another Jordanian Royal connection

Readers of this blog may recall a piece I wrote in October about a group of Jordanian women in Pakistan who were seeking repatriation, claiming that their menfolk had been killed fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan during the summer. The women claimed they were members of the Jordanian Royal family and that the deceased husband of one was a Royal prince.
It was thus interesting to note the Royal connections of Sharif Ali bin Zeid, the Jordanian intelligence officer who was handling Dr Hummam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the suicide bomber who penetrated FOB Chapman in Khost, killing seven CIA officers and injuring six others. bin Zeid who was also killed in the explosion, was certainly a member of the Jordanian Royal family and his funeral in Jordan was attended by King Abdullah and other Royal relatives.
Is there a possible connection? Were the afore-mentioned Jordanian fighters killed as a result of information supplied by al-Balawi? Probably not, although you never know. At the time the Jordanian Embassy in Pakistan denied the women were members of the Royal family, but it did agree to repatriate them.

US Intel officers told to work more like journalists

In what is arguably one of the most radical reorganisations of intelligence operations ever attempted in the middle of a conflict, US Army intelligence officers operating in Afghanistan are to be trained to operate like journalists, to collect and gather information from the front line in the hope of avoiding the narrow, sterile, issue-based intelligence-gathering that appears to be failing so comprehensively at present.
The outline for this new method of working is set out in a publication from the Center for a New American Security called Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan by Major General Michael T Flynn, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since June 2009.
As he says in the document's introduction: "Just as the old rules of warfare may no longer apply, a new way of leveraging and applying the information spectrum requires substantive improvements."
In fact his assessment makes it clear that the US reliance on covert intelligence gathering and all the other paraphernalia of modern intel operations has led to a situation in Afghanistan where commanders can no longer see the wood for the trees.
Flynn begins his report with a damning critique of eight years of intelligence gathering in Afghanistan: "Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade.
"Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency."
At the battalion level, he says, intelligence officers read human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and signficant activity (SIGACT) reports to try to get an idea of the battlefield.
But these officers rarely gather or process information from patrol debriefs, minutes from local shuras with farmers and tribal leaders, translated summaries of radio broadcasts or field observations from a wide range of personnel.
This leads to an over-emphasis of information about the enemy at the expense of political, economic and cultural information - most of it unclassified - that provides ways of marginalising the insurgency. Battalion commanders have begun to realise that they learn more about their own battlefield from reading newspaper reports than they ever would from reading material collated by their own intelligence officers. The newspaper reports discuss more than the enemy and IEDs.
He quotes one battalion operations officer: "“I don’t want to say we’re clueless, but we are. We’re no more than fingernail deep in our understanding of the environment.”
Flynn proposes that in future intelligence analysts should integrate information collected by a wide range of agencies, including civil affairs officers, atmospherics teams, Afghan liaison officers, female engagement teams, NGOs, UN officials, psyops teams, human terrain teams and others, dividing their work geographically, instead of along functional lines. Their reports will attempt to describe what is happening in a particular district from all standpoints, instead of having separate reports on governance, narco-traficking, insurgent networks, etc - an approach that Flynn recognises is not working.
Flynn says the analysts who have gathered this information will provide it to 'information brokers' who will organise all the reports and distribute them. Both analysts and brokers will be part of what Flynn calls Stability Operations Information Centers, together with State Department officials.
Flynn says "Leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts to serve in the Stability Operations Information Centers. These will be among the most challenging and rewarding jobs an analyst could tackle.
The highly complex environment in Afghanistan requires an adaptive way of thinking and operating."
Indeed the very format of this report is unique. Its author says it should be regarded as a directive (ie an order). Why did they choose to publish it in an open format, instead of as a memo to the general staff? "We chose to embody it in this unconventional report, and are taking the steps to have it published by a respected think tank, in order to broaden its reach to commanders, intelligence professionals and schoolhouse instructors outside, as well as inside, Afghanistan. Some of what is presented here reinforces existing top-level orders that are being acted on too slowly. Other initiatives in this paper are new, requiring a shift in emphasis and a departure from the comfort zone of many in the intelligence community."
Flynn's approach is exactly the same as that adopted by the British more than 100 years ago when fighting against the Afghan tribes. British officers immersed themselves in the culture and language of the Pashtuns, even translating their poetry and epic literature and compiling enormously detailed reports on tribes and areas. Colonel H C Wylly's From the Black Mountain to Waziristan, Lieutenant Charles Gray Robertston's Kurum, Kabul and Kandahar, the anonymous Report on Waziristan and its Tribes - these and dozens of other books published in the late nineteenth century are still the best sources on many of the tribes and their histories.
Then again, there are those who have spent a lifetime studying the Afghans who would claim they still don't really understand much at all....

Attacks on Haqqanis prompted CIA killings

Jordanian doctor al-Balawi, who carried out the bombing at FOB Chapman

The suicide bomb attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan on Wednesday that killed seven CIA officers (including the female station chief), a Jordanian intelligence officer, and wounded six others was an eloquent and bloody response by Islamist militants based in Pakistan to recent drone attacks in North Waziristan.
The attacker managed to get into the base's gym where a meeting was in progress. One report from AP says a senior CIA debriefer attended the meeting, specifically to meet an agent. The CIA officers based in the camp were part of a unit that collated information and tasked drones used to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters in Pakistan.
The AP report said that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Qari Hussein, known as a trainer of suicide bombers, claimed in interview on Friday to the agency that his organisation had been approached by a CIA-trained turncoat who said he was willing to attack his erstwhile colleagues:
"Thank God that we then trained him and sent him to the Khost air base. The one who was their own man, he succeeded in getting his target," Hussain told an AP reporter who travelled to see him in South Waziristan.
Yesterday US President Obama wrote to the CIA to offer his condolences: "In recent years", he said, "the CIA has been tested as never before. Since our country was attacked on September 11, 2001, you have served on the frontlines in directly confronting the dangers of the 21st century. Because of your service, plots have been disrupted, American lives have been saved, and our Allies and partners have been more secure. Your triumphs and even your names may be unknown to your fellow Americans, but your service is deeply appreciated. Indeed, I know firsthand the excellent quality of your work because I rely on it every day."
It was the worst loss of life for the CIA since eight of its officers were killed in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983. Four others have been killed in Afghanistan since 9/11.
The attack on FOB Chapman is most likely connected with three recent CIA drone attacks launched on targets associated with Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose forces control territory almost directly over the border in North Waziristan. The first strike took place on Thursday 17 December and killed two insurgents as they travelled in a vehicle in the village of Dosali.
A second attack on the same day saw five drones fire as many as ten missiles into a compound in the village of Degan, killing at least 15 people including a senior al-Qaeda figure and seven foreigners. The large number of drones and missiles suggest that the CIA, which operates the drones, believed there was a very senior figure present.
The third attack, on 18 Dec, killed at least three militants and injured others.
The significance of these attacks is that they were against the Haqqanis, who are regarded by the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, as an asset. The Haqqanis receive both arms and finance from the ISI. Pakistan has refused to extend its present military campaign against Islamist militants in South Waziristan into North Waziristan because the relationship with the Haqqani network is regarded as being of strategic importance.
However, this relationship is becoming increasingly problematic for the Americans and the attack on FOB Chapman will undoubtedly have major consequences.
If Qari Hussein's claim is true, it is possible it was carried out on behalf of the Haqqani network. The Haqqanis are acting as hosts to many TTP militants who have been driven out of South Waziristan by the Pakistan Army offensive and this may have been a way of repaying their hospitality.
Update: Various sources are now reporting that the bomber was a Jordanian doctor and double agent, recruited a year ago in Jordan to provide information on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda No2, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Named as Hummam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, it appears he turned on his handlers, who included a Jordanian intelligence officer, Ali bin Zaid, who was the eighth person killed in the explosion - and also a member of the Jordanian Royal family. Qari Hussein's claim may still be true, even though the Afghan Taliban have also claimed responsibility for the operation.

Pakistan terror victims at an all-time high

Figures compiled from newspaper reports by Dawn newspaper show that more than 3,300 people, including law-enforcement and armed forces personnel, were killed in 2009 in terrorism-related incidents in Pakistan.
The statistics confirm that Pakistan is more dangerous that Afghanistan at present, with more killings, more bombings and more suicide attacks. And this is despite the fact that in Azad Kashmir, previously a major hotspot for terrorism, there have been very few incidents in the last year.
Suicide bombers struck every fifth day in Pakistan, killing 1,037 people n 76 suicide attacks in 2009. December saw the highest number of suicide attacks — 15 — which claimed 211 lives. On average nine lives were lost daily.
The data show that 443 army and police personnel lost their lives during military operations and terrorist attacks, the most brazen of which was carried out on 10 October by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan militants on the heavily-guarded GHQ in Rawalpindi. Six soldiers and four attackers were killed in the siege, which lasted almost 24 hours.
At least 42 people, including a number of serving and retired army officers, were killed in two suicide blasts and a gun attack on an army mosque near the GHQ on 4 December.
The NWFP was the worst-hit province where more than 64 per cent of the terrorism-related incidents took place in 2009. About 2,133 people lost their lives in the province with another 699 killed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In Punjab, 369 people were killed in different incidents. Two incidents of terrorism took place in Sindh, where 44 people died. A further 35 people were killed in Balochistan, 29 in Islamabad and eight in Azad Kashmir.
The bloodiest month was May, during which 1,120 people — 945 in the NWFP alone — were killed. It was in this month that the government launched a full-scale military operation in Swat, Buner and adjoining areas.
The Taliban targeted many prominent personalities during the year, including elected representatives, seven of whom, including Allama Sarfaraz Naeemi who was an outspoken opponent of the Taliban, were killed in suicide attacks.
Federal Minister for Religious Affairs Hamid Saeed Kazmi survived an attempt on his life in Islamabad on 2 September.
Two MPAs from the Awami National Party — Dr Shamsher Khan and Alamzeb Khan — also lost their lives in terrorist attacks.
Senior NWFP Minister Bashir Bilour survived an assassination attempt in Peshawar on 11 March during which six people, including two suspected suicide attackers, were killed.
The Taliban also blew up the shrine of the revered 17th century Sufi poet Abdurrahman Baba in Peshawar.
The military claimed to have killed a number of important leaders of the TTP and al-Qaeda during operations in the NWFP and FATA. TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in August in South Waziristan.
In Lahore on 3 March a convoy of two buses carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials was attacked by 12 gunmen near the Qadhafi Stadium. Six policemen and two civilians were killed.

Leading Pakistani cleric makes Blackwater claim

Today in Karachi, the noted religious scholar Mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani (above) alleged that US defence contractor Blackwater was responsible for Monday's bloody suicide bombing in the city that killed at least 43 people and wounded a further 90 taking part in a Shia Ashura procession.
Mufti Usmani is no backwoods mullah, living out in the sticks. In fact, he is Grand Mufti of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
According to Wikipedia: "He is also the current President of Darul Uloom Karachi. He is the son of the late Mufti Muhammad Shafi Uthmani, the founder of Darul Ulum Karachi. He is recognized for his knowledge in fiqh, hadith, and tafsir. He has authored a large number of books in Urdu, as well as some notable treatises in Arabic. He is the brother of another notable Islamic scholar, Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani and Maulana Wali Razi. Mufti Sahab is also a member of Jamiatul Ulama USA."
After making this ridiculous claim at a press conference, the Grand Mufti went on to say that immediately after the blast, markets were set on fire according to a well thought-out plan and he asked how the perpetrators could get petrol and weapons so quickly.
The Mufti made this remarkable claim despite the fact that the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan has claimed full responsibility for the Karachi suicide attack.
"My group claims responsibility for the Karachi attack and we will carry out more such attacks, within 10 days," Asmatullah Shaheen, one of the commanders of TTP, told Reuters. He is in the leadership of TTP and one of its 20 most wanted figures.
Talking to Pakistan's SAMAA news channel on Wednesday Asmatullah Shaheen said that the suicide bomber’s Jihadi title was Hasnain Mawya. He was apparently an old man, although Shaheen refused to disclose his original name and age. He added that the attack was carried out in the name of reverence to the Companions of the Prophet. This is another way of saying that the victims were killed because they were Shias.
Update: On Thursday, TTP spokesman Azam Tariq denied that his organisation had carried out the Karachi attack. He said that TTP commander Asmatullah Shaheen, who took responsibility for the attack, "acted on his own will". Tariq denied that the TTP attacked public places. This is, of course, untrue. On the same day, the TTP's commander in the Punjab, Khalilullah, was arrested by police in the company of a 17-year-old suicide bomber. According to reports, they were planning to attack the flag-lowering ceremony at the Wagah border crossing into to India in two days time. Police say Khalilullah was responsible for the Moon Market bombing in Lahore on 8 December that killed more than 40 people and injured another 100, many of them women and children.

US Army training emphasises hearts and minds

An unclassified memorandum on training requirements, circulated by US Forces Afghanistan HQ earlier this month and published on the Cryptome website, contains some fascinating details of military procedures on a range of subjects including the pros and cons of wearing body armour, the deployment of Female Engagement Teams, the selection of Forward Operating Bases, language skills and the poor training of soldiers in indirect (mortar) fire.
The memo shows that at least at leadership level the US Army is prepared to make major doctrinal changes based on experience in the field. Whether these changes are actually implemented by platoon commanders is more difficult to judge.
On language training, the memo says it is "as important as your other basic combat skills". Soldiers are to begin language training well before they deploy and every platoon commander must reach a basic level of proficiency in Dari/Pashto.
The memo notes that units deploying to Afghanistan cannot interact with the female half of the population and that Female Engagement Teams (FETs) should be used more widely. "FETs have the potential to significantly improve relationship-building within Afghanistan, enhance information gathering and cast US forces in a positive light", it says.
The memo notes that to date FETs have been used primarily by the Marines, but that this should now be extended to all units. It recommends culture classes to educate FET members on considerations such as dress, offensive physical gestures, customs and religion. They should also receive training in the Pashtunwali code "to better understand Pashtun culture".
The issue of body armour is a delicate one. In the UK, the lack of it was a major issue until the government made more money available to ensure all troops were fully equipped.
However, the memo states that although wearing individual body armour (IBA) can be an appropriate force protection measure, "its near-universal application in Afghanistan has become a hindrance to establishing bonds in this personal relationship and trust-based society."
It notes that wearing IBA has become a default position, but that to Afghans it conveys a message of distrust or uneasiness. Usfora's Counter-Insurgency guidance notes state that "excessive force protection is distancing, not inspiring". Instead, units should be trained to know when to take off IBA.
On the selection of sites for forward operating bases (FOBs), the memo notes that in one town, locals asked for the FOB to be built around the local cellphone tower, as a previous one had been destroyed by the Taliban. It says FOBs - of which there are more than 200 - should be built within population centres to encourage trust and support from the local population. Locals should even be involved in the selection of sites for FOBs.
Interestingly, the memo encourages soldiers to think of the Taliban in two distinct groups:
"Group 1 are the ideological Taliban who will never accept a Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as legitimate. This group must be eliminated. Group 2 are the 'upset brothers', a description in Pashto. When we address and alleviate their issues they will reintegrate with Afghan society. We can affect this goal with the 'upset brothers' by using our FOBs to enhance participation with the people."

Bergdahl says he is "healthy, well and safe"

The video released by the Taliban on Christmas Day of captured US soldier Bowe Bergdahl does little to resolve the question of whether or not he is a traitor. Put out by Al-Emara Jihadi Studio, the Taliban's new media arm - until earlier this year they relied on the Pakistan-based As-Sahab media house - the video, entitled One of their People Testified, is mainly a propaganda argument about the treatment of prisoners. Much of its 37 minutes is taken up with details of the atrocities committed against moslem prisoners in Guantanamo and at Bagram in Afghanistan, together with footage from Abu Ghraib in Iraq.
All of this, of course, was free propaganda for the Islamists and starkly illustrates why mistreatment of prisoners is ultimately counter-productive.
This is the second video of Bergdahl, who was captured on 30 June in eastern Afghanistan and is probably being held by the Haqqani faction of the Taliban, based over the border in Pakistan's North Waziristan.
The video was produced by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's Commission of Cultural Affairs and contains a warning at the beginning that it should not be seen with a musical accompaniment.
Only after a long introduction about American treatment of prisoners do we see Bergdahl himself. In contrast to the first video, where he was shown wearing traditional Afghan clothes, in the new video he is wearing his battledress, a military helmet and sunglasses and it is difficult to tell whether or not he is reading a prepared statement.
He speaks in the first person and seems to be extemporising when he says, for example, that "the numbers and facts prove that we have surpassed Hitler in his horror". His speech is rambling, but he occasionally looks to one side as if he may be looking at some general notes. Clearly his captors do not want it to appear that he is reading from a prepared statement.
He tells his parents at one point that he is "so sorry that it took so long to do something with my life" and that "strangely enough, I am making a lot of headway here."
He adds that "I'm healthy, I'm well, I'm safe", although he admits he is chained. Still shots show him eating a banana. He says his captors are treating him according to their religion and that they are following their religion "more than I have seen anybody follow their religion".
He adds that he has a toothbrush, toothpaste, shaving equipment and that he is "getting meals as if I was a guest here". One possibility is that he is now studying Islam, although he does not feel confident enough to declare himself a moslem. Personally, I would not be surprised if he becomes a convert.
The video ends with a statement read by official Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, who says that the offer to exchange Bergdahl for a "limited number" of Taliban prisoners still stands.
If Bergdahl is ever recaptured/freed by the US Army, there will doubtless be a debate over whether or not he has betrayed his country. His family still believes he is simply a captured prisoner. Others may be less sympathetic.

Pakistan Taliban commander unbowed

Hakimullah Mahsud (l)and Waliur Rahman (r)

Interesting comments from the Pakistan Taliban's deputy leader, Waliur Rahman, who on Monday night gave the first interview by any of the group's leaders since the start of the Pakistan Army's offensive into South Waziristan on 17 October.
The interview took place in Shaktoi in South Waziristan, which in itself is revealing. Shaktoi is on the border of north and south Waziristan, in the territory of the Shabi Khel Mahsuds, one of the sub-tribes. It is interesting to note that Mullah Powindah, one of the most active opponents of the British in Waziristan in the 1880s-90s, was a Shabi Khel Mahsud.
You may also be surprised to find out that he assumed the title of Badshah-e-Taliban in the 1880s, so don't let anyone try to convince you that the Taliban is a new phenomenon.
Either side of this territory is land controlled by the Daurs and the Tori Khel Wazirs, both supporters of the TTP.
Waliur Rahman himself is from the Mal Khel of the Manzais of the Mahsuds, who are cousins to the Shabi Khel. As one informant told me: "They normally are on very good terms and are closer to each other in blood than the others, so if there is a problem among the Mahsud clans, the Manzais would always stand with Shabi Khels and vice versa."
This may all sound a bit complicated, but it is all of significance. The real point about Rahman's appearance is that it took place despite the presence of thousands of Pakistani troops in the area and Pakistani Army claims of a major success against the TTP.
Rahman appeared relaxed, according to the Ishtiaq Mahsud, the AP reporter who got the interview. He said he first travelled to the North Waziristan town of Mir Ali and from there was taken by Taliban militants on a six-hour ride to South Waziristan in a vehicle with tinted windows. No attempt to disguise themselves, it seems.
The interview took place in a large mudbrick compound, where Waliur Rahman was surrounded by seven bodyguards,and Azam Tariq, the TTP official spokesman. Despite Army claims that they have killed more than 600 fighters, Rahman claimed to have lost no more than 20.
Doubts are growing about the success of the Pakistan Army's offensive in South Waziristan. Although they have destroyed a lot of houses and seized large numbers of weapons, they appear not to have engaged and destroyed the TTP fighters, most of whom ran away to North Waziristan and Orakzai before the offensive began. Who is right: the Pakistan Army or Waliur Rahman?