Wednesday, 15 July 2009

List of Afghan Presidential candidates

After making a request to the independent electoral commission in Afghanistan for a list of presidential candidates in English earlier this week, I was duly sent the details. At the risk of boring my readers I am going to publish the list in full, not least because it has hardly been circulated. Here is the full list of 41 candidates:

Haji Rahim Jan Shinzad
Mohammad Yasin Safi
Mohammad Sarwar Ahmadzai
Eng. Moin-ul-din Ulfati
Dr. Habib Mangal
Zabih-U-llah Ghazi Noristani
Sayed Jalal Karim
Mirwais Yasini
Bismillah Shir
Bashir Ahmad Bizhan
Motasim Billah Mazhabi
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
Abdul Latif Pedram
Shahnawaz Tanai
Dr. Mohammad Nasir Anis
Mulla Abdul Salam Rockity
Zia-ul-haq Hafizi
Mohammad Akbar Oria
Baz Mohammad Kofi - withdrawn
Sangin Mohammad Rahmani
Mahbob-U-lah Koshani
Mohammad Hakim Torsan
Abdul Hasib Arian
Mulla Ghulam Mohammad Rigi
Ramazan Bashardost
Mawlawi Mohammad Sayed Hashimi - withdrawn
Abdul Majid Samim
Nasrullah Baryalai Arsalai - withdrawn
Alhaj Shah Mahmood Popal
Mrs. Shahla Ata
Dr. Ghulam Faroq Nijrabi
Alhaj Abdul Ghafor Zori
Mohammad Hashim Tawfiqi
Haji Hasan Ali Sultani
Hamid Karzai
Mawlana Abdul Qadir Imami Ghori
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Dr. Ferozan Fanah
Abdul Jabar Sabit
Hidayat Amin Arsala
Gul Ahmmad Yama

There is no indication of political party for any of the candidates, most of whom are unknown. However, there are two women and I recognise the names of several besides the incumbent. There is, for example, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the former foreign minister who says that President Karzai offered him a plum job if he decided not to run. There is also Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, former finance minister who many people believe is a possible serious contender.
At a slightly different level is Mullah Rockity. Readers may remember him as a former Taliban commander who earned his name due to his prowess with an RPG rocket launcher against the Soviets. After his arrest by the Americans in Kandahar in 2001, he was detained for almost a year before he was released (you can find a more detailed profile here).
Curiously, it appears that rumours are circulating in Kabul that President Karzai may withdraw from the race in favour of either Dr Ghani or Dr Abdullah. The rumours were reported in the newspaper Roznama Mandegar today. Yesterday, another newspaper, Wrazpanra Weesa, reported that up to 20 candidates were about to withdraw in favour of Dr Abdullah. Clearly there is something happening in the Presidential Palace.
Update 26/7/09: Two candidates have withdrawn from the presidential race in the last few days. Nasrullah Baryalai Arsalai withdrew in favour of Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Mawlawi Mohammad Sayed Hashimi, a Shi'ite cleric who leads the Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan, withdrew in favour of Hamid Karzai. More withdrawals are expected in the coming days.
Update 2 - 31/7/09: Candidate Baz Mohammad Kofi announced his withdrawal from the presidential race in Kabul yesterday, urging his supporters to vote for Hamid Karzai.

Afghans who are being driven towards insurgency

Yet another report that appears to challenge the military orthodoxy that dominates decision making in Afghanistan. Thomas Ruttig, co-director of Afghan Analysts Network (AAN), has just published The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors andApproaches to ‘Talks’ which offers a detailed analysis of the Afghan insurgency.
The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) says it is a non-profit, independent policy research organisation that aims to bring together the knowledge, experience and drive of a large number of experts to better inform policy and to increase the understanding of Afghan realities.
Ruttig notes the complexity of the insurgency, pointing out that it is made up of seven separate armed components. Four of these comprise the Taliban, which is made up of the Kandahari mainstream, the Haqqani and Mansur families and the Tora Bora front in eastern Afghanistan based on the remnants of Heb-e Islami (Khales). While there are differences, they all bear allegiance to Mullah Omar.
In addition, there are two other armed insurgent organisations, Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and small Salafi Islamist groups operating in Eastern Afghanistan.
The seventh and final segment, much more recent, is a cluster of former mujahidin groups that feel alienated from the post 2001 political process and that have adopted a Taliban-like modus operandi, but who act independently of each other. "These organisations and groups do not consider Mullah Omar as their leader", says Ruttig. "In the field, however, they occasionally cooperate and coordinate with local Taliban. This includes joint 0perations, the use of the Taliban ‘label’ by other groups (e.g. on , ‘nightletters’, used to threaten the population or individuals) and unwritten, mutual non-aggression agreements".
Ruttig notes that while the Taliban is still a predominantly Pashtun movement, its appeal amongst non-Pashtun groups is increasing. This, he says, is due to a deepening sense of occupation and enormous growing anger about the behaviour of foreign forces ,which has already brought groups closer to the insurgency that earlier had supported international engagement in Afghanistan. "If this trend continues and ideologically different elements feel compelled to join, the insurgency has the potential to develop beyond ethnic boundaries and religious differences into an even broader Afghan nationalist movement."
Faced with a growing and heterogeneous insurgency, says Ruttig, it is necessary to develop differentiated political approaches to achieve stability. Pure counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency techniques will not succeed. He advocates developing multi-layered contacts (‘talks’) with different elements of the insurgency in order to differentiate between the motivations, aims and demands of its different components.
However, a ‘talks’ approach must be embedded in a broader ‘reconciliation’ strategy. The Afghan state itself is part of the problem and therefore cannot play a significant role in initiating either the short-term peace talks or long-term reconciliation. Instead, the best facilitator of ‘talks’ would be the UN in close cooperation with either a group of its Islamic member-states or the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
At the same time, the international community should focus on supporting pro-reform
and pro-democracy forces who are needed as stabilisers within Afghan society following the likely inclusion of additional Islamist forces as the result of a possible political accommodation.

Monday, 13 July 2009

The risks of military entanglement in the South

As British and American forces battle against the Taliban in the southern province of Helmand, it is worth considering, even if only for a moment, whether or not they are fighting in the right place.
I don't say this lightly, as many soldiers have already died and it is in no way a criticism of their bravery to point out that they may have died for little palpable gain.
Last month Gilles Dorronsoro, a French scholar working with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan , which argues that military forces have little chance of making gains in the South and should therefore concentrate on holding and consolidating the North of the country. He says that while all military eyes have been on Helmand, the Taliban has been extending its influence in the North.
Dorronsoro makes the point that the Taliban, which he describes as "a revolutionary movement, deeply opposed to the Afghan tribal system and focused on the rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate", has been under-estimated - a point that has often been made in this blog.
"They have made clever use of ethnic tensions, the rejection of foreign forces by the Afghan people, and the lack of local administration to gain support in the population. In so doing the Taliban have achieved their objectives in the South and East of the country, isolating the Coalition, marginalizing the local Afghan administration, and establishing a parallel administration (mainly to dispense Sharia justice and collect taxes)", he says.
Moreover, he notes, in recent months, a more professional Taliban has succeeded in making significant inroads by recruiting from non-Pashtun communities.
Dorronsoro argues that the current Coalition strategy of focusing its reinforcements in the South (Helmand and Kandahar) is risky to say the least. The lack of local Afghan institutions there will require a long term presence and therefore a need for even more reinforcements in the coming year.
Meanwhile, he says, the pace of Taliban progress in other provinces far outstrips the ability of the Coalition to stabilize the South. The Coalition should change the priorities of its current strategy, shifting resources to stop and reverse the Taliban’s progress in the North, while reinforcing and safeguarding the Kabul region or risk losing control of the entire country.
He makes some very pertinent points about the US strategy of killing Taliban commanders.
"Ironically, the International Coalition is unwittingly helping the Taliban maintain its cohesion by killing those commanders in the field most capable of opposing the central shura. Prime examples are Mullah Akhtar Osmani, killed in December 2006, Mullah Berader in August 2007, and Mullah Dadullah in May 2007. Evidence of the resilient character of the Taliban’s structure is the fact that the International Coalition’s killing of major leaders and its battlefield victories have not reversed the Taliban’s momentum."
The Taliban, says Dorronsoro, has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that "routinely outperforms the coalition in the contest to dominate public perceptions of the war in Afghanistan.” He says they build on the growing discontent of Afghans through a relatively sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which employs radio, video, and night letters to devastating effect. Videos, made in as-Sahab, the Taliban’s media center in Quetta, Pakistan, are readily available. This is certainly accurate, as I can attest myself. Last summer I came across Taliban videos being circulated by mobile phone around Kabul.
Backing up research by the Afghan organisation Cooperation for Peace and Unity (see my previous blogs on their research), Dorronsoro says that the main driver of the insurgency is not the political programme of the Islamist radicals, but local conflicts (many of which have an ethnic component) that have been allowed to flourish through government inaction, incompetence and corruption.
There is much to recommend Dorronsoro's analysis. Unfortunately, it would appear that battle lines have been drawn and that a re-emphasis on the North would now look like a defeat. We are reminded of one of the oldest laws of warfare - know your enemy.

Friday, 10 July 2009

Presidential horse trading Part 2.

More on the deals being made by President Karzai to ensure that he wins in next month's presidential election. When the list of 41 candidates was released by the Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan last month, several names were not included, having been disqualified.
Amongst them was Akbar Bai, who comes from the Turcoman minority. Readers of this blog will remember that In February last year Bai and members of his family were the victims of a vicious assault by Uzbek warlord General Abdur Rashid Dostum, during which he was attacked with a bottle, according to former US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (see my posting of 4 December 2008).
The attack took place because Bai had the temerity to break with Dostum's Junbish-e-Milli party and set up the Turcoman Council in opposition to his former ally.
It was this incident that was the final straw for the US in deciding Dostum had to leave the country. When, a few months later, Dostum ordered the bulldozing of an official war crimes site to hide evidence of his murderous actions in the wake of the Taliban's fall, he was finally flown out to Turkey, allegedly for medical treatment.
Now we know that President Karzai has been courting his favour in order to win Uzbek votes during the election (see story below). Part of the deal may also have been to ensure Akbar Bai did not stand as a presidential candidate. Bai was allegedly disqualified from standing because he had served time for drug offences in a US prison. However, he is indignant. “If there was a protest or complaint against us, they should have informed us earlier and given us an opportunity to defend ourselves, “said Akbar Bai.
He claimed that the president had ordered the electoral commission to exclude him, a charge the body has denied. But the charge is backed by Afghan political analyst Wahid Muzhda. “The decisions on the candidates were not impartial,” he says. “It seems that some kind of compromise has taken place,” said Muzhda. “This violates the commission's independence.”
And there are other signs that the President has been doing deals. This week President Karzai pardoned five heroin smugglers, one of whom is a relative of Deen Mohammad, the man who heads his campaign for re-election.
His relative was jailed for more than a decade in 2007 for smuggling more than 100 kg of heroin. But Deen Mohammad belongs to a powerful family from eastern Afghanistan. One of his brothers served as a deputy for Karzai before he was assassinated in 2002.
Karzai's spokesman, Siyamak Herawi, said the president had ordered the release of the five men some months ago and said it had no link with the election or Deen Mohammad's job.
"The tribal chiefs had sought their release and the president ... acquitted them," Herawi said.
Herawi said more than 3,000 people have been tried or imprisoned over drugs in Afghanistan in recent years, but he admitted the pardons were the first ordered by Karzai.
A further deal by Karzai concerns his running mate for vice president. In defiance of international pressure, Karzai appointed Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a commander in the militant group Jamiat-e-Islami during the country's civil war 20 years ago, as one of his two vice-presidential running mate.
A 2005 report from Human Rights Watch called Blood-stained Hands found "credible and consistent evidence of widespread and systematic human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law" were committed by Jamiat commanders, including Mr Fahim. He has been accused of murdering prisoners of war during the mujahideen government in the 1990s and has been linked to kidnap gangs operating in Kabul.
Mr Karzai was "insulting the country" with the choice, the New York-based group said recently.
Mr Karzai's other running mate is one of his current vice-presidents, Mohammed Karim Khalili, a Shia leader and former mujahideen commander.
As for the rest of the candidates, few are in a position to challenge the incumbent. When the Electoral Commission announced the list of 41 contenders, Azizullah Lodin, head of the commission, complained that many of them should not have been on the ballot paper at all:
"There are people among the candidates that even if you are not a psychiatrist you would say take them to the Ali Abad hospital," he said, referring to a Kabul mental hospital. He added, "The law says a candidate must have a good reputation, has not committed actions against Islam and national issues. A number of candidate are famous for committing actions against national interests.
"I personally feel ashamed that when I ask someone are you literate, and he says no. I ask if he has a professional background, and he says no. I ask if he was a mullah in a mosque, and he says no. And now he comes and registers himself and he wants to be president of Afghanistan. This is really shameful," Lodin told reporters.
(A list of candidates is available on the Electoral Commission website, but I have yet to find a list in English. If anyone has found one, please send me a copy.)
No-one wants to discredit these elections, which will be held against the background of a major insurgency and during which many people will die - both soldiers and civilians. But something needs to happen to politics in Afghanistan to make sure that they do not die in vain and that Afghans get a government they can believe in.

Wednesday, 8 July 2009

Karzai's deal with the Hazaras and Uzbeks

As the Afghanistan Presidential election approaches, it is worth noting some of the deals that President Hamid Karzai is cutting to try to keep his position. The most significant so far involves the Hazaras and Uzbeks, who between them make up around 20 per cent of the electorate.
In early June the Wahdat-Junbish Alliance, representing the main Hazara and Uzbek political organisations and led by Haji Muhammad Muhaqiq and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, announced they would be supporting Karzai for the presidency.
The alliance between Hizb-e-Wahdat and Junbish-e-Milli came about after Muhaqiq visited General Dostum in Turkey in May. Dostum was dismissed as chief of the Army staff and forced to leave the country at the end of last year after it was clear that he would face war crimes charges. Under American pressure, the Turks took him under their wing, and they have clearly been working very hard since then to rehabilitate him.
In exchange for the Hazara and Uzbek votes, Karzai has apparently promised a substantial package of reforms that is little more than a political bribe.
The proposed reforms include:
* that Jaghoor and Behsood, two Hazara districts in Ghazni and Maidan, should be declared provinces;
* that the second vice president should be a Hazara. Karzai has already selected Mr Khalili as his VP;
* that Hazara representation be officially declared as 25per cent and Uzbek 15 per cent;
* that Wahdat should receive five cabinet portfolios and Junbish should receive four;
* that a highway be built from Kabul to Herat through Bamiyan and Daikundi;
* that the issue of Kuchi grazing rights - a source of conflict with Hazaras - should be resolved permanently;
* that the state should promote the Turko-Mongol language and culture;
* Perhaps most controversially, that General Dostum should be re-appointed as chief of the Army staff. This has now occurred, although Dostum remains in Turkey, allegedly undergoing medical treatment. On a visit to Afghanistan in June, the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, said Dostum would soon be returning home.
Whether or not one likes the way politics plays out in Afghanistan, the Hazaras and Uzbeks are certainly supporting the new alliance. Earlier this week they held a massive joint rally outside the Hazrat Ali shrine in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. An estimated 70,000 people took part in what was the largest political demonstration ever held in the city. They heard their political leaders urge them to vote for Karzai. Whether Karzai can deliver on his promises remains to be seen.

Tuesday, 7 July 2009

UK military spend in Afghanistan up 36% in a year


The UK government's announcement today of a Defence Review can hardly have come as a surprise to anyone who had read the House of Commons Defence Committee's scrutiny of the Defence Estimates for the military budget for 2009-10, covering both Iraq and Afghanistan, published a week ago.
That report showed that the total amount requested this year by the MoD is £39.7bn, of which £3.495bn will be spent in Afghanistan. This latter figure represents an increase of 36.6 per cent on last year. (In Iraq, in contrast, defence costs have decreased by 55.2 per cent as troops have been withdrawn.) Overall costs for operations in both countries added together show a slight decline by 3.2 per cent.
The committee berates the government for the late delivery of the Estimates this year, saying that they have barely had time to look at them properly and asking for an explanation. "We expect the Government in its response to this Report to set out the reason for the delays and the actions it intends to take in future years to ensure such delays do not happen again", they say.
A Memorandum from the MoD explains the increase in costs thus:
"Operations in Afghanistan include the additional security costs required for the local elections, and the costs of around 200 personnel providing counter improvised explosive device (IED) expertise. Capital costs for Afghanistan include Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) such as further force protection (e.g. tactical support vehicles and surveillance equipment), and ongoing further modifications to military equipment for use in the operational environment (e.g. further adaptations to Tornado aircraft and Lynx and Merlin helicopters). UORs by their very nature reveal a capability gap in a specific operational environment and are therefore sensitive. We therefore cannot provide precise details. There is also an additional capital provision for increased airfield and associated support infrastructure in Afghanistan.”
The report helpfully provides a table showing UK defence expenditure in Afghanistan for the last five years. As the figures below show, spending has risen dramatically - by about a billion pounds a year over the last two years:
2005-6: £199m
2006-7: £738m
2007-8: £1,482m
2008-9: £2,559m
2009-10 (est): £3,495m

The large increases in costs in Afghanistan, combined with extra government spending because of the financial crisis, means that defence spending faces a cut of 10-15 percent over the period 2010-16, or about £6bn a year according to one analyst. Writing in Future Defence Review, published by the Royal United Services Institute, analyst Malcolm Chalmers makes the point that much of this saving may have to come from operations in Afghanistan. He continues:
"It is still entirely possible that, at some stage during this period, the conditions for a useful UK (or indeed US) combat presence will no longer exist, and an honourable transition to a support role will become possible. At the margins, increasing financial stringency at home may give UK leaders a further reason to restrain the continuing costs of the operation (in both human and financial terms), while also seeking solutions that allow such an exit to take place. This pressure will increase to the extent that the Treasury insists on the MoD funding part of the additional operational cost from its own core budget. But it will be developments within Afghanistan itself (including the success of Taliban reconciliation efforts and the strengthening of local security forces), together with strategic decisions taken in Washington DC, that will be the most important drivers of UK withdrawal."
It is clear that from next year onwards the British government will be under enormous pressure to reduce its spending in Afghanistan. It will not be long before signs of this - possibly in terms of greater support for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban - become apparent.
Today the Ministry of Defence announced a Defence Review to identify where savings can be made. Work is to begin immediately on the consultation process and the results will be published in a Green Paper early next year with the review to be launched after the general election.
In a written statement to the Commons Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth said the review would be designed “to ensure that we develop and maintain Armed Forces appropriate to the challenges we face and the aims we set ourselves as a nation”.

Wednesday, 1 July 2009

Who's tweeting on Afghanistan?

Who's tweeting on or from Afghanistan? I had a quick look this morning and came up with the following list. Some I already follow, others look interesting: artafghanistan has 94 followers; afghanbuddies (73); AfghanistanNews ((16,757); US forces in Afghanistan usfora (4386); Afghanistandocu (1284); Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan RAWA77 (152); British Army MediaOps (1811); AfghanNews (3982); USEmbassyKabul (449). Any more suggestions?

Beanz Meanz Mung


I had to laugh at the Guardian story this morning about the British Army's discovery of 1.3 tonnes of 'opium poppy seed' in Helmand during Operation Panther's Claw. Having laid on press coverage and trumpeted their success to the world's media, suddenly the story began to look decidedly shaky. Guardian reporter John Boone submitted some of the 'poppy seeds' to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation in Kabul, only to be told they were in fact mung beans, a common food staple in the region introduced around 10 years ago. How anyone confused mung beans with poppy seed (you know, the tiny black ones you get on your bread rolls) is beyond me, but then again there's nowt so blind as those that don't want to see.
This debacle came only days after the British announced they were not going to change their opium eradication policy in Afghanistan, despite the fact that the Obama Adminstration has decided to abandon a similar policy as unworkable.
(PS The picture shows Mung beans).

Wednesday, 24 June 2009

Pak Air Force staff court martialed for terror links

Fifty-seven members of the Pakistan Air Force have been arrested and charged with having links to terrorism over the last two years, according to reports appearing today in the Pakistan media. Some of the investigations against the men began during General Musharraf's rule over the country. A PAF official called Mushtaq was arrested and that led to others being rounded up.
The arrests took place all over the country, including in Kamra, Lahore, Sargodha, Mianwali and Karachi. Of the 57 arrested, 26 have faced a court martial, where sentences ranging from three-and-a-half years to 17 years were handed down. Six others received death sentences for involvement in serious, but unspecified crimes.
At least one fugitive is still at large and his photos have been posted up around military bases. No details about the nature of the links or the offences that resulted in death sentences.
Update: The PAF has confirmed that the men were arrested following an assassination attempt on former President Musharraf in 2003. All the arrests took place more than two years ago. Relatives of some of the men have protested their innocence, saying they were targeted for voting against Musharraf in a referendum.


Rohde and Ludin's lucky escape

Kidnapping, particularly of journalists, is a big business in Afghanistan, with high rewards for those involved. It is thought, for example, that in October 2007 the Korean government paid millions of dollars to Taliban fighters for the release of a group of 19 Korean Christian missionaries. Despite protests from journalists working in Afghanistan who fear copycat kidnappings, money continues to be paid.
So it was with great relief that we read last week of the remarkable escape of New York Times journalist David Rohde and his Afghan fixer, Tahir Ludin, from a compound somewhere in North Waziristan. Rohde had been captured last November south of Kabul on his way to meet a local Taliban commander.
We will have to wait until Rohde publishes his own story to find out all the details, but in the meantime, New York magazine has published an excellent article on the case. Matthew Cole’s piece makes it clear that there is a lot more to this story than meets the eye. And don't forget that there are others still being held.

Tuesday, 23 June 2009

Tide turns agains the Taliban in Pakistan?

Events in Pakistan may yet have a great bearing on the conflict in Afghanistan. This video, filmed in Pakistan in the Punjabi city of Jhelum a week ago, shows a protest against the Taliban and al-Qaeda after they murdered the renowned cleric, Dr. Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi in Lahore in a suicide attack in his mosque. Dr Naeemi had issued a fatwa correctly stating that suicide bombings are forbidden by Islam and had also condemned Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) – sister organisation to its Afghan counterpart - as un-Islamic.
Despite Dr Naeemi’s killing and last week's bombing of the Pearl Continental hotel in Peshawar, it is clear that the TTP are now on the defensive in Pakistan. The Swat Valley, where for the last two months the Pakistan Army has been engaged in a fierce confrontation with Islamist militants, has now been cleared. Some of the estimated 2.5 million internal refugees will soon be able to start returning to their homes and harvesting their crops.
Significantly, in some areas of Swat local villagers took up arms against the TTP fighters. At least three villages in Upper Dir were cleared by local lashkars (militias) who killed more than a dozen TTP fighters.
The big test will be the Army’s campaign in Waziristan. Up to 10,000 fighters loyal to TTP Emir Baitullah Mahsud, along with hundreds of Arab, Uzbek and Chechen fighters from al-Qaeda are based in this remote tribal agency bordering Afghanistan. It is likely that much of the al-Qaeda leadership is also in this region.
The Army’s new offensive, known as ‘Path of Salvation’, is already underway, although it has so far only involved air strikes and artillery bombardments. But Pakistani officials have already been able to drive a wedge between Mahsud and two former allies, Turkistan Bhittani and Qari Zainuddin Mahsud, both of whom have called Baitullah an enemy of Islam.
Qari Zainuddin Mahsud, who comes from the same tribe as Baitullah, was killed today when one of his guards opened fire on him in the north-western town of Dera Ismail Khan. Turkistan Bhittani, 40, remains a significant threat.
According to a well-informed article published by the Jamestown Foundation

Bhittani told local jirgas that he will take revenge on Baitullah for killing innocent Pakistani civilians and security forces. The article describes him thus:
“Turkistan Bhittani, 40, once a friend of Baitullah Mahsud who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, is now his biggest enemy. Turkistan also served in the Frontier Corps (FC) until his retirement in 1998. He developed differences with Baitullah and parted ways with him when Baitullah slaughtered some FC officials and began using suicide bombing as a tool to terrorize his opponents inside Pakistan."
These divisions and the formation of lashkars are significant. Nothing similar has happened in Afghanistan so far, but if the jihadi infrastructure built up by Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service over many years begins to come apart, it will undoubtedly have an impact on the Afghan Taliban leadership, who are mostly based in Quetta in Baluchistan.

Saturday, 20 June 2009

Local conflict key to peace in Afghanistan

Local conflict in Afghanistan is increasing at a faster rate than the insurgency and armed conflict, says a new report from the Afghan organisation Cooperation for Peace and Unity.

I have been impressed by the quality of CPAU’s work and have commented on several of their previous reports. This latest report, Trends in local Afghan conflicts, is based on CPAU’s research into local conflicts in five provinces in the country. All five local conflicts were the subject of separate reports and this latest publication pulls all this work together.

It notes that there has been a significant increase in local conflicts since 2005 and that these conflicts are increasingly involving whole communities and that they are increasingly threatening livelihoods and undermining the ability of government and aid agencies to work effectively.

“Local conflict is affecting many communities which struggle to find suitable ways of resolving their disagreements. Many of these conflicts turn violent and they are being aggravated by the worsening security situation in Afghanistan,” said CPAU’s director, Kanishka Nawabi.

Sadly, but not surprisingly, CPAU has also found that the work of international development agencies can exacerbate these local conflicts. They cite several cases where development projects have led to water and land disputes that have threatened the ability of local people to support themselves.

“The international community has an obligation to ensure that its programmes in Afghanistan do not increase local conflict and make the situation worse for local people,” says Nawabi.

CPAU wants more peace building and conflict resolution projects to help resolve these disputes and also wants to improve access to justice and non-violent conflict resolution. It is calling on the international aid agencies to ensure that their programmes address local conflict and include funding for peace building, including a new programme for charity workers.

Thursday, 18 June 2009

A quick update

After a little over six months of writing this blog, I thought I should bring readers up to date on how it is going. First, the blog presently receives around 30 to 40 hits per day, with a total of around 2,700. Particularly successful were the blog on the Taliban cartoon, which has been picked up all over the place, and also the blog on TIME magazine, which sadly refuses to further acknowledge the fact that it printed a recycled and inaccurate story about General Dostum.

I have been asked to become an official France24 ‘Observer’, which means that my blog features on the France24 website. I have also been quoted by Asia Media Forum, which picked up the Taliban cartoon story. And the Russian website agentura.ru now runs a banner ad notifying its readers of my existence.

When I launched the blog, I decided to keep my identity private. However, as it is now becoming an open secret I have updated my personal information. Finally I would like to thank you all for reading this blog and making it worthwhile for me.