Showing posts with label Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. Show all posts

Friday, 20 August 2010

Former Egyptian jihadist predicts Taliban victory


Interesting note from the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor on a new book by former al-Qaeda ideologue and founder, Dr Fadl, that predicts a Taliban victory in Afghanistan.
Dr Fadl (real name Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif) was a leading member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with al-Qaeda No2 Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, but recanted his beliefs while serving a life sentence in prison in Egypt. He later criticised the 9/11 attacks as both immoral and counterproductive.
Now he has published a book in Arabic called Future of the War between America and the Taliban in Afghanistan which gives 12 reasons why the Taliban will win:
1. A successful jihad must be accompanied by a religious reform movement. The religious motivation of the Taliban (as opposed to tribal loyalties or the pursuit of wealth) meets this criterion.
2. The Taliban cause is just, as it seeks to repel foreign occupation.
3. Cross-border tribal bonds with Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen are vital to the jihad’s success; “Loyalty of the Pashtu in Pakistan to the Pashtu in Afghanistan is stronger than their loyalty to their government in Islamabad.”
4. Jihad has popular support from the people of Afghanistan, who provide fighters with support, shelter and intelligence.
5. The nature of the terrain in Afghanistan and the inaccessibility of Taliban refugees make it eminently suitable for guerrilla warfare; “He who fights geography is a loser.”
6. The backwardness of Afghanistan favours the success of jihad. The Soviet experience proved that even a scorched earth policy has little effect on people who are tolerant, patient and have little to lose in the first place. There is little in the way of cultural establishments to be destroyed – Afghanistan’s monuments are its mountains and “even atomic bombs do not affect them.”
7. As the battlefield widens beyond the Taliban strongholds in the south, occupation forces must face increasing financial and personnel losses.
8. Both time and the capacity to endure losses are on the side of the Taliban, who “do not have a ceiling to their losses, especially with regard to lives…”
9. Suicide operations make up for the shortage of modern weapons.
10. After three decades of nearly continuous warfare, Taliban fighters and leaders have the necessary experience to prevail against the occupation.
11. History is also on the Taliban’s side. Despite being world powers, both the British Empire and the Soviet Union failed to conquer Afghanistan.
12. Pakistan’s support of the Taliban provides the necessary third-party refuge and supplies to any successful guerrilla struggle.

Can anyone argue with his logic?

Tuesday, 1 June 2010

Death of al-Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan


The reported death of Sheikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed, along with members of his family in a US drone strike in North Waziristan last week, is a huge blow for al-Qaeda. An Egyptian who was a long-time companion of al-Qaeda No. 2 Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, he was a founder member of al-Qaeda, a member of its ruling shura and - since May 2007 - the head of the organisation in Afghanistan.
As a veteran he would have known many of the Afghan Taliban leaders personally and would have been instrumental in ensuring that al-Qaeda did not offend its Taliban hosts and at all times in Afghanistan acted under their auspices. In recent years those relationships have come under strain and it was hardly surprising that al-Qaeda moved much closer to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and particularly its former leader Baitullah Mahsud - who was killed in a US drone strike last August. al-Yazid issued a fulsome tribute to Mahsud on his death, calling him a "valiant and incomparable leader".
Since his appointment as al-Qaeda emir in Afghanistan, al-Yazid has issued regular statements through al-Qaeda's as-Sahab media house. Covering such subjects as the death of Sheikh Abu al-Laith al-Liby, the June 2008 attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad, the December 2009 suicide attack on a CIA station in Khost and regular appeals to the people of Pakistan and appeals for money, they can be read on the website of the NEFA Foundation. No successor has yet been announced.

Thursday, 11 February 2010

Uncertain future for Pakistan Taliban

The death of Hakimullah Mahsud, confirmed earlier this week, will have a significant impact on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the bloodthirsty gang he led until succumbing to injuries caused by a US drone missile strike in mid-January.
The organisation's future is uncertain and it is likely to become increasingly irrelevant, with its remaining members either joining forces with the al-Qaeda remnants still operating in the harsh borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or lapsing into criminality.
Hakimullah and his lieutenants Qari Hussein and Waliur Rahman - both of whose fate is still unknown - presided over a period of bloodletting that is almost without precedent in modern Pakistan history. Little if any of this was achieved by either conventional military attacks or even by guerrilla warfare. Their main weapon was the suicide bomber.
Qari Hussein in particular developed an expertise in training young boys to blow themselves to pieces. Sometimes these attacks were aimed at the Pakistan military, but mostly they happened in crowded public places as a way of striking terror into the heart of Pakistan. The bombers killed far more innocent Pakistani civilians than soldiers.
At the time of its formation three years ago, the TTP, under the leadership of Baitullah Mahsud, had the potential to cause considerable problems for Pakistan. Created with strong support from Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda and with tacit support from sections of the Pakistani intelligence community, it capitalised on the growing insurgency in Afghanistan, but tried to extend that struggle into Pakistan itself, particularly after the government's attack on the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad.
Surprisingly, the Musharraf regime appeared oblivious to this possibility and willingly conceded territory and political power to the organisation. The Army made tentative moves against militants in South Waziristan, but after hundreds of soldiers were captured, it withdrew its forces and left the TTP to get on with it.
In 2009 the full consequences of this policty of laissez faire became clear, particularly in the Swat Valley, where the Taliban established a state-within-a-state, only a hundred miles or so from the capital. Brutal killings, public beatings, the banning of education for girls, forced abductions of young men to fight or become suicide bombers, followed one after the other.
Finally, in late spring 2009, the Army moved against the militants in the Swat Valley. The TTP fighters, despite their swagger, were by then deeply resented by most Swatis. They had no political programme other than a vague idea of a bastardised sharia law and were unable to win support other than from a minority of landless peasants who had longstanding grievances against their landlords.
More than a million residents of the Valley were forced to leave their homes as the Army moved in to clear out the TTP, many of whose fighters were from South Waziristan and were regarded as 'foreigners' by the locals. Many of the militants were as much motivated by plunder as they were by any religious ideology.
With the death of the founding TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud in a drone strike in early August, the organisation was plunged into crisis. The succession was not clear, with different factions allegedly shooting it out.
Hakimullah came out on top of the pile, mainly because he was seen as an effective and experienced guerrilla leader, having cut his teeth ambushing NATO convoys in the Khyber Pass. It is said that al-Qaeda played a major role in securing his position.
But there were always tensions beneath the surface, not least because many tribal militants from FATA were unhappy with the decision to target the Pakistani state itself. Even the Afghanistan Taliban of Mullah Omar tried to distance itself from the TTP, saying it no longer wanted to be known as the Taliban.
As the TTP campaign against the Pakistani state gathered momentum - aided and abetted by an influx of fanatical Punjabi militants - the Army made its move into South Waziristan last October.
Despite the rumoured 15,000 TTP fighters, the Army encountered little opposition as it advanced into areas where government soldiers had never before been allowed to operate. More than a quarter of a million new refugees were created.
The Army trashed dozens of villages and destroyed the family homes of most of the TTP leaders and still they met little opposition. Long-standing sanctuaries for Uzbek and Chechen sympathisers were destroyed and massive amounts of arms and ammunition seized.
Hakimullah and his henchmen moved further into FATA, accepting the reluctant hospitality of the Haqqani clan in neighbouring North Waziristan. When asked where all his fighters were, Waliur Rahman, from a secret hideout, told AP he had sent them all to fight in Afghanistan. This was a lie. By December many of the less committed TTP fighters could see where things were going and had silently melted away. Even the elders of his own tribe, the Mahsuds, turned against Hakimullah and offered to hand him over if they caught him.
And as the Pakistan military consolidated its positions in South Waziristan, the CIA drone attacks increased in intensity - and in accuracy. So when it became clear that Hakimullah had played a major role in training the Jordanian suicide bomber who killed seven CIA officers in Afghanistan on 30 December, it was only a matter of time before he would run out of luck.
The unprecedented storm of drone attacks that followed the CIA killings - with a dozen strikes in less than three weeks - shattered the TTP leadership and its aura of invincibility. Now no-one is safe. There are no longer any safe havens. This lesson will not have been missed by the remaining TTP militants in the tribal territories of Pakistan.
They will have to decide if it is worth being martyred for the crazed and delusional rantings of idealogues like al-Zawahiri. Most, it can be guaranteed, will prefer returning to their old trades of drug smuggling and car theft.

Saturday, 6 February 2010

More information on 2008 Taliban talks in Mecca

With the possibility of talks between the Afghan government and its Taliban foes now taking a central role, it is worth taking a look at an article by Hamid Mir, published in The News, which gives the fullest account published so far of the talks that took place in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in September 2008.
According to Mir:
"The Afghan Taliban in the Makkah talks were represented by their former foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, former minister Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, and Afghanistan’s last ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef. It is said the trio had travelled to Makkah to perform Umra, but sources said they were hosted as official guests of the Saudi government. They were also among those who attended the Iftar-cum-dinner party of King Abdullah on September 29, 2008. The Afghanistan government delegation was led by former chief justice Maulvi Abdul Hadi Shinwari and included, among others, Abdul Salam Rocketi, a Taliban commander under Mullah Omar who eventually surrendered to the US."
Mir says the talks foundered over Taliban demands that all US and foreign forces leave the country before they would consider such questions as handing over Osama bin Laden or signing up to support the Afghan constitution.
He also says that Prince Turki al-Faisal played an important role in convening the talks. Prior to the talks, the Saudis also sent an emissary to North Waziristan to meet with the Afghan Taliban leadership. At one point it was hoped the emissary might be able to meet with al-Qaeda's deputy leader, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. The meeting never took place and only lower-level Taliban leaders made themselves available, possibly for security reasons.
The make-up of the Taliban delegation to Mecca explains how the Taliban can claim that no official representatives were present at the talks. All three men are former Taliban ministers who live under the Karzai regime and have renounced violence, but who retain links with their former comrades.