How did this lot get here? And who's taking it away?

Waiting for a lift home

The cost of returning more than £6 billion-worth of British military equipment from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 – including 3,500 hi-tech and heavily armoured reconnaissance and troop-carrying vehicles – could reach half a billion pounds, according to evidence submitted to a Parliamentary inquiry published this week.

The Commons Defence Select Committee notes that there are presently more than 11,000 container-loads of military equipment in Afghanistan, including 350 Foxhound reconnaissance vehicles worth almost £1 million each, storerooms full of  weapons and ammunition, dozens of rotor and fixed wing aircraft – and everything else Britain’s 9,000 troops need to function efficiently.

For the US forces, the problems are even more stark; with an estimated $36 billion-worth of equipment in country – made up of 750,000 pieces of major military equipment - it is likely to cost something in the region of $6 billion to bring back home. A detailed assessment of the issues, from the US GAO can be found here.

With just over 18 months to go before British troops withdraw, equipment is still arriving in country. A plan for bringing the equipment home is not expected to be announced for another six weeks, according to the MOD. Negotiations with countries to the north of Afghanistan over transit routes are not expected to be completed until July at the earliest. A new transit deal with Pakistan has recently been agreed, but it remains a dangerous route.

Unlike the British withdrawal from Iraq, where much of the equipment was transported by road before being loaded onto ships in Kuwait, Afghanistan is a land-locked country with poor infrastructure. Equipment can only leave via one of three long and dangerous land routes, or via an expensive air bridge. “There’s little point in bringing back gear that costs more to transport than it’s worth,” said an MOD official.

MOD officials told the committee that ‘only’ 6,500 containers will eventually be brought home, with the contents of the remaining 40 per cent being either destroyed, donated, sold or consumed.  Much of the remaining ‘warlike’ equipment will not be allowed to travel northwards through Uzbekistan and then by rail through Russia, whilst other equipment is too secret or strategically important to trust to the roads, where it could be attacked or stolen by insurgents.

Instead, Britain will have to compete with other ISAF countries to charter one of the small number of massive Antonov AN-124 transport aircraft that are available on the commercial market. If the equipment of all ISAF forces is taken into account, it is estimated that more than 100,000 containers-worth of military equipment will have to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The Defence Select Committee report does not provide an overall cost for removing military equipment from Afghanistan, although it says each container load can cost up to £12,000 to send by road and rail and up to £30,000 if it has to be sent by air. Defence Secretary Philip Hammond initially said the total cost will be around £100 million – later updated to £300 million - but evidence from Brigadier David Martin, who retired last year as head of the Army’s Support Chain Management, says such a figure “looks very optimistic”. He believes that a total of £500 million will be closer to the mark, although even that figure may eventually be too low.

Defence analyst Francis Tusa, who also gave evidence to the select committee, was equally sceptical about both the MOD’s costs and the timetable: “If you were just to rely on the airlift that the UK could reasonably call upon and you assumed everything else was benign, and we could move stuff from out bases to Camp Bastion with no obstruction, it would still take the best part of three complete years to draw all the equipment. Forget the people; the people would be extra. Three complete years to withdraw the equipment we have in Afghanistan.”

He pointed out that the permanent joint logistics HQ was recently very pleased that it had managed to ship back 120 containers in one six-month period. “The air bridge is working great at getting stuff out there. The problem is that the imperative is always to get stuff out there.” Getting it back is a different problem.

Tusa, who thinks a minimum figure of around £600 million is likely, pointed out that the far less complex operation to draw down from Kuwait, conducted in an entirely benevolent environment and with much of the equipment previously withdrawn, still cost £170 million. In that case there were fewer than 4,000 containers of equipment to be disposed of, compared to the 11,000-plus in Afghanistan – and only 500 vehicles compared to 3,500.

Tusa added that just refurbishing the vehicles that are brought back, in order to make them fit for service, will cost close to £2 billion. At present there is no budget for this level of expenditure.

How Raymond Davis gummed up the works

The New York Times is serialising chunks of Mark Mazetti's new book, The Way of the Knife: the CIA, a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth (please excuse the gratuitous caps), about CIA operations in Pakistan. The latest installment, on the Raymond Davis case, makes excellent reading and purports to explain the major fall-out between the US and Pakistan following the arrest of the CIA contractor on a double murder charge in Lahore in January 2011.

Car rally in FATA runs out of gas

Whatever happened to that car rally planned for FATA by the Pakistan Army? No takers?

Drilling down into Lashkar-e-Taiba

Fighters from Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba – responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and many other terrorist atrocities, are only 17 years old on average when they are recruited and around 21 when they died, according to a detailed study of 900 militants from the group who died while members of the organisation, published by the Combatting Terrorism Center.

Using information collected from obituaries published in four Urdu-language newspapers, the authors have put together a comprehensive portrait of young militants in the organisation, which complements Stephen Tankel’s Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011).

 Families are generally very supportive of members who join the organisation, most of whom have a higher level of education than the average Pakistani male. Most had only spent an average of three years at a madrassa and few had a high level of formal religious education.

Most are recruited from the Punjab region of Pakistan, including the regions around Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Bahawalpur. They were recruited by current members, family members, mosques, hearing LET speeches or friends, in that order. Training took place mainly in Muzaffarabad in Kashmir or in Afghanistan. Most of those who died were killed in Kashmir, although numbers have dropped off as the organisation has spread out to work in different areas.

Stinging rebuke on Pakistan aid programme

The UK Parliament’s International Development Committee has delivered a stinging blow to the Department for International Development over its aid policy to Pakistan. A report published this week by the committee recognises the importance of the UK’s bilateral aid to Pakistan, but notes that in the past British aid money has “not been spent effectively” in Pakistan.

It says that such aid spending cannot continue unless there is “clear evidence that the newly elected Pakistan Government is also willing to make the necessary changes so as to contribute more to improving the livelihood of its people”.

At present only 0.57 per cent of Pakistanis – around 768,000 people – pay income tax. The rich pay nothing, nor do more than 70 per cent of elected politicians. No-one has been prosecuted for income tax evasion during the last 25 years. 

The committee says that DFID should only increase official development assistance to the planned £464 million per annum “if there is evidence that the newly elected Pakistan administration will increase tax revenues in general and income tax, in particular, and if it subsequently succeeds in increasing the amount of tax taken.”

It adds: “If the Pakistan Government is unwilling to take action to increase its revenues and improve services for its people, it cannot expect the British people to do so in the long run. We cannot expect the citizens of the UK to pay taxes to improve education and health in Pakistan if the Pakistan elite is not paying income tax.”

The committee also recommends that Britain and other donors encourage the Pakistan government to strengthen the powers and independence of the country’s National Accountability Bureau in an effort to reduce corruption in the country.

Nagieb Khaja's Afghanistan film in London

This weekend there are two opportunities in London to see Nagieb Khaja's film, My Afghanistan - Life in the Forbidden Zone. On view as part of the Human Rights Watch Film Festival at the Ritzy Cinema in Brixton (Saturday) and at the Curzon Soho (Sunday), the film is based on filmclips shot by Afghan citizens in and around LashKar Gah in Helmand.
Najieb is a Danish filmmaker of Afghan origin, but even he was unable to travel far from the town. Instead he gave people mobile phones equipped with cameras and asked them to film their daily lives.
Thus we get the story of Hakl Sahab as he drives in his brakeless, 70-year-old jeep; we hear hairstyling tips from Jurna Gulm; watch farmer and widower Abdul Mohammed raise his four children alone, and so on.
Most of the films that come out of Afghanistan are told from Westerners' viewpoints, often the military. This film is different. Go and see it.

State Dept (finally) designates Maulvi Nazir group

The US Department of State has announced, rather belatedly, that what it theatrically refers to as the ‘Commander Wazir Group’ of South Waziristan and one of its alleged leaders , ‘Sub Commander Malang Wazir’ are to be designated as a global terrorists. Steady on boys! This is not South America! A detailed investigation into the various factions in South Waziristan written by Mansur Khan Mahsud of the FATA Research Centre in 2010, makes no mention of Maulvi Nazir's group being known by this name.

Leaving aside the fact that Maulvi Wazir himself was killed in a US drone strike in January, it seems a little odd to me that State has decided to designate ‘sub commander’ Malang Wazir, who is known to be part of the leadership, but has chosen not to mention Bahawal Khan, also called Salahuddin Ayubi, who was announced as Nazir's successor.

Bahawal Khan, said to be aged 34 and an illiterate former bus driver, is a long-time close associate of Mullah Nazir, the two men having fought together alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan before the 2001 US invasion. Bahawal Khan is seen as hot-tempered, unlike his predecessor.

No fall in Taliban attacks in 2012

So reported attacks by the Taliban did not fall by 7 per cent last year, according to the AFP news agency. ISAF had previously published the figures on its website, but yesterday was forced to admit they were wrong. "This is a regrettable error in our database systems that was discovered during a routine quality check. We are making the appropriate adjustments," said Pentagon spokesman George Little.

Officials later explained that the figures were wrong because some had come from Afghan units which had not entered the figures correctly into a database. Literacy and levels of education in some of the units is low, according to reports. In fact Taliban attacks in 2012 totalled around 3,000, about the same as the previous year.

Panorama preview at the Frontline tonight

At the Frontline Club in London tonight, where we will be previewing a Panorama film, directed by Ben Anderson, on Helmand. Anderson's film, Mission Accomplished? The Secrets of Helmand, shows that American combat troops have already withdrawn, training has been reduced, not accelerated - and the Afghan Security Forces are not ready to take over. Casualty rates are as high as ever, they are just all Afghan now, the Taliban are as strong as ever, locals say their lives have not improved and the police still look like part of the problem. 
I will be chairing the discussion following the screening of the film. Also on the panel are Dawood Azami, former BBC World Service Bureau Chief and Editor in Kabul, and Will Pike who served as a British Army Major in Afghanistan, and on the Afghan Desk at the MOD before leaving the Army in late 2007.

US Army on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office at Ft Leavenworth has published an interesting essay on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Written by Matthew Stein, The Goals of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Its Impact on Central Asia and the United States the document looks into "the history, current operations, and goals of the IMU". Conclusions: "The current lack of consistent leadership and subsequent goals has meant that the IMU is difficult to differentiate from other militant or terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan, particularly when the remnants of the IMU rely on others to stay operational. The IMU’s goals are now more dependent on and reflective of these other groups. For the United States, the IMU remains a threat while the country’s forces remain in Afghanistan, although the threat is more from associated groups with better capabilities. For the governments of Central Asia, the IMU remains a threat, but a minor one compared to the capabilities of the group in 1999-2000. Ultimately, the group has become more of a misnomer than a threat to stability."

Pakistan Taliban leader Hakimullah Mahsud with IMU's Usman Odil

Civilian casualties fall for first time in six years

A total of 2,754 civilians were killed and 4,805 injured in Afghanistan in armed conflict during 2012, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)  These numbers reflect a 12 percent reduction in civilian deaths and a minimal increase in civilians injured compared to 2011, but they also underscore the continuing high human cost of armed conflict in Afghanistan Over the past six years, 14,728 Afghan civilians have lost their lives in the armed conflict.
Anti-Government Elements - most the Taliban - increasingly targeted civilians throughout the country and UNAMA documented 6,131 civilian casualties (2,179 civilian deaths and 3,952 injuries)  in 2012, an increase of nine percent compared to 2011. 81 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2012 were attributed to Anti-Government Elements.

UNAMA recorded a 108 percent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings and a rise in casualties from the indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly illegal pressure plate IEDs which are victim-activated. 

Eight percent of all civilian casualties (316 deaths and 271 injuries) were attributed to Pro-Government Forces in 2012, a 46 percent decrease from 2011. Civilian casualties from the actions of Afghan National Security Forces in 2012 were consistent with numbers documented 2011 with 96 civilian casualties (33 civilian deaths and 63 injuries), the majority occurring during ground engagements.The remaining 841 civilian casualties (259 deaths and 582 injured) could not be attributed and occurred in crossfire incidents during ground engagements, cross-border shelling or from explosive remnants of war.
One interesting fact contained in the report: the number of weapons released by drones jumped from 294 in 2011 to 506 in 2012 - a 72 percent increase in Afghanistan.
UNAMA documented five incidents of drone strikes which resulted in 16 civilian deaths and three injuries, an increase from 2011 when UNAMA documented one incident involving civilians. There are no figures for the number of combatants killed by drones.
Most of the civilian casualties from drone strikes in 2012 appear to be the result of weapons aimed directly at insurgents. However, some may have been due to targeting errors. For example, UNAMA documented one incident that occurred on 20 October 2012 when a drone struck in Baraki Barak district, Logar province, killing four children, aged between 11 and 13 years. Three boys died immediately while the fourth died during the transport to a Kabul hospital.

Pay up or get out - the plague of corruption

Corruption continues to plague Afghanistan, according to a new report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe last year while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$ 3.9 billion - an increase of 40 per cent in real terms between 2009 and 2012, while the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively constant (23 per cent in 2009; 20 per cent in 2012).
Corruption is also seen by most Afghans as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country and yet seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life. Thus 68 per cent of those interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009). Similarly, 67 per cent considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 per cent in 2009).
Afghanistan has made a little progress in reducing the level of corruption within the public sector. While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per  cent did so in 2012.
But worrying trends have also emerged: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer with the average cost of a bribe rising from US$158 to US$214. Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012. In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.

Death and injury in war - the bare facts

A total of 2,165 US servicemembers have been killed so far in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), in Afghanistan, and 18,230 have been wounded in action. In addition, since 2000 (and therefore including US activities in Iraq) a total of more than 131,000 servicemembers have been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and more than 250,000 have been diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. 
Of this latter diagnosis, about 195,000 have been mild, 42,000 were moderate and around 6,500 have been severe or penetrating. All figures come from a new report from the Congressional Research Service.
Nearly 700 servicemembers in Afghanistan have lost major limbs due to battle-injury amputations, with another 28 losing part of a foot or hand.
The Department of Defense says 97 servicemembers died of self-inflicted wounds while serving in OEF. Ninety-eight per cent of those killed in Afghanistan were men, with a total of 42 women having been killed.
A breakdown by race shows that 85.4% of those killed were classified as white, 7.9% as black or African American, 2.7% were Asian and 1.3% American Indian/Alaska Native.
A total of 23,742 servicemembers were air-evacuated for medical reasons from Afghanistan, of which about a third were due to battle injuries.

Mental disorders suffered by US Veterans.

A Congressional Research Service report on mental disorders amongst Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom veterans says that of the 1.6 million veterans in touch with the Veterans Administration (VA), about 14% suffer from a major depressive disorder, whilst a further 22 suffer from less serious depressive disorders.
About 29% are said to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; 6% are said to be alcohol dependent; 3% are drug dependent; and 5% are drug abusers. The VA stress that there are important limitations on the data, which are explained in the report.