A report from the US Government Accountability Office on Afghanistan's Donor Dependence notes that the US and other funders have provided 90 per cent of Afghanistan's public expenditures from 2006-2010. The US alone has allocated over $72 billion to its mission in Afghanistan. To put this in context, in 2010, for example, the Kabul government's entire domestic revenues - raised mostly through customs revenues and property taxes - amounted to just $1.6 billion.
With the 2014 target date for the withdrawal of US troops now only three years away, these figures raise huge questions about how the government in Kabul will fund its own security forces, who use up the lion's share of this donor income.
The report shows that Afghanistan's total public expenditure more than doubled between 2006-2010, from $5.5 billion to $14.3 billion, but that almost 80 per cent was off-budget ie donor funded. Of this, just under half (45%) was security related. Ninety per cent of all security spending was provided by the US.
Wednesday, 21 September 2011
Tuesday, 20 September 2011
Massive increase in Coalition night raids
Night raids, one of the most divisive and resented tactics used by Coalition forces in Afghanistan, have skyrocketed in use, increasing five-fold between February 2009 and December 2010, according to a new report from the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office (an independent Afghan NGO).
This is the second report published by OSI and the Liaison Office. The first, published in February 2010, can be found here.
The new report, The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians, notes that military forces conducted an average of 19 raids a night in the three months between December 2010 and February 2011. The trend is continuing according to the report's authors and may even be increasing, with reports of up to 40 raids a night on occasion. It adds that the raids have created a massive backlash and that ISAF commanders have refused to alter their policy, although there have been some changes to procedures that have reduced property damage and led to more respectful treatment of women.
However, the report notes: "although civilian casualties have been reduced significantly, they still occur, many as a result of mistaken interpretations of 'hostile intent'."
The report recommends that ISAF and US forces should cease raids that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians, ensure such raids are not used as substitutes for criminal proceedings or other methods of intelligence gathering and that commanders should consider alternative methods of detention wherever possible.
This is the second report published by OSI and the Liaison Office. The first, published in February 2010, can be found here.
The new report, The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians, notes that military forces conducted an average of 19 raids a night in the three months between December 2010 and February 2011. The trend is continuing according to the report's authors and may even be increasing, with reports of up to 40 raids a night on occasion. It adds that the raids have created a massive backlash and that ISAF commanders have refused to alter their policy, although there have been some changes to procedures that have reduced property damage and led to more respectful treatment of women.
However, the report notes: "although civilian casualties have been reduced significantly, they still occur, many as a result of mistaken interpretations of 'hostile intent'."
The report recommends that ISAF and US forces should cease raids that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians, ensure such raids are not used as substitutes for criminal proceedings or other methods of intelligence gathering and that commanders should consider alternative methods of detention wherever possible.
Monday, 12 September 2011
New Afghan local police units failing - HRW
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| Members of the newly formed Afghan Local Police |
The ALP was created, funded and armed by the US to supplement national security forces, particularly in remote parts of the country. Predictably, it has not quite gone that way. Such local groups quickly become attached to local warlords and power brokers and some are soon drawn into criminality or settling old scores. Nor is this the first attempt to create such a force. Already since 2001 we have had the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, Afghan Social Outreach Program forces, Community Defense Forces, Community Defense Initiative/Local Defense Initiative forcees and the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure units.
All are based on the doctrine set out in the US Army manual on Tactics in Counter Insurgency, published in 2009. While those promoting the new ALP units argue that they have begun to deliver improvements to local security, HRW says that in the provinces it investigated there are serious problems. It recommends that irregular armed groups should be disbanded and that allegations of abuse should be investigated. An external complaints body should be created to monitor the ALP and recruits should be more closely vetted.
All worthy stuff, but will these kind of measures be any more successful than the militias themselves? I doubt it very much.
Taliban propaganda goes from strength to strength
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has published a very good article by Bashir Ahmad Gwakh on the Taliban's internet strategy. "Over the past decade, the Taliban has dramatically groomed its public relations skills", he says. "It possesses several Internet domains, which host official content and have backup domains in case of an attack on the main website. Taliban members also use e-mail on a daily basis to communicate with journalists."
Gwakh's article includes comments from Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, described as the web editor of a Taliban website, who tells him that the Taliban has an official media committee and a professional production studio called al-Shahamat, set up to produce videos. "From there, the films are distributed on Taliban websites, passed from mobile phone to mobile phone, and reach broader audiences through other outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube", Gwakh says.
The Taliban uses several Twitter accounts, including @alemarahweb, which is in English and followed by around 5,500 people and rising; and @alsomood, which is mostly in Arabic. Around 450 people follow Mustafa Ahmadi, who runs the official Facebook page for the Taliban. Ahmadi also adminsters the fan page for Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid, the Taliban leader, which is followed by around 200 people.
Gwakh laments the fact that the Coalition forces in Afghanistan do not seem to take Taliban propaganda seriously, even though it is a vital part of their war effort. I concur with him. Three years ago I was asked to comment on the extent of Taliban propaganda and ways of confronting it. I pointed out the way the Taliban circulated video by phone and the failure to combat their messaging. My comments were ignored. Three years on and nothing much has happened except that the Taliban's messages are much more coherent, more Afghans have access to social media and very few Afghans understand what foreign forces are doing in their country.
Gwakh's article includes comments from Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, described as the web editor of a Taliban website, who tells him that the Taliban has an official media committee and a professional production studio called al-Shahamat, set up to produce videos. "From there, the films are distributed on Taliban websites, passed from mobile phone to mobile phone, and reach broader audiences through other outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube", Gwakh says.
The Taliban uses several Twitter accounts, including @alemarahweb, which is in English and followed by around 5,500 people and rising; and @alsomood, which is mostly in Arabic. Around 450 people follow Mustafa Ahmadi, who runs the official Facebook page for the Taliban. Ahmadi also adminsters the fan page for Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid, the Taliban leader, which is followed by around 200 people.
Gwakh laments the fact that the Coalition forces in Afghanistan do not seem to take Taliban propaganda seriously, even though it is a vital part of their war effort. I concur with him. Three years ago I was asked to comment on the extent of Taliban propaganda and ways of confronting it. I pointed out the way the Taliban circulated video by phone and the failure to combat their messaging. My comments were ignored. Three years on and nothing much has happened except that the Taliban's messages are much more coherent, more Afghans have access to social media and very few Afghans understand what foreign forces are doing in their country.
Thursday, 8 September 2011
$2 billion costs of US civilian uplift in Afghanistan
When the US decided to expand its civilian presence in Afghanistan in 2009, it had little idea of how much it would cost. Now a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been able to answer that question.
In increasing the number of US civilians from 320 in early 2009 to 1,040 by June this year, the US has spent nearly $2 billion. It costs US taxpayers between $410,000 and $570,000 to deploy one civilian employee to Afghanistan for one year and those costs will undoubtedly rise. Remarkably this is the first time any US agency has worked out how much it costs to keep civilian staff in country.
In increasing the number of US civilians from 320 in early 2009 to 1,040 by June this year, the US has spent nearly $2 billion. It costs US taxpayers between $410,000 and $570,000 to deploy one civilian employee to Afghanistan for one year and those costs will undoubtedly rise. Remarkably this is the first time any US agency has worked out how much it costs to keep civilian staff in country.
Monday, 5 September 2011
Let's make up and be friends
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| Younis al-Mauritani |
It said he was planning to target US economic interests including gas/oil pipelines, power generating dams and strike ships or oil tankers by using explosive-laden speed boats in international waters.
Some background on al-Mauritani can be found in this article, coincidentally published in today's edition of Spiegel Online.
ISPR also mentioned that the operation to arrest al-Mauritani - along with Abdul Ghaffar al-Shami (aka Bachar Chama) and Messara al-Shami (Mujahid Amino) - was "planned and conducted with technical assistance of United States intelligence agencies with whom Inter Services Intelligence has a strong, historic intelligence relationship".
True, but in recent months that relationship has been in tatters and is still an open wound. Giving the Pakistanis live information on important al-Qaeda suspects and allowing them to make all the running in the arrests would be a nice gesture, just to show that there are no hard feelings. Wouldn't it?
Friday, 2 September 2011
Thoughts on Afghanistan's endgame by Pak elite
Pakistan's policy elite believe their state has two overriding objectives in the endgame in Afghanistan, according to a new report published jointly by Pakistan's Jinnah Institute the the United States Institute of Peace.
The first is to ensure that any settlement does not lead to instability in Pakistan, particularly amongst Pashtuns; second, to ensure that the Afghan government is not antagonistic towards Pakistan and does not allow its territory to be used against Pakistani state interests - presumably a reference to alleged Indian interference in Baluchistan.
These two objectives translate into three outcomes for the government, say the authors; first the need for stability; second, a government in Kabul that adequately represents Pashtuns and - as far as some of those questioned were concerned - includes participation by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network; and third, a limit on India's activities in Afghanistan to ensure it is restricted to development work.
The report is based on interviews with 53 senior Pakistani figures, many of them former ambassadors or senior Army officers - all named - together with a sprinkling of journalists and academics.
Many of those questioned thought that US strategy in Afghanistan to be inconsistent and counter-productive to Pakistan's interests. "The most scathing criticism was targeted at the political component of the strategy, which is largely seen to be subservient to the military surge. Not many among the participants were optimistic about the prospects of the surge. While there was recognition that operations over the past year have degraded the Taliban’s capacity, virtually no one was convinced that this would force the main Taliban factions to negotiate on America’s terms", says the report.
Many participants recognised a dilemma for Pakistan over US policy in the region. While they argued that the US military presence exacerbated tensions and led to instability, they also felt an early US withdrawal would lead to added instability in Afghanistan. Most thought it was in Pakistan's interests for reconciliation talks to take place as quickly as possible, although they recognised that there could be no return to Taliban rule in the whole of Afghanistan. Good material in this report which casts light on a subject that is seldom aired.
The first is to ensure that any settlement does not lead to instability in Pakistan, particularly amongst Pashtuns; second, to ensure that the Afghan government is not antagonistic towards Pakistan and does not allow its territory to be used against Pakistani state interests - presumably a reference to alleged Indian interference in Baluchistan.
These two objectives translate into three outcomes for the government, say the authors; first the need for stability; second, a government in Kabul that adequately represents Pashtuns and - as far as some of those questioned were concerned - includes participation by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network; and third, a limit on India's activities in Afghanistan to ensure it is restricted to development work.
The report is based on interviews with 53 senior Pakistani figures, many of them former ambassadors or senior Army officers - all named - together with a sprinkling of journalists and academics.
Many of those questioned thought that US strategy in Afghanistan to be inconsistent and counter-productive to Pakistan's interests. "The most scathing criticism was targeted at the political component of the strategy, which is largely seen to be subservient to the military surge. Not many among the participants were optimistic about the prospects of the surge. While there was recognition that operations over the past year have degraded the Taliban’s capacity, virtually no one was convinced that this would force the main Taliban factions to negotiate on America’s terms", says the report.
Many participants recognised a dilemma for Pakistan over US policy in the region. While they argued that the US military presence exacerbated tensions and led to instability, they also felt an early US withdrawal would lead to added instability in Afghanistan. Most thought it was in Pakistan's interests for reconciliation talks to take place as quickly as possible, although they recognised that there could be no return to Taliban rule in the whole of Afghanistan. Good material in this report which casts light on a subject that is seldom aired.
Thursday, 1 September 2011
Very, very, very big numbers.
If you want to read where all those dollars (31 billion of them) were wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan, here is the link to the Commission on Wartime Contracting's final report to Congress. The report found that the US military has over-relied on contractors - 260,000 of them in total, sometimes outnumbering the number of regular military forces - and was "unable to provide effective management and oversight" over the $206 billion it took to pay them. Think of very big numbers, then double them lots of times and that gives you an idea of how much has gone down the Swannee.
The report also notes that between October 2001 and July 2011, 2,429 contractors were reported by their employers to have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. There were 6,131 U.S. military fatalities during the same period.
The report also notes that between October 2001 and July 2011, 2,429 contractors were reported by their employers to have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. There were 6,131 U.S. military fatalities during the same period.
Wednesday, 31 August 2011
Minister's gaffe reveals IMF audit of second Afghan bank
International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell's gaffe yesterday, when he was photographed carrying a document on Afghanistan as he left a National Security Council meeting in Downing Street, revealed that the British government was not unduly concerned about President Karzai leaving office in 2014.
However, less coverage was given to another point in the document's final paragraph, which reveals that there is substance to rumours that a second Afghan bank - after Kabul Bank - may be facing financial problems. This probably refers to Azizi Bank, the country's second largest financial institution, which is thought to face a shortfall of funds and for which the IMF has demanded an audit.
Below, so far as is possible, are the actual words that can be read on the document. Where Mr Mitchell's hand obscures the words, I have suggested likely candidates (in brackets).
The document itself is headed 'Protect.Policy', presumably a reference to the government's CONTEST programme for countering international terrorism, which contains four strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare.
"Protect Policy
Agenda item 1: Northern Ireland update
No DFID points to make
Agenda Item 2: Afghanistan Update
Points to make: We have been encouraged by the progress made by the Government of Afghanistan in recent weeks to meet IMF requirements. An IMF (team) is planning to visit Afghanistan in September to resume negotiations. We are hopeful that the Government will have demonstrated sufficient progress towards credible reforms of the financial sector, and actions to address the Kabul Bank fraud, so that a new programme can be agreed over the Autumn.
* The World Bank have told us that the suspension of UK and other donor funds to the Afghan Government will soon begin to destabilise actions essential to successful transition. To guard against this I have (agreed)....to fund critical interventions in the ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) investment Window (for x months) while negotiations on the new programme are (continuing. This)..... does not change our suspension of support to the Government .....costs to ensure .... leverage during IMF negotiations.
* Note that Karzai has publicly stated his intention to step down at the end of his second term as per the constitution. This is very important. It improves Afghanistan's political prospects very significantly. We should welcome Karzai's announcement in private and in public.
*(on Vice-CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) presentation). Afghan perceptions of violence are very important for their confidence in their future and for their readiness to work for the Afghan government. Have we got the strategic communications on levels of violence right?
Background
IMF programme: Although the critical reforms to the banking sector are not yet complete, we have been encouraged by the actions of the Afghanistan Government in recent weeks - for example in commencing the forensic audit on the second bank at risk. The IMF is planning to visit Afghanistan in September to take negotiations forward and we are hopeful that there will be evidence of sufficient progress from the Afghan Government to submit a new programme to the IMF board in the autumn. We are continuing to work closely with both sides for resolution."
However, less coverage was given to another point in the document's final paragraph, which reveals that there is substance to rumours that a second Afghan bank - after Kabul Bank - may be facing financial problems. This probably refers to Azizi Bank, the country's second largest financial institution, which is thought to face a shortfall of funds and for which the IMF has demanded an audit.
Below, so far as is possible, are the actual words that can be read on the document. Where Mr Mitchell's hand obscures the words, I have suggested likely candidates (in brackets).
The document itself is headed 'Protect.Policy', presumably a reference to the government's CONTEST programme for countering international terrorism, which contains four strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare.
"Protect Policy
Agenda item 1: Northern Ireland update
No DFID points to make
Agenda Item 2: Afghanistan Update
Points to make: We have been encouraged by the progress made by the Government of Afghanistan in recent weeks to meet IMF requirements. An IMF (team) is planning to visit Afghanistan in September to resume negotiations. We are hopeful that the Government will have demonstrated sufficient progress towards credible reforms of the financial sector, and actions to address the Kabul Bank fraud, so that a new programme can be agreed over the Autumn.
* The World Bank have told us that the suspension of UK and other donor funds to the Afghan Government will soon begin to destabilise actions essential to successful transition. To guard against this I have (agreed)....to fund critical interventions in the ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) investment Window (for x months) while negotiations on the new programme are (continuing. This)..... does not change our suspension of support to the Government .....costs to ensure .... leverage during IMF negotiations.
* Note that Karzai has publicly stated his intention to step down at the end of his second term as per the constitution. This is very important. It improves Afghanistan's political prospects very significantly. We should welcome Karzai's announcement in private and in public.
*(on Vice-CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) presentation). Afghan perceptions of violence are very important for their confidence in their future and for their readiness to work for the Afghan government. Have we got the strategic communications on levels of violence right?
Background
IMF programme: Although the critical reforms to the banking sector are not yet complete, we have been encouraged by the actions of the Afghanistan Government in recent weeks - for example in commencing the forensic audit on the second bank at risk. The IMF is planning to visit Afghanistan in September to take negotiations forward and we are hopeful that there will be evidence of sufficient progress from the Afghan Government to submit a new programme to the IMF board in the autumn. We are continuing to work closely with both sides for resolution."
Thursday, 18 August 2011
Understanding the Pak Army offensive in Kurram
A timely report from Jeffrey Dressler at the Institute for the Study of War on the Pakistan Army's current offensive in Kurram in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) says that the insurgency in Afghanistan's Eastern region is likely to benefit from the action.
Dressler explains that the action is aimed at curbing the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose supporters have been involved in the capture and murder of Shias living in the region, while giving more freedom to the Haqqani network to launch attacks into Afghanistan.
The Shias live in parts of Kurram that control access to Afghanistan, which explains why the Haqqani network - which is strongly supported by the Pakistani military - spent months negotiating a peace agreement with them so that the Shias could travel safely through surrounding Sunni areas - in exchange for transit rights for Haqqani fighters to Afghanistan. Unlike the TTP, which directs much of its activities towards the Pakistani state, the Haqqanis are oriented towards fighting in Afghanistan and rely heavily on the Pakistani Army and ISI for political and financial support. Their agreement with the Shias was put in jeopardy by the actions of local TTP commanders who continued to target Shias for purely sectarian reasons.
Dressler points out that the Pakistani military action is targeting only selected pockets of militants, while groups that have recently declared a truce with the Pakistani military or are aligned with elements of the security establishment are allowed room to expand. These include, for example, Fazal Saeed's group. Saeed - who has added the name Haqqani to his own - announced in June that he was defecting from the TTP and setting up a new organisation - see my report on this development here. He denounced the TTP for using suicide bombers to attack "mosques, markets and other civilian targets" and said he was redirecting his followers to cross the border and fight in Afghanistan.
Dressler makes it clear that the Pakistani military has little interest in curbing militancy in the region. It is simply taking on those elements of the TTP that have turned on their former mentors, solely in order to strengthen the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Dressler explains that the action is aimed at curbing the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose supporters have been involved in the capture and murder of Shias living in the region, while giving more freedom to the Haqqani network to launch attacks into Afghanistan.
The Shias live in parts of Kurram that control access to Afghanistan, which explains why the Haqqani network - which is strongly supported by the Pakistani military - spent months negotiating a peace agreement with them so that the Shias could travel safely through surrounding Sunni areas - in exchange for transit rights for Haqqani fighters to Afghanistan. Unlike the TTP, which directs much of its activities towards the Pakistani state, the Haqqanis are oriented towards fighting in Afghanistan and rely heavily on the Pakistani Army and ISI for political and financial support. Their agreement with the Shias was put in jeopardy by the actions of local TTP commanders who continued to target Shias for purely sectarian reasons.
Dressler points out that the Pakistani military action is targeting only selected pockets of militants, while groups that have recently declared a truce with the Pakistani military or are aligned with elements of the security establishment are allowed room to expand. These include, for example, Fazal Saeed's group. Saeed - who has added the name Haqqani to his own - announced in June that he was defecting from the TTP and setting up a new organisation - see my report on this development here. He denounced the TTP for using suicide bombers to attack "mosques, markets and other civilian targets" and said he was redirecting his followers to cross the border and fight in Afghanistan.
Dressler makes it clear that the Pakistani military has little interest in curbing militancy in the region. It is simply taking on those elements of the TTP that have turned on their former mentors, solely in order to strengthen the insurgency in Afghanistan.
RAND's plans for Afghan peace talks
A new report, Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer, from the RAND Corporation says that the Washington should help to appoint a figure of international repute "with the requisite impartiality, knowledge, contacts, and diplomatic skills" to take charge of putting together and then orchestrating a negotiation process with the Taliban. Afghans should be at the centre of this process, but with several concentric rings of regional and other interested governments on the periphery.
Authors James Shinn and James Dobbins point out the paradox that America's chance of getting an acceptable agreement depends on it not needing one: "Only if Washington has an acceptable non-negotiated outcome in prospect will American diplomats have much chance of securing their negotiating objectives", they say. US diplomats should prepare for two futures: one negotiated, one not. And both aimed at preventing an al-Qaeda-linked regime coming to power in the country.
If negotiations fail, American military engagement will extend well beyond 2014. However, a promise to leave by an agreed date may be the carrot that will persuade the Taliban to enter meaningful negotiations.
The report also suggests that a UN peacekeeping force might be the best way to police any negotiated settlement in order to "set a high threshold for evasion by any party of its undertakings." It says that, as in Iraq, the US must:
include former insurgents in an enlarged coalition government;
promise to 'go home';
remain heaving engaged in the implementation of whatever accord is finally reached.
The authors say that the US should seek a UN-endorsed facilitator to promote agreement between the various parties, and that Bonn - or Geneva - would be a good location for peace talks. Doha is suggested as another possible location. "We recommend that only the Afghan parties take formal part in the core negotiations over their country’s future but that all of the major external stakeholders, including India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, conduct parallel, less formal discussions with a view to exercising convergent influence on the Afghan parties."
Not a lot new here, but coherent and well argued.
Authors James Shinn and James Dobbins point out the paradox that America's chance of getting an acceptable agreement depends on it not needing one: "Only if Washington has an acceptable non-negotiated outcome in prospect will American diplomats have much chance of securing their negotiating objectives", they say. US diplomats should prepare for two futures: one negotiated, one not. And both aimed at preventing an al-Qaeda-linked regime coming to power in the country.
If negotiations fail, American military engagement will extend well beyond 2014. However, a promise to leave by an agreed date may be the carrot that will persuade the Taliban to enter meaningful negotiations.
The report also suggests that a UN peacekeeping force might be the best way to police any negotiated settlement in order to "set a high threshold for evasion by any party of its undertakings." It says that, as in Iraq, the US must:
include former insurgents in an enlarged coalition government;
promise to 'go home';
remain heaving engaged in the implementation of whatever accord is finally reached.
The authors say that the US should seek a UN-endorsed facilitator to promote agreement between the various parties, and that Bonn - or Geneva - would be a good location for peace talks. Doha is suggested as another possible location. "We recommend that only the Afghan parties take formal part in the core negotiations over their country’s future but that all of the major external stakeholders, including India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, conduct parallel, less formal discussions with a view to exercising convergent influence on the Afghan parties."
Not a lot new here, but coherent and well argued.
Taliban falls out with influential Noorzai tribe
An interesting article by Ron Moreau of Newsweek, published on the Daily Beast website, notes that the Noorzai tribe has fallen out with the Taliban leadership over the question of money. The tribe has taken exception to the demands from the Taliban's Quetta Shura leadership that all money raised locally should pass through the centre before being distributed to regional areas.
The Noorzai are a force to be reckoned with in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 4.5 million members of the tribe inhabit a large part of the south of Afghanistan, with significant groups in Kandahar, Kabul, Farah, Helmand, Herat and Nimroz. Eighty per cent of the population of Farah is from the Noorzai tribe while 42 per cent of the population of Helmand is Noorzai, who live in Washer, Gereshk, Garamser and Lashkar Gah. Another million live over the southern border in Baluchistan.
The dispute centres on Maulvi Habibullah, a prominent member of the Noorzai tribe. As head of a big madrassa in the largely Afghan town of Gardi Jungal in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, Habibullah is an influential pro-Taliban leader among the Afghans who live along the frontier and a major fundraiser for another Noorzai leader, Mullah Baz Mohammad, a powerful Taliban commander in the western Farah Province.
Habibullah's decision to send money to Mohammad without reference to the Quetta Shura upset Maulvi Ismael, the Taliban's military commander, who took Maulvi Habibullah prisoner. When Mullah Baz Mohammad heard about this he promptly organised the kidnapping of Maulvi Ismael, who was not released until Habibullah was freed.
At the end of all these shenanigans, says Moreau, "the incident has embarrassed the Quetta Shura’s leadership and humiliated its military council’s chief." It has also led to serious tensions between the Noorzai and the Taliban leadership which will not easily be swept under the carpet. Somewhere in the background of all this is the growing realisation amongst many Afghans that the insurgency is deteriorating into a warlord-led free-for-all, prompting memories of the terrible period in the early 90s. Then, Afghan turned on Afghan and much of Kabul was destroyed. The Afghan tribes have always proved to be the undoing of wannabe rulers of the country. Once again it looks like the same old same old.
Monday, 8 August 2011
Insider's account of bin Laden raid
Nicholas Schmidle has written a very detailed account for New Yorker magazine of the US Navy SEALs raid on Abbottabad in Pakistan in which Osama bin Laden was killed on the night of 1-2 May. His largely uncritical account includes some interesting details, including the fact that this was not the first time that the SEALs had crossed the border into Pakistan from Afghanistan. In fact, he says, they "had surreptitiously entered the country on ten to twelve previous occasions", mostly into north or south Waziristan, as they attempted to capture/kill bin Laden - who was known to the Joint Special Operations Command by the codename 'Crankshaft'.
How did Schmidle - who was expelled from Pakistan in 2008 without explanation - get such incredible access to both planners and participants, allowing him to write this insider's account of the raid? The fact that his father is Richard Schmidle, a lieutenant general in US Special Operations and now deputy commander for US Cyber Command, probably helped.
How did Schmidle - who was expelled from Pakistan in 2008 without explanation - get such incredible access to both planners and participants, allowing him to write this insider's account of the raid? The fact that his father is Richard Schmidle, a lieutenant general in US Special Operations and now deputy commander for US Cyber Command, probably helped.
Sunday, 7 August 2011
Excellent explanation of Pakistan-US tensions
The clearest explanation I have read so far of the spat between Pakistan and the USA, written by Sebastian Abbot, Kathy Gannon and Kimberly Dozier and published by AP last Wednesday, was followed only by the Washington Times and Pakistan's Dawn newspaper.
It reveals that the US Ambassador to Islamabad phoned Washington in an urgent attempt to get the CIA to call off a drone strike on 17 March, the day following the release of CIA contractor Raymond Davies. Cameron Munter believed the attack would further inflame already strained ties with Islamabad.
In the event the attack was approved by CIA director Leon Panetta , resulting in the death of around 40 people. The CIA said they were all militants, but strong evidence from the region suggests a local jirga, set up to discuss a mining dispute, was attacked.
Other attacks followed, many of which seemed timed to cause maximum embarrassment to both countries.
As predicted, relations deteriorated very rapidly and were only set back on course again recently with the removal of the second Pakistan CIA station chief within six months. An excellent article.
It reveals that the US Ambassador to Islamabad phoned Washington in an urgent attempt to get the CIA to call off a drone strike on 17 March, the day following the release of CIA contractor Raymond Davies. Cameron Munter believed the attack would further inflame already strained ties with Islamabad.
In the event the attack was approved by CIA director Leon Panetta , resulting in the death of around 40 people. The CIA said they were all militants, but strong evidence from the region suggests a local jirga, set up to discuss a mining dispute, was attacked.
Other attacks followed, many of which seemed timed to cause maximum embarrassment to both countries.
As predicted, relations deteriorated very rapidly and were only set back on course again recently with the removal of the second Pakistan CIA station chief within six months. An excellent article.
Wednesday, 3 August 2011
Abdullah Anas to represent High Peace Council in Europe - report
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| Abdullah Anas |
They say Burhanuddin Rabbani, former Afghan president and currently leader of the 67-member High Peace Council, has told associates on the council that he wants to hire Anas.
Anas, who fought against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, is the son-in-law of Abdullah Azzam, the renowned Palestinian theorist of jihad who formed the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) organisation in Peshawar, which became the main organising centre for Arabs fighting against the Soviets. Azzam was murdered in Peshawar in 1989, along with two of his sons.
Anas, who is Algerian by birth, but who has British nationality, also worked for MAK alongside Osama bin Laden and other Arabs, but fell out with him when bin Laden decided to form al-Qaeda. Anas formed a close relationship with Ahmad Shah Massoud during the anti-Soviet jihad and has retained strong links with his family and other figures in the Panjshir Valley. It is also rumoured that he has played a behind-the-scenes role in recent attempts to negotiate with the Taliban. More on this soon.
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