Tuesday, 9 June 2009

Growing opium poppies - but not in Afghanistan



My picture, taken today, shows large fields of opium poppies (papaver somniferum), which are the principal crop of southern Afghanistan and the source of 90 per cent of the world’s heroin. But this picture was not taken in Helmand, the main opium-growing region. It was not even taken in Afghanistan. What about Turkey or Burma? No. Give up?

The astonishing truth is that this picture was taken in Oxfordshire in the south of England. Faced with a growing shortage of morphine and codeine for medicine, the UK’s Home Office has granted the pharmaceutical company Macfarlan Smith, a world leader in the production of alkaloid opiates, a licence to harvest poppies in Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire. Hundreds of acres are now under cultivation. The company then processes the poppies into pain-killing drugs for use by doctors all over the country.

Nor is Britain the only country that is experiencing a massive shortage of poppy-derived morphine. There are shortages in many parts of the world.

Why then are we destroying opium fields in Afghanistan? A good question, particularly as this week it is being reported that there is a growing recognition that Afghanistan’s counter-narcotic strategy is failing. Two weeks ago the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen told the US Senate that the international community was losing the battle against opium production in Afghanistan. Mullen said foreign forces in Afghanistan need to do more than simply fight Taliban militants who are paid by criminal groups to protect opium crops.

And last week it was announced that UN officials in Afghanistan are attempting to create a 'flood of drugs' in the country intended to destroy the value of opium and force poppy farmers to switch to legal crops such as wheat.

After the failure to destroy poppies in Afghanistan's volatile south, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime says the answer is to stop the drugs from leaving the country in the first place. The have realised that manual eradication is inefficient and instead propose flooding the country with cheap opium. Last year the Afghan government succeeded in destroying only 3.5% of Afghanistan's 157,000 hectares of poppy because eradication teams were either attacked or bought off by local drug lords.

The ‘flooding’ option has clearly not been thought through and will probably result in thousands more opium/heroin addicts in Afghanistan.

What about encouraging poppy production in order to satisfy the world market for morphine? The Senlis Council proposed this strategy some time ago in its report Poppy for Medicine. Despite receiving backing from the European Parliament, nothing much more has happened. Perhaps it is an idea whose time has now come?

Thursday, 4 June 2009

Taliban uses cartoon character to tell the news

Just come across this on YouTube. The cartoon guy, ('Dickie') reads out the usual list of highly imaginative battle reports from the Taliban. The words he uses are taken directly from the communiques issued on the official Taliban website. This is the second such broadcast. The first was released on 25 May. They are made by someone called 'resistz2exist'. No idea where this person is based. Other videos from the same source are all pro-Taliban. Remarkable though that someone close to the Taliban has the technical expertise to produce this kind of material. My guess is that the voice is synthesised, although comments on that point would be welcomed. Don't let anyone tell you that the Taliban are a bunch of unsophisticated tribals living in caves. This little production, which is only a few days old, took both skill and money.

Wednesday, 3 June 2009

UN special rapporteur on military crimes

Last week the Human Rights Council of the United Nations published a report by Philip Alston, its special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Alston’s subject was a mission he undertook to the United States earlier this year.

As with the Amnesty International report mentioned below, the report makes harrowing reading. Leaving aside Alston’s comments on the judicial system within the United States and at Guantanamo Bay, he takes the military and judicial authorities in America to task for their failures to protect human rights in Afghanistan or Iraq.

“It is noteworthy,” says Alston, “that ‘command responsibility,’ a basis for criminal liability recognized since the trials after World War II, is absent both from the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the War Crimes Act. It appears that no U.S. officer above the rank of major has ever been prosecuted for the wrongful actions of the personnel under his or her command. Instead, in some instances, commanders have exercised their discretion to lessen the punishment of subordinates for wrongful conduct that resulted in a custodial death.”

Alston says there has been a “zone of de facto impunity” for private contractors and civilian intelligence agents operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, not through a lack of law, but through an unwillingness of prosecutors to prosecute. He adds: “Prosecutors have also failed, even years after alleged wrongful deaths, to disclose the status of their investigations or the bases for decisions not to prosecute. One well-informed source succinctly described the situation: “The DOJ has been AWOL in response to these incidents.” “

He gives as an example the August 2002 shooting to death of Afghan national Mohammad Sayari. The army investigation into Sayari’s death recommended charges including conspiracy and murder against four members of a Special Forces unit. In fact, the commanding officer dropped all charges and issued only a written reprimand of a captain who had ordered his subordinates to destroy evidence.

The best way to end these abuses, says Alston, is to create a commission of inquiry tasked with carrying out independent, systematic and sustained investigation of policies and practices that lead to deaths and other abuses. He also recommends the appointment of a ‘Director of Military Prosecutions’ who would be independent of the chain of command.

The final section of Alston’s report deals with the legal basis for ‘targeted killings’ – in particular the use of missiles fired from drones that often kill innocent civilians.

Alston says he has asked on several occasions for details of the legal basis for these attacks. He says the US government has been evasive in its answer, telling him the answer lies outside his remit. The best he can ascertain is the fact that in September 2001 President Bush signed a ‘presidential finding’ pursuant to the authority of which the CIA developed the concept of “high-value targets” for whom “kill, capture or detain” orders could be issued in consultation with lawyers in DOJ, CIA, and the administration.

However, that leaves many questions, not least on whether or not it is legal to carry out such attacks in a country such as Pakistan with which the USA is not at war.

Alston’s report makes depressing reading. It shows that for all the talk about freedom and democracy, the US pays little heed to these values in the way it deals with the crimes and errors of an admitted tiny minority.

Tuesday, 2 June 2009

US Army tweets in Afghanistan

The US Army has decided to start using new media to keep the public informed of its activities in Afghanistan. As of this morning, you can now follow the latest developments on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Not sure what the policy is on Twitter. Former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General McKiernan's farewell speech in Kabul today gets four tweets, but no mention so far of the four US soldiers reported killed by IEDs in Wardak yesterday.

Monday, 1 June 2009

Could the Taliban be much worse?


If it were any other country, we would be calling for boycotts and protesting outside embassies across the world at the activities of President Karzai’s regime in Kabul. The publication of Amnesty International’s annual report on the country is both shocking and shameful.

Its summary is uncompromising: “Millions of people living in southern and eastern Afghanistan, terrorized by the Taleban, other insurgent groups and local militias ostensibly allied with the government, suffered insecurity that further restricted their already limited access to food, health care, and schooling. Indiscriminate attacks, abductions and the targeting of civilians reached unprecedented levels. The Taleban and other anti-government groups significantly expanded their attacks to cover more than a third of the country, including areas once considered relatively safe in the centre and the north. Increased military attacks between anti-government groups and US and NATO troops resulted in more than 2,000 civilian deaths. The government failed to maintain the rule of law or to provide basic services to millions of people even in areas under its control.”

The catalogue of human rights abuses is endless: a ministry of justice that refused to cooperate with the country’s human rights commission; trials for former Guantanamo prisoners that “failed to meet national or international fair trial standards”; failure to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses; the state execution of 17 people in 2008 and the upholding of 131 death sentences; the lack of a systematic programme for assisting those injured by Afghan and international military forces; the decision by NATO and US forces to continue to hand over detainees to Afghanistan’s NDS intelligence service, which is known to perpetrate human rights violations including torture and arbitrary detention.

Then there is the intimidation, both by the government and the Taliban, of journalists, several of whom have been killed or injured. In one particular notorious incident, in September 2008, Ahmad Ghous Zalmai, a journalist and former spokesperson for the Attorney General, and Mullah Qari Mushtaq were each sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for publishing a Dari translation of the Qur’an without the Arabic text alongside.

There are other serious human rights abuses, including the killing of civilians, both by the Taliban and by Coalition and Afghan government forces. There is little oversight of private military contractors. Several hundred thousand people in Afghanistan are internal refugees. Many women and girls are denied the right to education.

Where does this leave us morally? Looking at it logically, in the name of democracy we are spending billions of dollars propping up a backward, repressive, religiously conservative government. Perhaps you can live with that, but do you really think that the Taliban could be much worse?

A snaphot of the war in Afghanistan


I make no apologies for recommending a book by my friend and former colleague Stephen Grey. Operation Snakebite: The explosive true story of an Afghan desert siege tells the story of the attempt by British and other forces to liberate the Taliban stronghold of Musa Qala in Helmand Province in December 2007. It was to become the biggest operation conducted by the British in Afghanistan for more than a century.
He says the book is “neither an official nor a comprehensive or definitive account of the war in Afghanistan. It is an attempt to look in detail at one small snapshot of a modern counter-insurgency action through the eyes and ears of a few key individuals, both in command and on the front line.”
There is no end to military books on Afghanistan. Journalists, aid workers, former soldiers have all done their best to give a sense of what it is like to be a frontline soldier in this most inhospitable of wars. Most fail miserably, mainly because their writers have very little insight.
Stephen’s book is different. It describes events over just a few days and successfully combines a narrative of what happened and what it was like for the soldiers on the ground with a detailed and fascinating account of the power politics in Kabul and elsewhere that informed these events. He interviewed more than 200 people, from lowly private soldiers up to the chief of the General Staff and including diplomats, spies and everyone in between.
“I soon discovered the real story of the Battle of Musa Qala,” Stephen writes, “and the events leading up to it, had all the dimensions of a thriller – courage, love and betrayal, intrigues at the palace in Kabul, tension between friends, assassination and intelligence blunders and occasionally high farce.”
What also comes across is the picture of a very complex battlefield. In the same terrain, there are NATO soldiers from different countries, including Americans, then American soldiers who are not part of NATO, but are operating independently as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as US Marines, British Royal Marines, special forces units from all of the above, CIA, MI6 and other intelligence operatives, Afghan National Army soldiers and many others.
If you want to know how the war in Afghanistan is being fought today and to understand something of what is meant by asymmetric warfare, I strongly urge you to read this book.

Tuesday, 26 May 2009

Your money. Safe in their hands?

When the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued its first report last week, it noted that the military command overseeing $15bn in US military aid cannot be sure the money is being managed effectively.
In fact, the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is not based in Afghanistan at all, but in Maryland - nine time zones away. At the time of the inspection, four months ago, the CSTC-A had no-one working in Afghanistan and just one technical representative (from another company) actually located in Afghanistan.
In other words, as was the case in Iraq, when billions of dollars were left unaccounted for, no-one appears to be watching out for the US taxpayer. Huge contracts are being let with little supervision.
To make the point clearly, the Special Inspector decided to look at one contract in particular - a $404 million contract to an unnamed company to train the Afghan Army. This is what their report says:

"We found that assigning one contracting officer's representative in the field did not provide the degree of oversight that is needed to ensure that funds are used as intended. The person assigned this duty has limited contracting experience and is on a six-month assignment to Afghanistan. According to CSTC-A, this person has taken the required contractor officer's representative training, but CSTC-A acknowledged that additional training is needed. This assigned contracting officer's representative told us that visits to training sites are not performed; therefore contractor performance is not effectively monitored. Because of other duties, this official does not have time to make field visits. In addition, because some of the training sites are located far from Kabul, availability of transportation resources is also a factor that makes it difficult to perform field visits to oversee contractor performance."

It did not take long to find out that the unnamed company in receipt of an unsupervised mult-million dollar contract was Military Professional Resources Inc (MPRI), a Virginia-based company formed in 1987 by eight former senior military officers, including former Army Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono. Today it has more than 3,000 employees in 40 countries. In 2000 it was taken over by defence contracting giant L3 Communications.
MPRI is no stranger to controversy. In 2004 The Center for Public Integrity revealed that MPRI wrote the Pentagon manual for contractors on the battlefield. They noted:
"Since 1997, Military Professional Resources Inc., which has two contracts worth a total of $2.6 million related to reconstruction in Iraq, has also produced Field Manual 100-21, also known as Contractors on the Battlefield. The manual "established a doctrinal basis directed towards acquiring and managing contractors as an additional resource in support of the full range of military operations", according to the company's website."
In the same year MPRI was hired by the Pentagon to work with the armed forces and national police in Colombia to teach them psychological operations, training, logistics, intelligence and personnel management. After a year Colombian defence officials denounced them as useless, noting that no-one on the company's staff spoke Spanish. The contract was not renewed, although the Pentagon publicly backed the company.
Further information on MPRI, particularly that related to Operation Storm in Croatia in August 1995, where the company was accused of having trained Croatian soldiers who carried out one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing during the Balkan War, can easily be found on the internet.
Why is the military unable to supervise its own contractors? Answers on the back of a dollar bill, please.